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Towards a Hybrid Regulatory Scheme
for the Internet
Henry H. Perritt, Jr.t
Private regulation of the internet enjoys important advan-
tages over traditional public regulation. Significant among them
is reducing uncertainty regarding jurisdiction and choice of law
for internet disputes that cross national boundaries. But private
regulation also involves important disadvantages-failure to re-
spect deeply held local or national values, insufficient protection
of consumers, tendency to encourage havens for conduct repre-
hensible to political entities, and imposition of rules that are ar-
bitrary or which inappropriately limit competition. Hybrid regu-
lation-the combination of broad public law frameworks within
which private regulatory regimes work out the details-is a
promising way to realize the advantages of private regulation
while mitigating the disadvantages.
It is time to synthesize from prototypes of hybrid regulation,
such as the Internet Corporation For Assigned Names and Num-
bers ("ICANN"), credit card chargebacks, the European Commis-
sionlUnited States Privacy Safe Harbor Principles, and the Chil-
dren's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 ("COPPA"), some
general concepts for the relationship between public law frame-
works and private regulatory regimes. Especially important are
mechanisms for assuring accountability of private rulemaking in
contexts where technology makes the rules self-enforcing.
In developing these concepts, one should distinguish among
four situations in which private rulemaking and dispute resolu-
tion occur: situations in which public institutions delegate or de-
fer to private institutions; situations in which all parties actually
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consent and waive their power to resort to public institutions;
situations in which affected parties are so satisfied with private
rules and their applications, after the fact, that they do not seek
involvement by public institutions; and situations in which pri-
vate institutions control important assets.
In three of these situations, the public law framework to
guide private regulation already exists. Delegating or deferring
agencies can condition delegation or deferral on certain behavior
by private entities. Consenting parties can channel private regu-
lation through contract law. Parties acquiescing after the fact can
withhold their acquiescence. The foremost challenge relates to
the situation in which private entities have the power to make
and enforce rules because they control important assets. Here the
linkage between public and private law is obscure, but the argu-
ments in favor of governmental abstention over private exercise
of property rights are strongest. The law needs mechanisms of
accountability to protect access to important resources, while also
limiting intrusion into property owner prerogatives.
Criteria for private governance must include standards for
determining real consent-and thus activating a contractual ma-
trix for private regulation. When consent is not the legitimating
engine of private governance, public legal institutions must spec-
ify criteria entitling private regulatory regimes to deference or
immunity, and conversely apply standards for civil liability. For
private regulatory regimes with direct effect-exercise of private
power to exclude persons from desirable resources-private rights
of action must allow challenges to impermissible private regula-
tory decisions. The content of these rights of action should reflect
public concerns.
This Article reviews, in Part I, the advantages of private
regulation; considers the growing literature that raises questions
about conflicts between private regulation and democratic values;
suggests that private regulation occupies four distinct positions
vis-a-vis overarching legal systems; and explores how overarching
legal systems can limit private regulation, potentially making it
more accountable, in conjunction with private rulemaking, adju-
dication, and enforcement. Then, in Part II, the Article examines
private rights of action that might enable persons injured by pri-
vate regulatory activity to obtain review in the courts, and con-
siders the standards of accountability that those courts might
impose on private regulators.
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The Article concludes that the greatest need for new legal
doctrine to assure accountability of private regulators exists
when the power to regulate privately arises from control of valu-
able resources, especially when private regulators use computer
code to block access to major segments of the internet. In that
situation, neither administrative law nor contract law provides a
clear pathway to judicial review. An extension of traditional tort
theories of public nuisance, intentional interference with contrac-
tual relations, or a relaxation of some of the limitations on anti-
trust scrutiny are necessary to assure accountability of private
regulation in this context.
I. PRIVATE REGULATION OF THE INTERNET ENJOYS SOME
IMPORTANT ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OVER
TRADITIONAL REGULATION BY PUBLIC AGENCIES
A. Benefits of Private Regulation
The advantages of private regulation of the internet have
been reviewed in the literature.' David Post expresses enthusi-
asm for private regulation thus:
Fundamental values are indeed at stake in the construc-
tion of [ciyberspace, but those values can best be protected
by allowing the widest possible scope for uncoordinated
and uncoerced individual choice among different values
and among different embodiments of those values. We
1 See, for example, Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Cyberspace Self-Government: Town Hall
Democracy or Rediscovered Royalism?, 12 Berkeley Tech L J 413, 420-24 (1997) (noting
that private regulation of the internet is desirable because self governance may be more
efficient, networks need different rules and procedures, open networks escape enforcement
of conventional rules, and self governance promotes voluntary compliance); David G. Post,
What Larry Doesn't Get: Code, Law, and Liberty in Cyberspace, 52 Stan L Rev 1439, 1458
(2000) (noting that some policies "best emerge not through politics and political processes,
but as the aggregate outcome of uncoerced individual decisions"); David R. Johnson and
David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 Stan L Rev 1367, 1367
(1996) (arguing that cyberspace needs its own law and legal institutions and that "estab-
lished territorial authorities" may defer to the "self-regulatory efforts of Cyberspace par-
ticipants" whose rules will "play the role of law by defining legal personhood and property,
resolving disputes, and crystallizing a collective conversation about online participants
core values"); Harold I. Abramson, A Fifth Branch of Government: The Private Regulators
and their Constitutionality, 16 Hastings Const L Q 165, 196 n 70 (1989) (noting that pri-
vate regulation may enable more democratic decisionmaking than comparable action by
public regulators; private regulation may provide greater opportunity for affected parties
to participate; private regulation enables Congress to expand resources for regulation;
private regulation may enable "interim" regulation of aspects of the marketplace when
insufficient consensus exists for public regulation).
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don't need "a plan" but a multitude of plans from among
which individuals can choose, and "the market," and not
action by the global collective, is most likely to bring that
plenitude to us.2
Post and his sometime collaborator David R. Johnson are the
most prominent advocates of self regulation.' But other advocates
exist as well. The former Chairman of the Federal Trade Com-
mission, Robert Pitofsky, enumerated the following benefits of
industry self regulation in 1998: self-regulatory groups may es-
tablish product standards that assure safety; private standard
setting can lower the cost of production; private regulation helps
consumers evaluate products and services; self regulation may
deter conduct that is universally considered undesirable but out-
side the purview of civil or criminal law; self regulation is more
prompt, flexible and effective than government regulation.4
Neil Weinstock Netanel has classified the arguments for self
regulation.' He explains that the arguments by supporters of pri-
vate regulation fall into three categories: Cyberpopulism, Cy-
bersyndicalism, and Cyberanarchy. Cyberpopulists argue that
self governance through the internet more fully realizes the ide-
2 Post, 52 Stan L Rev at 1440 (cited in note 1).
3 See Johnson and Post, 48 Stan L Rev at 1397 (cited in note 1) ("Cyberspace may be
an important forum for the development of new connections between individuals and
mechanisms of self governance by which individuals attain a sense of community."). See
also David R. Johnson and David G. Post, "Chaos Prevailing on Every Continent": Towards
a New Theory of Decentralized Decision-Making in Complex Systems, 73 Chi Kent L Rev
1055, 1087 (1998) (suggesting that the internet calls for deference to rulemaking within
"a-geographical, decentralized, voluntary associations").
4 Robert Pitofsky, Self Regulation and Antitrust, remarks prepared for Washington
D.C. Bar Association Symposium (Feb 18, 1998), available online at <http://www.ftc.gov/
opa/1998/9802/selfreg.htm> (visited Oct 30, 2001). And former General Counsel of the
Federal Trade Commission, Debra A. Valentine, extolled self regulation as often being
quicker, more flexible, less adversarial and therefore less burdensome than governmental
regulation, enabling government to devote scarce resources to higher priority matters,
capable of achieving rapidly a high degree of compliance because of the power of self-
regulatory bodies to repudiate and reward, and the possibility of addressing a problem
more capably than could a government agency because of "hands on" experience by self
regulators. See Debra A. Valentine, Industry Self Regulation and Antitrust Enforcement:
An Evolving Relationship, remarks prepared for the Arison School of Business and the
Israeli Antitrust Authority Seminar on New Developments in Antitrust § II (May 24,
1998), available online at <http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/dvisraelspeech.htm> (visited
Feb 3, 2001) [all internet materials cited in this note on file with U Chi Legal F).
5 Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace Self-Governance: A Skeptical View from Lib-
eral Democratic Theory, 88 Cal L Rev 395, 497-98 (2000).
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als of liberal democracy than traditional government.' Cybersyn-
dicalists argue that internet-based groups are more effective than
public institutions in determining and applying norms of those
affected by their application.7 Cyberanarchists argue that tradi-
tional public institutions cannot be effective in regulating cyber-
space.8
Important among the practical advantages of private regula-
tion is reduced uncertainty regarding jurisdiction and choice of
law for internet disputes that cross national boundaries. Conflict
of law rules for contract disputes long have recognized that par-
ticipants in a contractual relationship can anticipate and resolve
jurisdictional issues through choice of law and forum selection
clauses Thus, when consent forms the foundation of self regula-
6 See id at 414 (noting that cyberpopulists consider representative government a
.second-rate democracy," and that internet users "are able to gain a far more informed
understanding").
7 See id at 428 (noting that cybersyndicalists see the "local cultures" of the internet-
epitomized by chat room and Usenet groups-as the "site of a political order highly reflec-
tive of consensual governance and individual liberty").
8 See id at 443 (pointing out that there "is little room for state created law" in cyber-
space, where users can "determine and modify entitlements to suit their local needs").
9 See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 186 (1971) ("Applicable Law"). See
also id at § 187 ("Law of the State Chosen by the Parties"); id at § 188 ("Law Governing in
Absence of Effective Choice by Parties"); 1980 Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to
Contractual Obligations (consolidated version), 498Y0126(03), Official Journal C 027 at
34-46 (Jan 1, 1998), available online at <http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/lif/dat/1998/
en_498Y0126_03.html> (visited Feb 3, 2001) [on file with the U Chi Legal F (European
Union convention providing choice of law rules for contract disputes and preferring party
choice-of-law clauses); Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations Rome Convention Art 11(2) ("Rome Conven-
tion") (Oct 26, 1961), available online at <http://www.wipo.org/treaties/iprome/rome.
html> (visited Feb 23, 2001) [on file with the U Chi Legal F]:
2. (1) If broadcasting was consented to by the performers, it shall be a
matter for the domestic law of the Contracting State where protection
is claimed to regulate the protection against rebroadcasting, fixation
for broadcasting purposes and the reproduction of such fixation for
broadcasting purposes. (2) The terms and conditions governing the
use by broadcasting organisations of fixations made for broadcasting
purposes shall be determined in accordance with the domestic law of
the Contracting State where protection is claimed. (3) However, the
domestic law referred to in sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) of this para-
graph shall not operate to deprive performers of the ability to control,
by contract, their relations with broadcasting organisations.
See also European Communities Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judg-
ments in Civil and Commercial Matters ("Brussels Convention"), 1972 OJ (L 229) 32,
reprinted in 8 ILM 229 (1968), amended at 1990 OJ (C 189) 1, reprinted in 29 ILM 1413
(1990). The Brussels Convention binds the members of the European Union to rules for
jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Will the Judgment-
Proof Own Cyberspace?, 32 Intl Law 1121, 1129 n 30 (1998), citing Paul R. Beaumont,
Anton & Beaumont's Civil Jurisdiction in Scotland 90-94 (1995).
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tion, the consenting participants in the self-regulatory regime can
choose their own forums, including forums of their own creation,
and can prescribe their own law, including law developed by the
private regulatory regime. '
Public institutions can anticipate and resolve jurisdictional
problems by delegating power and deferring to private institu-
tions. They do this all the time in America. Deferral and delega-
tion to private institutions is the centerpiece of American labor
law." Delegation and deferral to self-regulatory organizations
constituting stock exchanges is the centerpiece of American secu-
rities regulation. 2 When public institutions from different coun-
tries agree to delegate and defer to the same private institutions,
they solve transnational jurisdictional problems. This is what
happened with the European Commission/United States Depart-
ment of Commerce Privacy Safe Harbor Agreement. American
firms using data originating in Europe were potentially subject to
the jurisdiction of European administrative agencies. By negoti-
ating an agreement allowing compliance with private standards
to substitute for direct compliance with European governmental
standards, the jurisdictional problem was alleviated.
10 The permissible scope of choice of law clauses in contracts is traditionally more
limited than the text suggests. Some commentators and courts would permit the parties to
choose the law only of states that have a connection with their relationship. See Restate-
ment (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187(2)(a) & comment f (1971). Other commentators
and courts would allow the choice of any state, but not of private sources of law. See id at
§ 187(1). Others would allow the choice of private rules as well as those entitled to the
status of "law." See id at comments c, e.
11 "Deferral" refers to the practice of the National Labor Relations Board of refraining
from deciding unfair labor practice charges that could be or have been resolved by collec-
tively bargained arbitration. For a general discussion, see Calvin William Sharpe, NLRB
Deferral to Grievance Arbitration: A General Theory, 48 Ohio St L J 595 (1987) (reviewing
recent cases and recommending revisions in NLRB deferral policy). Labor law delegates at
two levels. Congress delegates certain matters to the National Labor Relations Board. See
Country Ford Trucks, Inc v NLRB, 229 F3d 1184, 1189 (DC Cir 2000) (characterizing
relationship between board and statute in determining appropriate unit). Although not
usually discussed as part of the "nondelegation doctrine," the national labor policy also
delegates to the negotiators in a collective bargaining process the power to determine
specific terms and conditions of employment. See New York Shipping Association, Inc v
FMC, 854 F2d 1338, 1373 (DC Cir 1988) (discussing importance of courts and agencies
allowing parties to reach their own agreement in collective bargaining process).
12 See generally Mitchell v Forsyth, 472 US 511, 553 n 8 (1985) (noting good faith
immunity for self-regulatory organizations in 15 USC § 78 III(b)); Sparta Surgical Corp v
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc, 159 F3d 1209, 1212 (9th Cir 1998) (ex-
plaining that SROs must issue rules and bylaws in conformance with statute, subject to
approval by SEC, and must comply with association rules); Donald & Co v American
United Energy Corp, 746 F2d 666, 670 (10th Cir 1984) (referring to presumptions in favor
of arbitration in disputes between members of self-regulatory organizations despite asser-
tion of securities law violations).
HYBRID REGULATION OF THE INTERNET
When private institutions control important assets, such as
internet domain names, they easily can make and enforce rules
across national boundaries because they do not need to rely on
geographically defined state-based institutions to enforce their
decisions.
Thus, private regulation represents one interesting solution
to jurisdictional problems presented by the internet's indifference
to geographic boundaries that historically have determined adju-
dicatory and prescriptive jurisdiction. It may be more efficient; it
may promote compliance; it may adapt better to changing tech-
nologies and business practices.
B. Dangers of Private Regulation
But private regulation also involves important disadvan-
tages. Many of its advantages are based on false premises. It can
fail to protect democratic values; it can neglect important local
values; it is usually less accountable than traditional government
regulation. It is increasingly imposed through computer code,
which bypasses political and legal institutions that protect due
process and democratic values.
Netanel explains that private self-governance claims track
associational self-governance claims that long have been made
and that "hit a fault line in liberal democratic theory and prac-
tice." 3 At best, Netanel observes, "American law has been gener-
ally unaccommodating to strong self-rule claims." 4 Thus, "argu-
ments for cyberspace self-governance fall closer to the category of
weak self-rule claims," because citizens of cyberspace are also
citizens of the real world. 5
13 See Netanel, 88 Cal L Rev at 447 (cited in note 5).
14 Id at 448.
15 Id (noting that 'cyberians," as citizens in the real world, spend only a small fraction
of their time online and therefore seek "autonomy for particular, discreet association, for
rules governing the part of their lives and activity that concerns that association"). For a
similar rationale see Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace 219-20 (Basic
Books 1999) (acknowledging that Americans are skeptical of government but noting the
necessity of making fundamental choices about what "life will be like in [cyber]space, and
therefore life in real space" and that Americans may be "antigovernment, but for the most
part [ ] believe that there are collective values that ought to regulate private action").
215] 221
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
1. False premises.
Several of the Cyberpopulist arguments are based on as-
sumed ease of exit, but exit is not always easy."6 "For the vast
majority of us, in the vast majority of cases, user input will con-
sist entirely of consumer purchasing behavior."" Meaningful
choice probably is thin. Like Netanel, I have almost never chosen
one web site over another because I preferred the former's condi-
tions of use over the latter's.8 Internet users, like participants in
the traditional world, face significant information and collective
action costs in responding to producers' standard terms by
switching service providers.19
It is not only feelings of social attachment and fear of loneli-
ness that represent barriers to exit in cyberspace. Indeed, now
that the internet is relatively more important as a market than
as a place for chatting, other switching costs are more relevant.
Often, one's internet service provider owns one's domain name.
To switch to another ISP would mean getting a new domain name
and building public awareness of that domain name. Most e-mail
addresses are linked to the domain name of the e-mail service
provider. Switching means getting a completely new e-mail ad-
dress, and there is no common practice to leave a forwarding ad-
dress with the e-mail service provider unless one continues to pay
for the abandoned service. Moreover, ease of exit is a mixed bless-
ing. As game theory suggests, virtual communities are likely to
unravel due to the ease of exit and entrance. ' °
2. Tyranny by the majority.
Cyberpopulism gives inadequate attention to possible tyr-
anny by the majority.21 A pure form of cyberanarchy would allow
unhindered discrimination based on race, gender, sexual orienta-
tion, and other immutable personal characteristics.2 Even if
popular will is the correct measure, internet plebiscites are not
16 Netanel, 88 Cal L Rev at 429 (cited in note 5) ("Virtual communities, with their
relative ease of exit (and, in many cases, entrance) present classic counter examples to the
types of territoriality bound close-knit groups in which rule by social norms is possible.").
17 Id at 434.
18 Compare id at 435 (offering a similar confession).
19 See id at 437.
20 Netanel, 88 Cal L Rev at 437 (cited in note 5).
21 See id at 425 (arguing that exit is "far from costless" where users have developed
"deep feelings of attachment and loyalty to virtual communities").
22 See id at 415 ("Cyberpopulism fails to provide a workable mechanism for protecting
the liberties of minorities and dissenters."). See also id at 444-45.
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necessarily certain to reflect the popular will. Further, they do
not necessarily promote civil discourse, which is a collective
good.2" To the extent that consumers rely on Cyberagents or in-
termediaries, they are not in fact exercising individual consent.24
In addition, important economies of scale and scope provide cen-
tralization forces.25
3. Why rediscover the liberal state?
Netanel also is skeptical about the institutionalization of
internet regulatory authority and a new Cyberregulatory author-
ity:
From the viewpoint of the liberal state, there would be no
advantage-and considerable disadvantage-in delegating
authority to a cyberconstitutional authority to interpret
and enforce liberal metanorms in cyberspace. The liberal
state has existed for over 200 years. It has an established
tradition of defining and applying liberal principles. The
state's hallucination elucidation of those principles thus
has considerable power in shaping social understandings
and norms. State-centered law-both legislation and con-
stitutional adjudication-carries considerable weight in
legitimizing certain beliefs and practices and delegitimiz-
ing others.... A cyberauthority, in contrast, would have
to start from scratch.26
4. Lack of accountability.
Professor Michael Froomkin has sharply criticized domain
name regulation under ICANN as insufficiently accountable.27
Even though Froomkin's target is ICANN, which exists in a hy-
23 See id at 430.
24 Netanel, 88 Cal L Rev at 440 (cited in note 5) (noting that many unsophisticated
consumers must rely on sophisticated internet users as their "agents").
25 See id at 440-41 (arguing that the diversity of cyberspace is threatened by the
concentration of service providers that follows from technology induced economies of scale
and that, in this environment, the threat of "oligopolistic constraints on competition" is
particularly troublesome).
26 Id at 484.
27 A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route Around
the APA and the Constitution, 50 Duke L J 17, 26-27 (2000) (noting that the authority
that ICANN has violates "fundamental U.S. policies that are designed to ensure democ-
ratic control over the use of government power").
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brid framework, his claims of insufficient accountability would
apply a fortiori if ICANN were completely private.
His most basic objection is to the privatization of important
policy decisions. While he acknowledges that the government's
interest in domain name regulation is shaky,28 the fact that it
holds control over the domain name system "imposes legal obliga-
tions on the United States which it cannot evade .... [T]he gov-
ernment should not be allowed to bob and weave around the Con-
stitution's imposition of duties of due process and equal protec-
tion through the creation of formally private intermediaries for
policy making."29
5. Local values.
In addition to the tension between the way private regulation
really works and democratic political values, explored by Netanel,
critics of private regulation also express concern that its global
character is likely to ignore deeply held local or national values.0
They worry that most private regulatory regimes ignore asymme-
tries in information and bargaining power and thus fail to protect
the interest of consumers." This is at the heart of the debate be-
tween Europeans and Americans over special adjudicative juris-
diction rules in the Hague Judgments Convention allowing con-
sumers to sue at home.
6. Havens for misconduct.
Concerns also exist that private regulation, at least in some
areas such as gambling and indecent content, is likely to encour-
28 Id at 165 (arguing that government's interest is not easily described as either a
property interest or an intellectual property interest, but, rather, that its main legal inter-
est may be as beneficiary of contracts with NSI and others who manage DNS).
29 Id at 166.
30 For example, the National Research Council ("NRC") will convene two international
symposia as part of their project, "Global Networks and Local Values." The stated goals of
the project are to "discuss the tensions between (a) the global expansion of the Internet
and other communications networks and services that traverse borders seamlessly and in
many ways uncontrollably, and (b) the desires of nations and communities to protect in-
digenous values through policies that apply within their borders." See generally <http:ll
www4.nas.edu/webcr.nsf/ProjectScopeDisplay/CSTB-L-97-06-A> (visited Feb 5, 2001) [on
file with U Chi Legal F].
31 See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 Colum L Rev
1549, 1564 n 51 (1989) (arguing that information asymmetry justifies mandatory regula-
tion).
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age havens for conduct ieprehensible to democratic political enti-
ties who will have difficulty erecting border controls. 2
7. Tyranny of code.
In his important book, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace,
Larry Lessig explains that rules amounting to de facto law can be
embodied in computer code. " When that occurs, persons affected
by the code are compelled to comply with this "law" more com-
pletely than traditional enforcers like sheriffs might ever compel
them to comply with conventional legal rules. 4
The rules embedded in code are developed not by politically
accountable public officials, but by private persons, usually far
removed from public scrutiny. Lessig raises, in general terms, the
question of whether a shift of regulatory power to such a private,
self-enforcing regime may undermine important constitutional
values.35 Ultimately, he implies, conventional states are the best
regulatory mechanism for the internet. 6
Saying that the state must "back" regulation of the internet,
however, does not mean that state institutions must regulate the
internet directly. Netanel, for example, leaves room for hybrid
regulation. If one accepts some or all of Netanel's critique and
advocacy of a role for public institutions, the question remains:
How should mutual roles for governmental and private regula-
tion be structured?
32 See Joel Michael Schwarz, The Internet Gambling Fallacy Craps Out, 14 Berkley
Tech L J 1021, 1023-26 (1999) (reviewing concerns about offshore internet gambling ha-
vens); Keith J. Epstein and Bill Tancer, Enforcement of Use Limitations by Internet Ser-
vice Providers: How to Stop that Hacker, Cracker, Spammer, Spoofer, Flamer, Bomber, 19
Hastings Commun & Enter L J 661, 679 (1997) (referring to concern that internet is be-
coming haven for stalkers, child molesters, and pornographers).
33 Lessig, Code at 6 (cited in note 15).
34 Id at 89-99 (suggesting that code acts as inherent regulator and enforcer).
35 Id at 206-07 (questioning whether the shift from lawmakers to code writers should
proceed "unchecked").
36 Id at 488:
First, the liberal state would likely be a more effective guarantor of lib-
eral rights, both online and off, than would a new, independent cyber-
space authority. Second, cyberconstitutionalism would likely resemble the
"top-down" rule and interest group politics of the territorial liberal state,
not the "bottom-up" ordering cyberians envision. Third, given insur-
mountable collective action problems, a cyberauthority is highly unlikely
to emerge without the backing of the territorial liberal state.
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8. Limitations of the critiques.
Most of the critiques of private regulation expose its short-
comings, especially its lack of accountability, and challenge many
of the assumptions on which its defenders premise their advo-
cacy. But the critiques do not offer much in the way of new
mechanisms of accountability. Implicitly, any criticism of private
regulation suggests that regulation by public entities would be
better. Regulation by public entities makes its easier to hold the
decision makers politically accountable through the traditional
techniques of administrative and constitutional law. But criti-
cisms of public agency regulation abound as well. There is noth-
ing about the internet that makes it more suitable for traditional
regulation than airlines, railroads, motor carriage, occupational
health and safety, or television broadcasting, all of which are sub-
ject to persistent calls for deregulation.
So the hard question is whether regulatory mechanisms for
the internet can be constructed that offer some of the advantages
of both private and public regulation. Moreover, the respective
roles of nation states and other, more private, institutions in
shaping and applying law are evolving. 7 Developing appropriate
hybrid regulatory mechanisms for the internet is a part of this
phenomenon.
C. Categories of Private Regulation and
Mechanisms of Accountability
The introduction explained that private regulation occurs in
four basic situations: when (i) public institutions delegate some of
their rulemaking and adjudication authority to private institu-
tions or defer after the fact to private decisions; (ii) those subject
to private regulation consent in advance to the private regulatory
regime; (iii) private decisions are sufficiently acceptable to those
affected by them that they acquiesce after the fact rather than
pursuing their disputes before public institutions; or (iv) persons
or entities in control of valuable resources issue rules and enforce
them by threatening denial of access to the valuable right. The
fourth situation presents greater challenges for structuring hy-
37 For a general discussion, see Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The Internet is Changing the
Public International Legal System, 88 Ky L J 885, 893-94 (2000) (explaining and citing
other authorities on the increasing role of nongovernmental organizations in making law,
sometimes at the expense of the nation state).
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brid regulation because it lacks the enforcement and judicial-
review connections inherent in the first three situations.
Dean Abramson identifies three basic categories of private
regulation: private regulation resulting from formal government
delegation, private regulation involving no formal connection be-
tween government and private regulators, and private regulation
involving formal connections between government and private
regulators." Abramson's third category ("Category B") includes
advisory committees, rule negotiation groups, arbitrators and
issuers of private voluntary standards when standards are incor-
porated into public law. 9 Abramson's first category obviously cor-
responds to the first situation suggested above, although he does
not include deferral. His second category encompasses the other
situations suggested above. His third category includes elements
of several of the situations.
As with almost any taxonomy, practical examples may impli-
cate more than one category. ICANN-the private regulatory re-
gime for administering the internet's addressing and domain
name system-is a good example. The analysis that follows ex-
plains that certain parts of ICANN relate to the delegation cate-
gory; other parts are nominally contractual; and in important
respects the effectiveness of ICANN depends on its self enforcing
power over valuable resources-access to the internet.
1. Public law delegation and deferral-"delegation."
The nondelegation doctrine questions the loss of accountabil-
ity resulting when public institutions performing legislative func-
tions delegate their authority to private decision makers.4 ° Dele-
38 Abramson, 16 Hastings Const L Q at 169 (cited in note 1).
39 See id at 171-72 (describing the connection between government and private regu-
lators).
40 See ALA Schechter Poultry Corp v United States, 295 US 495, 537 (1935) (holding
that Congress cannot delegate its legislative authority to private trade or industrial asso-
ciations because such delegation is inconsistent with the "constitutional prerogatives and
duties of Congress"). See also Panama Refining Co v Ryan, 293 US 388, 430 (1935) (recog-
nizing immutable constitutional limitations on Congress's power to delegate legislative
functions to the executive branch or to administrative agencies); Froomkin, 50 Duke L J at
94 (cited in note 27) (arguing that ICANN's affects on the legal rights of third parties are
so sweeping that DoC has effectively "outsourced policymaking" to the corporation and
that such outsourcing may violate the nondelegation doctrine); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., In-
ternational Administrative Law for the Internet: Mechanisms of Accountability, 51 Admin
L Rev 871, 896-97 (1999) (discussing the implications of the nondelegation doctrine for the
structure of an international internet agency). Dean Krent offers a working definition of
delegation: "any congressional act which empowers those outside Congress to enforce or
implement a legislative objective and backs those efforts with the coercive force of the
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gation of rulemaking power, however, is commonplace in the
modern regulatory state, including federal delegation to states,4
delegation of authority to set standards for health care to the
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations
("JCAHO"),42 delegation of authority to approve minimum price
orders to agricultural cooperatives,43 delegation of rules and en-
forcement of airport security arrangements under the Federal
Aviation Act ("FAA")," and delegation of authority over railroad
trucking rates to Rate Bureaus.45 Newer examples include the
1994 Fraud and Abuse delegation to Securities Exchanges, 46 the
COPPA Safe Harbor Statutory Provisions,47 ICANN, and the
U.S./EU Privacy Safe Harbor Agreement.48
federal government." Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary Executive: Congressional
Delegations of Administrative Authority Outside the Federal Government, 85 Nw U L Rev
62, 67 (1990).
41 Krent, 86 Nw U L Rev at 80-84 (cited in note 40).
42 See id at 85-86. See also Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75
NYU L Rev 543, 610-13 (2000) (describing the crucial function the JCAHO, a private
organization of professional associations, plays in certifying health care institutions for
compliance with federal regulations); id at 600 n 232, citing U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services, Office of the Inspector General, The External Review of Hospital
Quality: A Call for Greater Accountability 1-2 (July 1999), available online at <http:l/
www.dhhs.gov/progorg/oei/reports/a381.pdf> (visited Feb 4, 2001), and U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, Office of the Inspector General, The External Review of Hos-
pital Quality: The Role of Accreditation, 6-7 (July 1999) available online at <http://www.
dhhs.gov/progorg/oei/reports/a382.pdf> (visited Feb 4, 2001) (discussing government-
issued reports that examine the role played by JCAHO in reviewing hospitals); [all inter-
net materials cited in this note on file with U Chi Legal F].
43 Krent, 86 Nw U L Rev at 86-87 (cited in note 40) (describing the Agricultural Mar-
keting Agreement Act of 1937).
44 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, codified at 49 USC §§ 40101-28 (1994). See also
Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Negotiated Rulemaking Before Federal Agencies: Evaluation of
Recommendations by the Administrative Conference of the United States, 74 Georgetown L
J 1625, 1667 (1986) (noting that section 601(a)(5) of the FAA requires the Administrator to
promulgate rules governing the maximum hours for periods of service for "airmen and
other employees of air carriers").
45 Square D Co v Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc, 476 US 409, 413-14 (1986)
(referring to Reed-Bulwinkle Act authorizing FCC to grant approval to rate bureau
agreements for setting rates collectively); Georgia v Pennsylvania Railroad Co, 324 US
439, 459 (1945) (reviewing role of rate bureaus and railroad rate setting).
46 See generally Ross P. Buckley, The Role and Potential of Self Regulatory Organiza-
tions: The Emerging Markets Traders Association from 1990-2000, 6 Stan J L, Bus & Fin
135 (2000) (reviewing operation of new self-regulatory organization). The 1994 Telemar-
keting and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Protection Act, Pub L No 103-297, 108 Stat 1545
(1994), codified at 15 USC §§ 6101-04 (1994), required the SEC and self-regulatory or-
ganizations to promulgate rules to prohibit deceptive or other abusive telemarketing acts
in the sale of securities.
47 See discussion of COPPA in text accompanying note 73.
48 See Part I A.
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Under the 1994 Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and
Prevention Abuse Act ("the 1994 Act"),49 for example, the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission reiterated its commitment to hy-
brid regulation long used to regulate securities exchanges. De-
clining to promulgate its own rules to implement the statute, it
found that existing self-regulatory organization (exchange) rules
were sufficient to realize the goals and enforce the duties ex-
pressed by the statute. ° Notably, however, this SEC conclusion
has been criticized because there apparently is no private right of
action to enforce SRO rules.51
Deferral to private decisions is a slightly different concept.
Public adjudicatory institutions have the power to decide dis-
putes, but they abstain from deciding them in favor of private
decisions when certain criteria are met. NLRB deferral to collec-
tively bargained arbitration,52 suspension of judicial litigation in
favor of private arbitration," eventual enforcement of private ar-
bitration awards under the Federal Arbitration Act and the New
York Convention,54 and abstention by courts in cases involving
private association decisions55 all are examples.
As noted in the introduction to this Part, ICANN illustrates
several different categories of private regulation. In important
respects, it illustrates delegation of governmental power. In this
context for private regulation, the inherent power of the public
rulemaking and adjudicatory institutions represent the public
law framework, while the exercise of delegated power and the
making of decisions to which public institutions will defer repre-
sent the private activity within the framework.
In theory, this context provides robust criteria for making
private decisionmaking accountable. The nondelegation doctrine
in administrative law requires "channeling" of private decision-
49 15 USC §§ 6101 et seq (1994).
50 See SEC Release No 34-38480 (Apr 7, 1997); 62 Fed Reg 698917 (Nov 12, 1997)
(notice of accelerated approval of marketed exchange rules).
51 Terrance S. DeWald and Amy B. Blumenthal, Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud
and Abuse Prevention Act: Did Congress Create a Private Right of Action for Violation of
SRO Rules?, 1062 PLI/Corp 241 (1998).
52 See generally Michael K Northrop, Distinguishing Arbitration and Private Settle-
ment in NLRB Deferral Policy, 44 U Miami L Rev 341 (1989).
53 9 USC § 3 (2000) (providing for stay pending arbitration).
54 9 USC § 9 (2000); id at § 201 (enforcement of New York Convention).
55 See Austin v American Association of Neurological Surgeons, 120 F Supp 2d 1151,
1152-53, 1155 (N D Ill 2000) (rejecting claim against private association for suspension;
stating rules for deference under Illinois law).
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making by limiting the scope of the subject matter of the private
actors, and by assuring judicial review of their decisions. 6
ICANN issues rules for issuance and retention of domain
names and for adjudication of trademark/domain name contro-
versies. 7 New dispute resolution intermediaries, such as admin-
istrative panels under the World Intellectual Property Organiza-
tion ("WIPO") dispute resolution rules,58 adjudicate these contro-
versies under the ICANN rules. Other intermediaries-domain
name registrars--enforce administrative panel decisions by re-
voking or transferring domain names.59
The public law framework for ICANN takes the form of a
"memorandum of understanding" entered into between ICANN
and the United States Department of Commerce ("DoC").6 °
Among other things, the memorandum commits ICANN to de-
sign, develop, and test a process "for affected parties to partici-
pate in the formulation of policies and procedures that address
the technical management of the Internet... includ[ing] methods
for soliciting, evaluating and responding to comments in the
adoption of policies and procedures."61 The ICANN MOU obligates
ICANN to afford participation to affected parties and to develop a
membership mechanism that fosters accountability and represen-
tation of global and functional diversity.
56 Whitman v American Trucking Association, 121 S Ct 903, 912 (2001) (restating
elements of the nondelegation doctrine).
57 See Internet Corporation for Unassigned Names and Numbers Uniform Domain
Name Dispute Resolution ("ICANN UDRP"), available online at <http://www.icann.org/
udrp/udrp.htm> (visited Feb 5, 2001) [on file with U Chi Legal F].
58 See World Intellectual Property Organization Supplemental Rules for Uniform
Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy ( "Supplemental Rules") (effective as of Dec 1,
1999), available online at <http://arbiter.wipo.intldomains/rules/supplemental.html> (vis-
ited Feb 5, 2001) [on file with U Chi Legal F].
59 See, for example, ICANN Registrar Accreditation Agreement § II(K) (Nov 4, 1999),
available online at <http://www.icann.org/nsi/icann-raa-04nov99.htm> (visited Feb 5,
2001) [on file with U Chi Legal F]:
K. Domain-Name Dispute Resolution. During the term of this Agreement,
Registrar shall have in place a policy and procedure for resolution of dis-
putes concerning SLD names. In the event that ICANN adopts a policy or
procedure for resolution of disputes concerning SLD names that by its
terms applies to Registrar, Registrar shall adhere to the policy or proce-
dure.
For clarification, see id at § I(K) ("An 'SLD' is a second-level domain of the DNS.").
60 See Memorandum of Understanditg between the U.S. Department of Commerce and
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers § 5(C)(6) ("ICANN MOU") (Nov 25,
1998), available online at <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/icann-
memorandum.htm> (visited Feb 5, 2001) [on file with U Chi Legal F].
61 Id.
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Professor Froomkin traces ICANN's power to DoC's control
over the domain name system ("DNS") root server,62 a control
which the U.S. Government has not given up. He also concludes
that DoC holds an effective veto over ICANN's policies, a veto of
which ICANN is well aware. 3 But, despite these formal links to
governmental power, Professor Froomkin finds the hybrid um-
brella for ICANN ineffective:
The specter of a series of ICANN clones in the United
States or in cyberspace should give one pause, because
ICANN is a very bad model, one that undermines the pro-
cedural values that motivate both the APA and the Due
Process Clause of the Constitution. DoC's reliance on
ICANN has (1) reduced public participation in decision-
making over public issues, (2) vested key decisionmaking
power in an essentially unaccountable private body that
many feel has already abused its authority in at least
small ways and is indisputably capable of abusing it in big
ways, and (3) nearly (but ... not quite) eliminated the
possibilities for judicial review of critical decisions regard-
ing the DNS. So far, ICANN appears to be accountable to
no one except DoC itself, a department with a strong
vested interest in declaring its DNS "privatization" policy
to be a success. 4
The "safe harbor" agreement between the European Commis-
sion and the DoC, allowing U.S. entities to exchange personal
data with European entities as long as they participate in private
regulatory regimes meeting certain criteria to protect privacy, is
an international example of delegation and deferral.65 When more
than one national sovereign delegates governmental power, the
62 See Froomkin, 50 Duke L J at 106 (cited in note 27) ("Certainly, until ICANN came
along, the U.S. government's de facto control over the root was clear, if not often exer-
cised."). Professor Froomkin does not make it entirely clear whether the root server is
government property, or an asset or operation as to which Congress has asserted legisla-
tive power.
63 Id at 106-13 (discussing ICANN's position that it only regulates because the gov-
ernment "makes ICANN do it").
64 Id at 29.
65 The EU/U.S. safe harbor is considered in greater detail in Perritt, 88 Ky L J 885
(cited in note 37); Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Margaret G. Stewart, False Alarm, 51 Fed
Commun L J 811 (1999); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Law and the Information Superhighway
176-85 (Aspen 2d ed 2001); Joel Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting International Data
Privacy Rules in Cyberspace, 52 Stan L Rev 1315 (2000).
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techniques employed by the nondelegation doctrine to assure ac-
countability must be adapted to the international context."
The core value embedded in the nondelegation doctrine is
political accountability. Rules should be made only by those who
are accountable to the people and-equally important-rules that
engender sufficient public opposition should be amenable to
change. The ultimate protection of the people is that rules made
by a regulatory agency are subject to legislative nullification.
Congress can enact legislation amending or repealing earlier leg-
islation and, through that process, abolish an administrative
agency outright. If rules promulgated by an internet regulatory
agency are sufficiently controversial, Congress can hold hearings
on them. If there is sufficient opposition, Congress could enact a
statute overturning the rules. 7
Some nondelegation doctrine cases can be read to suggest
that an absolute requirement of delegation is the availability of
judicial review in an Article III court.68 But none of the control-
ling cases say that explicitly, and a more reasonable interpreta-
tion of the doctrine is that the functional equivalent of judicial
review in an Article III court is required. That is, someone object-
ing to a rule adopted by the agency must have the right to pre-
sent the objections to an institution that uses adjudicatory proce-
dure and allows a fair opportunity to consider the challenged rule
in light of the limitations imposed on the agency by its organic
instrument. And as long as the adjudicatory review and deci-
sionmakers are reasonably independent of the same political in-
fluences that control the agency, the judicial review requirement
should be satisfied.
Dean Krent, Professor Froomkin, and others have expressed
concern over evasion of the traditional nondelegation doctrine
controls (ascertainable statutory standards channelizing the
delegated authority combined with judicial review) when the gov-
ernment delegates rulemaking or adjudicatory power to private
66 See Perritt, 51 Admin L Rev at 896-97 (cited in note 40).
67 See INS v Chadha, 462 US 919, 953 n 16 (1983) (stating that when "[e]xecutive
action under legislatively delegated authority ... is exceeded," it is not inherently invalid,
but rather, "open to judicial review as well as the power of Congress to modify or revoke
the authority entirely").
68 See Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 555, 605 (1992) (Blackmun dissenting)
("[I]ronically, this court has previously justified a relaxed review of congressional delega-
tion to the executive on grounds that Congress, in turn, has subjected the exercise of that
power to judicial review."); Touby v United States, 500 US 160, 170 (1991) (Marshall con-
curring) (suggesting that judicial review must be implied in order to save delegated law-
making).
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organizations.9 Nevertheless, accountability mechanisms do ex-
ist, including self-interest of sovereign governmental entities
other than the federal executive branch, self-interest of particular
industry representatives, judicial review and market forces.7" In-
deed, Krent notes, enhanced participation through private enti-
ties might adequately compensate for a reduced role for elected
public officials in superintending regulation.71
But he cautions:
the participatory explanation cannot justify congressional
delegations outside the federal government in several con-
texts. Most notably, it cannot account for delegations to
private experts who represent no constituency. Further-
more, delegations to private individuals serving in gov-
ernment agencies, such as the FOMC, cannot be explained
as well. Delegations to qui tam relators are also difficult to
justify, since no one has elected the relators to help govern
everyone else .... Only Congress has determined whether
or not a group is sufficiently representative to bind indi-
viduals within that group, and it is by no means clear that
the groups selected are truly representative of those af-
fected by governmental regulation. Instead, Congress has
delegated authority to concerned special interest groups.
Although the participation may, to a certain extent, reflect
republican values, it is an inegalitarian republicanism at
best.72
Krent's analysis suggests that delegation to private bodies regu-
lating the internet would be appropriate only upon assurances
that the private regulatory body represents relevant constituen-
cies and that it do so through reasonably democratic means.
Sometimes, the strings attached to private regulation when
public institutions delegate governmental power may be too tight.
The Children's Online Privacy Protection Act ("COPPA")73 may be
69 See Krent, 85 Nw U L Rev at 95 (cited in note 40) ("Prior delegations of authority
outside federal government coexist with understanding of separation of powers uneasily at
best."); Froomkin, 50 Duke L J at 143 (cited in note 27) (noting that the "usual" delegation
to a private person originates in a statute, but in the case of ICANN, the delegation re-
sults from a contract between the Department of Commerce and a private firm).
70 Krent, Nw U L Rev at 102 (cited in note 40).
71 See id at 106.
72 Id at 109-10.
73 Children's Online Privacy and Protection Act of 1998 ("COPPA"), 15 USC § 6501 et
seq (2000).
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an example. COPPA provides a two-level public law framework
for private regulation by content providers. The statute empowers
the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") to promulgate rules for
protecting children's privacy in web sites aimed at children
through the regular Administrative Procedure Act process."4 It
also defers to private regulatory regimes that have been accred-
ited by the FTC as meeting minimum standards. The FTC has
begun to review private applications for safe harbor treatment
under the Act.75
The hybrid character of this approach is obvious: a federal
statute, supplemented by federal agency accreditation of private
regulatory regimes, represents the public law framework. The
private regimes applying for accreditation represent the private
working out of details.
While it is too early to draw firm conclusions about the
COPPA framework, COPPA may illustrate a danger that hybrid
regulatory regimes should avoid: making the public law frame-
work too "tight" to allow incentives for participation in the pri-
vate regulatory regimes authorized by the public law framework.
The statutory criteria for safe harbor treatment of private regula-
tion may be so specific as to foreclose attractive private alterna-
tives. Willingness to participate in private regulatory arrange-
ments involve'a form of negotiation between both the private in-
terests involved in the private regulatory regime, and between
those private interests and the public institution providing the
public law framework. Successful negotiation depends upon an
assessment by participants of whether the negotiated outcome
will produce a more attractive result than alternatives to a nego-
tiated outcome.7" If the public law framework overly circum-
scribes the possible outcomes of the negotiated private regime,
potential participants in the private regime have no incentive to
prefer the private regime to direct application of public law rules.
74 Id. See also Federal Trade Commission, Children's Online Privacy Protection Rule,
16 CFR Part 312 (1999) (noting that the Federal Trade Commission is authorized to
promulgate rules under COPPA).
75 See Federal Trade Commission, Safe Harbor Program Application Review for Com-
pliance with COPPA, available online at <http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/safeharbor/shp.
htm> (visited Feb 6, 2001) [on file with U Chi Legal F] (posting applications and soliciting
public comments regarding safe harbor treatment of self-regulatory guidelines under
COPPA).
76 See Perritt, 74 Georgetown L J at 1635 (cited in note 44) (discussing BATNA).
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2. Consent and waiver-"contract."
Most private regulation occurs within a contractual frame-
work, in which those bound by private regulatory decisions agree
in advance to be bound. Private associations such as the Boy
Scouts," churches, condominium associations, AOL, and Micro-
soft Network all are examples. In this form of private regulation,
contract identifies the legislators, judges, and sheriffs, and also
defines subject matter and the processes for making, applying,
and enforcing rules. The parties bound by private regulatory de-
cisions are congruent with the parties to the contract.
Many private privacy regulatory regimes depend upon in-
termediaries to revoke membership or seals that immunize mem-
bers or holders from direct action by public authorities." In these
circumstances, also, the legal framework is contractual.
ICANN, exemplifying the delegation category, also has at-
tributes of the contract category. ICANN's rules are implemented
through contracts entered into between domain name registrars
and domain name registrants. In theory, domain name regis-
trants agree to the terms of the contract, such as the term, ex-
plored in the voteauction.com case discussed in Part I C 4 b, that
the domain name not be used for illegal purposes. But as Profes-
sor Dinwoodie points out, the contract basis for these rules is a
fiction-or at least farfetched. Whoever wants an internet domain
name must agree to the contractual terms decided upon by
ICANN.
While consent-based private regulatory regimes may appear
purely private, they are not. Contract law developed and applied
by public institutions provides a public law framework within
which the private regimes operate. While usually denominated
"private law" rather than "public law," the frameworks neverthe-
less represent judgments by public institutions as to the permis-
sible scope of private regulation.
Controversies over this kind of private regulation of the
internet center on the meaning of "consent." Often, the terms of
the contractual framework are determined not through negotia-
77 See, for example, Boy Scouts of America v Dale, 530 US 640, 656 (2000) (holding
that admission of a homosexual scout master would significantly affect the Boy Scouts's
right to associate with whomever it deems meets the standards of the organization).
78 See, for example, <http://www.truste.org/users/users how.html> (visited Feb 4,
2001) [on file with U Chi Legal F] (describing Truste, a private online organization that
monitors the information gathered by companies about their customers and gives the
Truste seal to companies that meet certain privacy standards set and enforced by Truste).
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tion among all affected parties, but by unilateral decision of one
party. The law must specify what kind of conduct by the other
parties represents assent to the unilaterally developed terms.
Whether subjecting oneself to the private regime represents le-
gally effective consent turns on adequate notice of the terms, and
on the availability of alternatives to a particular regime. This, in
turn, invites evaluation of the "switching costs" for leaving one
regime in favor of another.79
3. "Acquiescence."
Regardless of the construction of public law frameworks,
some private regulation will occur in circumstances where par-
ticipants voluntarily accept it after the fact.
The effect of private decisionmaking often depends not on
explicit delegation by public institutions or on before-the-fact con-
sent to the private regulatory regime, but on the practical accept-
ability of the private decisions. Employees denied promotions or
dismissed often accept the original decision or the result of em-
ployer-provided grievance mechanisms rather than suing in court
or filing charges with the National Labor Relations Board or the
Equal Opportunity Commission. More than a thousand domain
name disputes have been decided by the WIPO dispute resolution
process, discussed in Part I C 1, but almost no lawsuits in the
national courts have been filed over these disputes, even though
such national court litigation is permissible under the ICANN
UDRP. That is a strong example of acquiescence. Private litigants
often accept the result of advisory arbitration or other dispute
resolution mechanisms rather than pressing for a decision by a
jury or judge.
In the credit card chargeback regime, credit card issuers are
intermediaries charged with adjusting disputes between mer-
chants and consumers, declining to credit merchants who fail to
deliver promised merchandise or services, and ultimately revok-
ing credit from consumers who refuse to pay for merchandise or
services delivered pursuant to agreement. ° While the credit card
chargeback regime is hybrid in that Regulation Z provides the
public law framework within which private rules, adjudication,
79 See Netanel, 88 Cal L Rev at 426-27 (cited in note 5) (discussing problems with the
theory that user-exit from internet-based communities is easy and costless).
80 Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Dispute Resolution in Cyberspace; Demand for New Forms of
ADR, 15 Ohio St J on Disp Resol 675, 689-94 (2000) (discussing the credit card charge-
back system).
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and enforcement occur pursuant to cardholder and merchant
agreements, the public law framework is thin in practice. Rarely,
if ever, does the Federal Reserve System get involved in deter-
mining whether the details of a chargeback regime meet the re-
quirements of the statute, or otherwise satisfy democratic and
due process values. The credit card chargeback system is best
understood as an example of "acquiescence."
Most parties to credit card disputes apparently accept the
result of the chargeback process rather than suing in court."'
Surely far more disputes over e-commerce and other internet
conduct exist than result in lawsuits. In that subset of controver-
sies that do not turn into litigation, it is reasonable to character-
ize the disappointed party as having acquiesced in whatever form
of dispute resolution was available.
This category of private regulation definitionally assures ac-
countability because those adversely affected by private decisions
can take their dispute to another level, eventually ending up be-
fore a public institution.
4. "Self-enforcing power" stemming from the
direct deprivation of a valuable right.
The fourth category of private regulation presents the great-
est accountability challenges. In this context, the power of private
decision makers stems not from explicit or easily implied consent
by those subject to the private governance, nor from explicit dele-
gation of legal authority possessed by public institutions, but
from the de facto control over a valuable resource by private per-
sons or entities. Self-help repossession of tangible chattels and
private control of range land 2 are pre-internet examples.
81 A Westlaw search on March 11, 2001 for state or federal cases with the term "credit
card" and the term chargeback or "charge back" in the same paragraph in the syllabus or
headnotes or the opinion produced only 27 cases. That is a miniscule number, considering
the number of cardholders and merchants accepting credit cards. See generally Satellite
Receivers, Ltd v Household Bank, 49 F Supp 2d 1083 (E D Wis 1999) (issuer's agreement
with merchant allowed chargeback for amounts paid for unusable satellite dishes); Exxon
Corp v Butler, 325 SE2d 806 (Ga App 1984) (affirming judgment for service station opera-
tor invalidating oil company's right to chargeback for incompletely filled out charge slips).
The other reported cases mostly involved bankruptcy or other controversies between issu-
ers and persons other than merchants or cardholders.
82 Terry L. Anderson and J. Bishop Grewell, Property Rights Solutions for the Global
Commons: Bottom-Up or Top-Down?, 10 Duke Envir L & Pol F 73, 80-83 (1999) (describ-
ing control of common cattle range land).
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In Flagg Brothers, Inc v Brooks,83 the Supreme Court rejected
the idea that self-help repossession represented state action, enti-
tling the adversely affected party to the protections of the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.84 The Court re-
ferred to the "essential dichotomy between public and private
acts,"85 and went on to state that "while as a factual matter any
person with sufficient physical power may deprive a person of his
property, only a State, or a private person whose action may be
fairly treated as that of the State itself, may deprive him of an
interest encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment's pro-
tection.""s The "total absence of overt official involvement plainly
distinguishe[d]" Flagg Brothers from "earlier decisions imposing
procedural restrictions on creditors' remedies." 7 The Court re-
jected the argument that state action was involved because the
state had delegated a function exclusively belonging to the state
to a private party,8 illogically referring to the adversely affected
party's option of replevying the goods before self-help was exer-
cised, or seeking damages after the fact for wrongful use of self-
help remedies. 9
Domain name regulation, regulation by private internet and
service content providers, and the "Mail Abuse Prevention Sys-
tem" ("MAPS")9 ° are examples of private regulatory mechanisms
that enforce their authority through the deprivation of a valuable
right. The authority of ICANN and of domain name registrars
derives not so much from the ICANN MOU as from the de facto
control over the databases that translate domain names into IP
addresses. By refusing to list a domain name in authoritative
domain name servers, ICANN and domain name registrars can
deprive those subject to their regulatory authority of access to the
internet." AOL and Microsoft Network can exclude subscribers
83 436 US 149 (1978).
84 Id at 153 (rejecting the claim that a statutorily authorized sale of a debtor's goods
held by a creditor constitutes "state action" for purposes of Fourteenth Amendment analy-
sis).
85 Id at 165 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
86 Id at 157 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
87 Flagg Brothers, 436 US at 157.
88 See id at 159-60.
89 See id at 160 (holding that the assumption underlying these remedies is a recogni-
tion of the "traditional place of private arrangements in ordering relationships in the
commercial world," and thus could "hardly be said to have delegated to Flagg Brothers an
exclusive prerogative of the sovereign").
90 See Part I C 4 c.
91 In reviewing an earlier draft of this article, David R. Johnson pointed out that
denial of a domain name does not necessarily prevent access to the internet. One can
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from access to their other subscribers under rules developed pri-
vately by the service providers.
MAPS represents an extension of this category of private
regulation. MAPS maintains a list of IP addresses, known as the
"Realtime Blackhole List" ("RBL"). The RBL is machinery for
blocking access to the internet. It was created by private unilat-
eral action. It is a valuable resource in the negative sense that
one can use the internet only by not being listed in the RBL.
The spread of peer to peer networking architectures will
make the fourth category of private regulation relatively more
important with respect to the other three categories. Peer to peer
networking relies on Larry Lessig's "code"-computer protocols
that allow participants to discover resources maintained on other
participants' computers. While one could categorize self-enforcing
rules embedded in peer to peer networking protocols as contrac-
tually based (assent occurring when a participant uses the rule-
including protocol), the actual affect of any rule on those excluded
from resources results from the aggregate phenomenon of thou-
sands or millions of protocol users interacting with a rule unilat-
erally adopted by the code writer. This looks much more like a
single legislator (the code writer) prescribing law for a community
defined by technology than a web of contractual parties negotiat-
ing rules for their partnership or joint endeavor.
Still, this category of private regulation overlaps the "con-
tract" category to some extent. One can argue that "self-enforcing
power" is not distinct from the "contract" category because elect-
ing to use the private resource represents legal consent to the
private regulatory regime associated with the private resource.
Indirectly, one also can argue that those internet hosts subscrib-
ing to MAPS's RBL are simply incorporating by reference the
rules set associated with the RBL. Persons seeking to access the
network resources provided by the subscribers are consenting to
MAPS rules. But this is an attenuated form of consent. Because
the resource is valuable, switching costs may be so high as to be
infinite. The consent question resolves into a switching cost ques-
tion, which, in turn, resolves into questions whether the resource
to which access potentially is denied can easily be duplicated by
others.92
obtain a third level domain, and of course, one can rely on search engines' picking up
pointers to an IP address.
92 The feasibility of switching in this context is analogous to one of the elements of the
"essential facility" doctrine under the antitrust laws. See MCI Communications Corp v
American Telephone & Telegraph Co, 708 F2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir 1983) (describing
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The central question with respect to this category of private
regulation is what form the public law framework should take.
That depends, in turn, on the existence of a private right of action
to challenge decisions by this category of private regulator, and
on the criteria that would entitle the private regulator to a privi-
lege or immunity. These issues are discussed in Part II. These
questions cannot be resolved without also considering the appro-
priate prerogatives of those who control private property.
The special problems of self enforcing private regulation that
relies on denial of access to a valuable resource are illustrated by
three examples, one from more than one hundred years ago, and
the other two in the internet context.
a) Cattle ranges and roundups. In the Wild West (the
original one; not the "Wild West" of the internet), cattlemen
blacklisted new entrants to grazing ranges when they concluded,
privately, that the range had absorbed all the cattle it could han-
dle. The blacklist barred new entrants from roundups and any
other facilities of the enforcing cattlemen's association. The sys-
tem broke down with the arrival of sheep, who did not require the
mechanism of a roundup to be brought to market. 3 "Thus, round-
ups lost their effectiveness as an exclusion mechanism, and range
wars sometimes resulted."94
The issue was, thus, one of sovereignty, where:
sovereignty determines the ultimate authority to exclude
others. The cattlemen's associations were sovereign with
respect to the customary grazing rights until homestead-
ers and sheepherders challenged that sovereignty. The lat-
ter won the challenge by turning to the national sovereign
with its power to force cattlemen off their customary
ranges. In this sense, bottom-up property rights begin to
blur with top-down property rights because both depend
on having the coercive power to exclude. 5
the four elements necessary to establish liability under the essential facilities doctrine as
"(1) control of the essential facility by a monopolist; (2) a competitor's inability practically
or reasonably to duplicate the essential facility; (3) the denial of the use of the facility to a
competitor; and (4) the feasibility of providing the facility").
93 See Anderson and Grewell, 10 Duke Envir L & Pol F at 80-82 (cited in note 82).
94 Id at 82.
95 Id at 83.
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b) Voteauction.com. In October 2000, the Chicago Board
of Election Commissioners became concerned that a web site op-
erated in Austria, voteauction.com, had the potential to corrupt
or, at least, to undermine confidence in the general election sub-
sequently held on November 7, 2000 in Chicago and elsewhere in
the United States.96 Voteauction.com solicited voters in the then
forthcoming election to offer to sell their votes, and also solicited
persons interested in buying those votes. The web site was con-
structed so that offers to sell and offers to buy were made by fill-
ing out a form that included the address, with a pull down list
including Illinois as an option. Moreover, the web site also in-
cluded a summary of outstanding offers with Illinois as a specific
listing." There was, thus, little difficulty in concluding that Illi-
nois courts could exercise jurisdiction over the web site under the
Zippo continuum9 and the targeting concept of Millennium En-
terprises.99 Accordingly, the Board of Election Commissioners
filed a civil lawsuit in the Circuit Court of Cook County against
voteauction.com and its individual organizers and managers.
But the existence of theoretical jurisdiction was not enough.
Any judgment would need to be enforced, and the procedures for
transnational enforcement of judgments were not only uncertain
but would take months. The election was scheduled in weeks.
So, the Election Commissioners thought about practicable
enforcement measures that might be taken against property lo-
cated in the jurisdiction, or at least in the United States. One
96 See Preliminary Injunction Order ("voteauction.com Preliminary Injunction Or-
der"), Board of Election of Chicago v Hans Bernhard, No 00 CE 031, 2 (Ill Cir Ct Oct 18,
2000) [on file with the U Chi Legal F]:
Plaintiffs have demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits ...
that Defendants . . .have violated the election laws of the State of Illinois
and of the United States by using and operating a web site known as
"voteauction.com" as an auction forum for the purpose of encouraging, so-
liciting and allowing residents of Illinois to sell their votes to be cast at
the November 7, 2000 General Election and encouraging, soliciting, and
allowing individuals and corporations to "bid" on and buy such votes.
97 See id.
98 See Zippo Manufacturing Co v Zippo Dot Corn, Inc, 952 F Supp 1119, 1124 (W D Pa
1997) (holding that in internet cases, "the likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be
constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and quality of commercial
activity that an entity conducts over the Internet").
9' See Millennium Enterprises, Inc v Millennium Music, LP, 33 F Supp 2d 907, 922 (D
Or 1997) (holding that personal jurisdiction did not lie where the plaintiff offered "no
evidence that defendants targeted Oregon residents with the intent or knowledge that
plaintiff could be harmed through their Web site"). The Millennium Enterprises opinion
asks more to support jurisdiction than the interactivity demanded by Zippo. It seeks evi-
dence of "targeting."
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possibility was to target the domain name, "voteauction.com."' °
The offending domain name was present in Illinois and in hun-
dreds or thousands of domain name servers supporting hundreds
or thousands of internet service providers in the vicinity of Chi-
cago.' But a litigation strategy against all those ISPs quickly
was ruled out. Instead, voteauction.com's domain name registry,
Domain Bank, was named as a defendant in the lawsuit, and the
draft injunction attached to the complaint included a paragraph
ordering that the domain name be withdrawn or canceled. On
October 18, Circuit Court of Cook County Illinois Judge Murphy
signed the injunction after a hearing. '
Domain Bank had been notified of the lawsuit, and had en-
gaged in extensive telephonic discussions with counsel for the
Election Commissioners. Domain Bank had, in its standard do-
main name registration agreement, a provision prohibiting the
use of domain names for "illegal purposes." After the injunction
was issued, signifying a judicial determination that the domain
name was being used illegally, Domain Bank canceled the
voteauction.com domain name, shutting down voteauction.com all
over the world."3
But celebrations of victory in Chicago were tentative, and,
sure enough, about a week later voteauction.com opened up un-
der a new domain name, "vote-auction.com." This domain name
was registered in Switzerland with the Swiss CORE Internet
Council of Registrars ("CORE"). But CORE had a similar prohibi-
tion against illegal use in its standard domain name registration
agreement. After extensive telephonic and e-mail discussions be-
tween counsel for the Election Commissioners and counsel for
CORE, CORE also canceled the vote-auction.com domain name,
once again shutting the site down. Subsequently, voteauction.com
o Such an approach had been suggested by the author of this Article in Perritt, 32
Intl Law at 1138-40 (cited in note 9) (discussing domain names as a new target for judg-
ment execution).
"'1 The internet's domain name system is a hierarchical distributed database. When a
user enters a domain name in a web browser, a designated domain name server main-
tained by that user's ISP looks up the domain name, seeking to translate it into an IP
address. If that domain name server does not already know the IP address for the desig-
nated domain name, it sends a message to other domain name servers higher up the hier-
archy asking them for it. Eventually, the IP address for the domain name is returned to
the original domain name server, whereupon it caches it (stores it for a period of time in
its own memory). This process of look up and caching causes any domain name used with
any frequency to reside on multiple domain name servers throughout the internet.
102 See voteauction.com Preliminary Injunction Order at 1 (cited in note 96).
103 The author served as a consultant to counsel for the plaintiff and provides these
facts from his own personal knowledge.
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sought to publicize its IP address, the use of which would avoid
the domain name system all together, but by then, the election
had already occurred.
Voteauction.com illustrates the interplay between public and
private regulation. The lawsuit and the injunction obviously were
traditional adjudicatory processes by a court, a paradigmatic pub-
lic institution. But an important part of the overall result turned
on the private rule, promulgated by a private institution-the
domain name registrars-that prohibited illegal use of the do-
main name. Based on the determination of illegality by the public
institution, the private institution used its power over an asset,
the domain name, to achieve the result desired by the complain-
ant. Voteauction.com can be understood as an interesting case
about judicial jurisdiction, but it also is about enforcement of a
very broad rule by a private intermediary.
Voteauction.com involved the inverse of the usual relation-
ship between public and private institutions. In voteauction.com,
Illinois's public courts performed the adjudicatory function, and
the private domain name registrars decided whether to enforce
the judicial decision. Because no injunction clearly supported by
personal jurisdiction bound either of the domain name registrars,
their actions in revoking voteauction's domain name privileges is
best understood as purely private action, informed by the public
determination by the Circuit Court of Cook County.
The most important thing about voteauction.com was that
once the decision of illegality was made, a private government
took over and made the decision a reality by self enforcement:
denying access to a valuable resource, the internet.
Voteauction.com also shows the importance and practicabil-
ity in working out the boundary between public and private regu-
lation. In some theoretical sense, it would have been better to
have enforced the injunction against domain name translation in
or near Chicago. That would have kept the enforcement action
within the sovereign whose laws were being enforced. It also
would have comported more comfortably with geographic limits
on the jurisdiction of the court issuing the injunction. But doing
that was impracticable, given the large number of ISPs and un-
certain patterns of use. It was much easier under tight time dead-
lines, imposed by the proximity of the election, to focus enforce-
ment efforts on a single intermediary-the first located in an-
other state but within the United States, and the second located
in a foreign country. The theoretical jurisdictional grounds were
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shakier, but enforcement was practicable and was practically
achieved.
c) The MAPS controversy. Controversy over the "Mail
Abuse Prevention System" ("MAPS") illustrates relatively pure
private regulation outside a public law framework. It clearly il-
lustrates the self enforcing category, in which regulation began,
not with a public body or with a contract, but with an idea in the
mind of an individual who took on governmental functions.
MAPS is a nonprofit California corporation that allows ISPs
and e-mail service providers to exclude unsolicited commercial
email ("UCE")1°4 from their systems. °5 MAPS maintains a list of
IP addresses in the form of its RBL and permits MAPS subscrib-
ers automatically to exclude from their systems any e-mail mes-
sage originating from one of the listed IP addresses. Some twenty
thousand ISPs, corporations, government agencies and individu-
als, comprising some 40 percent of the internet, subscribe to
MAPS. l06
MAPS has published rules, known as "Basic Mailing List
Management Principles for Preventing Abuse" ("BMLMPPA"), 107
which purport to state internet standards and best current prac-
tices for proper mailing list management. Among other things the
rules require use of a double opt-in procedure'" before mail can
104 Sometimes pejoratively called "spam." Spain is unsolicited e-mail broadcast to
hundreds or thousands of e-mail addresses.
105 See -chttp://mail-abuse.org//> (visited Feb 6, 2001) [on file with U Chi Legal F]:
Welcome to the Mail Abuse Prevention System LLC (MAPS). We are a
not-for-profit California organization whose mission is to defend the
internet's e-mail system from abuse by spammers. Our principal means of
accomplishing this mission is by educating and encouraging ISP's to en-
force strong terms and conditions prohibiting their customers from engag-
ing in abusive e-mail practices.
106 See Harris Interactive, Inc v Mail Abuse Prevention System, No 00-CV-6364L(F),
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint 50 ("Harris Complaint") (W D NY filed Aug 9, 2000),
available online at <http://www.mail-abuse.com/cgi-bin/read.cgi?pagenum=13> (visited
Feb 6, 2001) (complaint dismissed Aug 22, 2000). MAPS subscribers include Microsoft,
BellSouth, Qwest, Micron, and Altavista. See id at T 62.
107 See MAPS Basic Mailing List Management Guidelines for Preventing Abuse
("MAPS MLMGPA"), available online at <http://www.mail-abuse.com/manage.html> (vis-
ited Feb 6, 2001) [on file with U Chi Legal F] (stating that the MAPS MLMGPA are "in-
tended to assist list administrators in establishing basic list management procedures that
should help them avoid the most common pitfalls" associated with electronic mail list
abuses). See also Harris Complaint at Appendix (cited in note 106).
108 The double opt-in procedure requires a recipient to indicate affirmatively that it
wishes to be on a mailing list and then to respond affirmatively to an e-mail message sent
to confirm the subscription. See MAPS MLMPGPA Guideline "Permission of new sub-
scribers must be fully verified before mailings commence," available online at <http://
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be sent to a particular addressee. Complaints about mailers not
complying with the rules result in the mailer being put on the
RBL,' °9 and owners of IP addresses on the RBL can be removed
only by satisfying MAPS that they will comply in the future.1 '
MAPS illustrates the fourth type of private regulation identi-
fied in Part I C, regulation enabled by control of a valuable pri-
vate resource. And MVAPS does not start with ownership of the
valuable private resources by the regulator; the resources are
owned by thousands of private internet service providers. MAPS
uses technology, "code" in Professor Lessig's parlance, to extend
its private decisions into control of resources owned by others.
In August 2000, Harris Interactive, Inc. a public opinion sur-
vey organization, sued MAPS and a number of its subscribers in
federal district court."' The complaint alleged tortious interfer-
ence with business and contractual relations,"' commercial
disparagement,'1 ' negligent breach of a duty to administer the
RBL in a fair and evenhanded manner,"4 violation of New York
general business law prohibiting deceptive and confusing
consumer communications," 5 defamation per se, 116 conspiracy to
interfere tortiously with plaintiff's business," ' federal antitrust
violations for concerted refusal to deal,"' attempted
monopolization," 9 monopolization, 20 conspiracy to monopolize by
refusal to deal,' 2 ' forming and operating a trade association that
unreasonably restricts competition, 22 and violation of the New
York "Donnelly Act."' 2' The suit requested compensatory damages
in excess of fifty million dollars and punitive damages.
www.mail-abuse.com/manage.html> (visited Feb 6, 2001) [on file with U Chi Legal F]. See
also Harris Complaint at 42 (cited in note 106).
109 See Harris Complaint at 49 (cited in note 106).
110 Id at 51.
111 Idat 11.
112 See id at 77-82 ("First Cause of Action"); id at [ 114-19 ("Seventh Cause of
Action"); id at I 130-35 ("Tenth Cause of Action").
113 See Harris Complaint at 83-88 (cited in note 106) ("Second Cause of Action"); id
at 120-24 ("Eighth Cause of Action").
114 See id at 89-93 ("Third Cause of Action").
115 See id at It 94-98 ("Fourth Cause of Action").
116 Id at 91 99-105 ("Fifth Cause of Action"); id at 91 125-29 ("Ninth Cause of Ac-
tion").
117 Harris Complaint at IT 106-13 (cited in note 106) ("Sixth Cause of Action").
118 Id at 91 136-42 ("Eleventh Cause of Action").
119 Id at IT 143-46 ("Twelfth Cause of Action").
120 Id at T 147-49 ("Thirteenth Cause of Action").
121 Harris Complaint at 91 150-52 (cited in note 106) ("Fourteenth Cause of Action").
122 Id at 91 153-57 ("Fifteenth Cause of Action").
123 Id at If 158-59 ("Sixteenth Cause of Action').
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The Harris lawsuit reveals the dangers faced by a private
regulator and the challenges presented to traditional legal insti-
tutions asked to develop a public law framework to assure ac-
countability. The lawsuit alleged that MAPS placed Harris on the
RBL without good cause... and without reasonably investigating
facts or giving Harris an opportunity to be heard, 121 that it prom-
ulgated standards that interfered with legitimate communica-
tions,126 and that it imposed conditions for removal from the RBL
that were arbitrary and unreasonable.127 The suit thus challenged
the content of the private rules, and claimed absence of due proc-
ess in applying them and illegality in the sanctions imposed for
violating the rules.
On November 15, 2000, Exactis.com, Inc. sued MAPS in the
United States District Court for the District of Colorado, 128 alleg-
ing claims under the Colorado Wiretapping Act, blocking commu-
nications in violation of state law, 129 the Colorado Organized
Crime Control Act, 3° the Sherman Act,'3 ' the Colorado Unfair
Trade Practices Act,'32 intentional interference with contractual
relations,"' intentional and negligent misrepresentation and ex-
tortion,' trade disparagement, and unfair competition. Exactis
alleged that among the services blocked by MAPS were requested
confirmations of brokerage transactions by Charles Schwab." 5
The complaint alleges a disagreement over the specific proce-
dures to be used to ensure that a recipient wishes to receive e-
mail transmitted through Exactis's service-MAPS insisting on
double opt-in, Exactis utilizing measures "different from, but not
less effective than" double opt-in."6
The example of cattle range regulation nicely parallels
MAPS. Private rules restricting access to a valuable common re-
124 See id at 92(4).
125 Harris Complaint at 60 (cited in note 106).
126 Id at 91.
127 Id at 64.
128 Motion and Memorandum of Plaintiff in Support of Temporary Restraining Order
and Preliminary Injunction ("Exactis.com Complaint"), Exactis.com, Inc v Mail Abuse
Prevention System, LLC, No 00-K-2250 (D Colo filed Nov 15, 2000) available online at
<http://mail-abuse.org/lawsuit/exactisl.html> (visited Feb 6, 2001) [on file with U Chi
Legal F].
129 Id at 65-72.
130 Id at 73-88.
131 Id at 9 89-101.
132 Exactis.com Complaint at 9$ 49-56 (cited in note .128).
133 Id at T 38-48.
134 Id at 91 57-64.
135 Id at 16.
136 Exactis.com Complaint at T 31 (cited in note 128).
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source are made and enforced without intervention of regular
legal institutions. Whether this kind of regulation in cyberspace
will break down as it did on cattle ranges is an open question.
One can only speculate as to possible outcomes of the Exactis
litigation had it not settled." 7 One obvious possibility is that the
MAPS regulatory regime may be allowed to continue according to
the desires of its owners and subscribers. Another possibility is
that the regime will be shut down under an injunction or because
of the magnitude of damages imposed or sought. Or, the courts
might impose conditions on continued operation of the regulatory
regime, analogous to those imposed in the past on private stan-
dard-setting organizations,'38 requiring substantive support for
the content of rules and due process in their application and en-
forcement. Finally, the controversy, and others like it, may stimu-
late legislative action to channel such private self-regulatory ac-
tivities.
The MAPS form of private regulation easily could be ex-
tended to other areas. Religious conservatives could organize a
blacklist for ISPs that handle material that undermines family
values-as defined by the authors of the list. The intellectual
property community could organize a blacklist for ISPs that do
not have sufficiently stringent policies to discourage infringe-
ment. Consumer groups could organize blacklists for ISPs that
allow online merchants to operate without appropriate return
and refund policies.
The spread of peer to peer networking will increase the num-
ber of MAPS imitators. Peer to peer networking depends on thou-
sands or millions of users implementing networking protocols
developed by third parties. Unlike the situation with AOL or
MSN, the desired resources are not present on the property of the
rule maker. Instead, the rule maker controls access to resources
owned by others.
Rule makers who write peer to peer networking codes will no
doubt come under pressure, not only from intellectual property
owners, but from others, to exclude those who do not follow cer-
tain rules with respect either to their acquisition and use of net-
worked resources or their offering of them to others.
137 The parties reached a settlement in the Exactis case on Oct 3, 2001. See "Exactis
Suit Against Maps Dismissed," MAPS, available online at <http://mail-abuse.org/
pressreleases/2001-10-03.html> (visited Oct 13, 2001) [on file with the U Chi Legal F].
138 See, for example, Radiant Burners, Inc v Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co, 364 US 656,
658 (1961) (holding that the refusal of a standard-setting association to approve a com-
petitor's design violated the Sherman Act).
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In all of these cases, ISPs could be coerced into "subscribing"
to the blacklist by threats that any non-subscribing ISP will be
treated like an ISP that handles offending material. Confronted
with the threat of being blacklisted, most ISPs would prefer to
subscribe and thus become a part of an ever-expanding govern-
ance regime, adopting the rules unilaterally determined by the
organizer of the blacklist.
Now David Post thinks all of this is just fine.'39 For Post, it is
sufficient that the government does not administer the RBL; a
private entity does. Post's preference for private ordering over
what he calls "collective" regulation apparently is premised on
the possibility of internet participants freely choosing which regu-
latory regime they prefer. It is not clear how this process of choice
is supposed to work with MAPS. Presumably, Post would say that
ISPs are free to subscribe to MAPS or not. That freedom may be
illusory if MAPS itself or a future elaboration of MAPS were to
blacklist any ISP who does not subscribe.
Moreover, an interest conflict exists between subscribing
ISPs and ISPs handling unsolicited commercial e-mail ("UCE").
The former want to eliminate the costs of handling certain types
of inbound e-mail; the latter want to use the internet as a unified
whole, any part of which is reachable from any other part. Why
should one side of the value argument get to make the decision
because it is in a position to use code to enforce its decision? If the
UCE handlers develop code that will circumvent the RBL, should
that reverse the value decision? That apparently is the world that
Post would prefer.
II. DESIGN OF PUBLIc LAW FRAMEWORKS: GIVING
MEANING TO THE "HYBRID"
It is time to attempt to synthesize from these experiments
some general concepts for the relationship between public law
frameworks and private regulatory regimes.
All modern legal systems proceed from the foundational
premise that only entities possessing sovereignty can make, ap-
139 See Post, 52 Stan L Rev at 1441-42 (cited in note 1):
The MAPS "vigilantes" (bad) can just as easily be characterized as "activ-
ists" (good), and the kind of "bottom-up," uncoordinated, decentralized
process of which the RBL is a part strikes me as a perfectly reasonable
way to make "network policy" and to "answer fundamental policy ques-
tions about how the Net will work."
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ply, and enforce law.14 Despite the association of sovereignty
with national governments, the reality of governance is dispersed
among a rich variety of public and private institutions. Most peo-
ple in industrialized society work for employers who administer
private systems of workplace governance. Most money moves in
complex clearinghouse systems set up and administered by pri-
vate banks. Most industrial production and commerce takes place
in private contractual webs. Much social and religious life tran-
spires in private associations. The increased importance of inter-
national human rights, trade, and environmental law has drawn
upon the energy and expertise of thousands of non-governmental
organizations ("NGOs"), such as Amnesty International and
Greenpeace, to provide information and analysis to treaty based
institutions.
In theory, however, these private governments derive their
power from the regular sovereigns and are subject always to the
sovereign imposing new regulations and enforcing them."4 The
relationship between private governments and traditional sover-
eigns is determined by regular laws or regulations enacted by
regular sovereigns, by constitutions defining the power of regular
sovereigns, or by international treaty or customary law.
Ultimately, the relationships between any governments re-
gardless of their character is determined by the practical ability
to assert coercive power and by the willingness to do so, usually
limited by conceptions of legitimacy. If a domain name server is
located in Country X, the governmental regime applicable to that
name server ultimately will be determined by the practical ability
of Country X to have its police or army seize the domain name
server and by the willingness of the police or army to do that un-
der the rule of law they obey.
140 This section draws heavily on Perritt, 12 Berkeley Tech L J at 425-26 (cited in note
1).
141 David Johnson, in reviewing an earlier draft of this article, objected to its implied
embrace of hierarchy. While he accepts the need for governments and laws to enforce
congruence, (see Part II F 6), he thinks that we are moving over the long term from hier-
archical legal topologies to networked ones, citing the shift from monarchy and other abso-
lutist forms of political rule to parliamentary democracy. He also could have cited the
modern drift from traditional sovereignty to a "civil society" in which NGOs and other
private organizations play roles formerly reserved to public authorities. See Perritt, 88 Ky
L J at 900-03 (cited in note 37) (reviewing role of NGOs). It may be that the only way to
control physical murder is to rely on state coercion, but when the threat is undesirable
electronic messages, a richer set of horizontal and vertical relationships may be more
effective and more just. There is no inherent reason that traditional governments are
always more just than private ordering mechanisms.
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Hybrid regulation signifies regulatory regimes in which
broad public law frameworks allow private regulatory regimes to
work out the details. Within this conceptual framework, Klaus
Grewlich says that self regulation can be realized in three forms:
1. Partial (selective) immunity of enforcement powers of
traditional legal institutions;
2. Immunity from the imposition of neighboring standards
of behavior; or
3. Recognition of rule-based adjudicatory acts of the
autonomous community.
142
Hybrid regulation and other contractual solutions to jurisdic-
tional uncertainty rely on intermediaries to develop and enforce
rules. Private regulatory regimes are a form of government. As
such, they must have legislators, judges, and sheriffs. 44 Private
legislators make the rules, private judges apply them to concrete
situations, and private sheriffs enforce the rules against viola-
tors. Each type of institution, in the private regulatory regime as
a whole, must be accountable. Hybrid regulation can be under-
stood as providing public law frameworks to assure accountabil-
ity.145
142 See Klaus W. Grewlich, Governance in "Cyberspace": Access and Public Interest in
Global Communications 323 (Iewer Law Intl 1999).
143 In the tax area, governments often use financial intermediaries--employers, banks,
and retailers-to collect taxes.
144 See Perritt, 12 Berkeley Tech L J at 426 (cited in note 1) ("The crucial elements of a
self governing community are completeness, the availability of coercive power to enforce
community decisions, and a contractual framework expressing the norms, procedures, and
institutional competencies."). Part II B of this Article explores the three functions of gov-
ernment more fully.
145 Accountability is a central feature of rule of law and democracy. See Jacques De-
Lile, Lex Americana?: United States Legal Assistance, American Legal Models, and Legal
Change in the Post-Communist World and Beyond, 20 U Pa J Intl Econ L 179, 186-87
(1999) (citing examples of insistence on accountability of governments receiving U.S. aid);
Jane S. Schacter, MetaDemocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory
Interpretation, 108 Harv L Rev 593, 594 (1995) ("Fidelity to the legislature is thought to
satisfy the demands of democratic theory by allowing popularly elected officials, presumed
to be accountable to their constituents, to make policy decisions."); Steven P. Croley, The
Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U Chi L Rev 689, 789
(1995) (exploring mechanisms for accountability of judges, consistent with traditions of
Democracy and constitutionalism); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a Constitutional
Theory, 87 Cal L Rev 535, 560 (1999) ("[1n the first instance, the responsibility for devel-
oping effective governmental programs should almost always devolve on politically ac-
countable institutions."); Froomkin, 50 Duke L J at 28 (cited in note 27) (noting that the
purpose of shackling private parties through administrative procedure is to assure ac-
countability); Netanel, 88 Cal L Rev at 451 (cited in note 5) ("social accountability" is part
of the foundation of democratic culture); A. Michael Froomkin, Of Governments and Gov-
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In evaluating the possibilities, the rest of this Article often
uses the nomenclature and many concepts from administrative
law, even though administrative law usually is thought of as fo-
cusing exclusively on public institutions. The justification for us-
ing administrative law as a source of concepts for making private
regulation accountable also is that administrative law is con-
cerned with protecting those regulated from arbitrary or proce-
durally irregular actions by regulators. That precise concern is
the concern of this Article.
A. The Imprecise Boundary between Public
and Private Regulation
In any legal system, the formal sovereign on occasion grants
(delegates) governmental power to nominally private entities,'46
the sovereign limits what a private actor may do with her own or
another's property, and the sovereign decides what contracts to
enforce.
These interactions between the public realm and the private
realm illustrate the influence of public law on private law and
vice versa; the boundary always has been permeable. '47 According
ernance, 14 Berkeley Tech L J 617, 628-29 (1999) (entrusting major aspects of policymak-
ing to elected officials ensures some form of accountability to the public at large); Perritt,
International Administrative Law, 51 Admin L Rev at 896-900 (cited in note 40) (explain-
ing how mechanisms of accountability in American administrative law can be extended
conceptually to internet regulatory agencies that operate in the international arena).
146 See, for example, Joseph Story, Familiar Exposition of the Constitution of the
United States §§ 10-13, 17-19 at 33-38 (Regnery 1986) (enumerating three types of
American colony-provincial, proprietary, and compact--each involving governmental
power delegated from the King).
147 Regarding the terms "public" and "private" law, a leading commentator has stated
that they are:
common in a variety of contexts and have also carried a variety of other
meanings. Because the public/private distinction emerged from the notion
that there is a separate and distinct private order, private law can be un-
derstood as protecting pre-political rights. Private law, then, was that
part of the legal system protecting the private ordering; public law con-
sisted of government compulsions restricting private freedom. Under that
definition, property law, tort law, and contract law may be considered ex-
amples of private law, and labor law and constitutional law public law.
Lan Cao, Looking at Communities and Markets, 74 Notre Dame L Rev 841, 924 (1999),
citing Daniel A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey, In the Shadow of the Legislature: The Com-
mon Law in the Age of the New Public Law, 89 Mich L Rev 875, 886 (1991).
Legal reform for transitional societies focuses on private law in the sense that it
emphasizes developing the law of property, of contracts, of corporations, and of financial
markets. See Paul H. Brietzke, Designing the Legal Framework for Markets in Eastern
Europe, 7 Transnatl Law 35, 41-51 (1994) (noting that neoclassical economists of the
Chicago school generally believe that appropriate reforms for Eastern European govern-
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to Philip Frickey and Daniel Farber, traditional conceptions hold
that private law is that part of the legal system that protects pri-
vate ordering, while public law consists of governmental compul-
sions restricting private freedom. 48 Now, they suggest, the dis-
tinction between public and private law has been blurred; private
law reflects public policy choices, and public law tends to grant
new individual rights.'49 "All conflict of laws rules allocate power
to government."5 ° And, public interests in a market economy in-
clude private interests. 5'
Most apparently private regulation is hybrid. The challenge
is not to define an impermeable boundary between public and
private spheres. While the public law framework for private regu-
lation must recognize the historic difference between the law's
treatment of the public and private spheres, it must include crite-
ria or rules of thumb to constrain private decisionmaking, thus
encompassing the three major functions of government: rulemak-
ing, adjudication, and enforcement.
Rulemaking, as its name suggests, is the adoption of new
rules or norms to guide behavior.'52 Adjudication is the applica-
tion of rules to particular persons, entities, and events. Adjudica-
ments should focus on adoption of "an idealized U.S. private law of property, contracts,
corporations, bankruptcy and securities regulation").
148 Daniel A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey, In the Shadow of the Legislature: the Com-
mon Law in the Age of the New Public Law, 89 Mich L Rev 875, 886 (1991).
149 Joel Trachtman has observed that "private law is an oxymoron." Joel P. Trachtman,
Conflict of Laws and Accuracy in the Allocation of Government Responsibility, 26 Vand J
Transnatl L 975, 984 (1994). For additional sources of the distinction between public and
private law, see id at 1035 n 245. In fact, he points out, conflict of laws-the traditional
category of private international law-relates to public law. See id at 985.
150 Id at 985. Trachtman proposes allocation of prescriptive jurisdiction to govern-
ment(s) whose constituents are affected by the subject matter, pro rata in proportion to
the relative magnitude of such effects, as accurately as is merited given transaction costs
in allocation of prescriptive jurisdiction. See id at 987.
151 See id at 997 (discussing whether conflict of laws address the state or the "private
person"). Dean Krent and Professor Freeman reinforce this insight, pushing for a more
sophisticated understanding of a regulatory state that enlists a variety of public and pri-
vate actors in the governance enterprise. See Krent, 85 Nw U L Rev at 62 (cited in note
40); Freeman, 75 NYU L Rev at 543 (cited in note 42).
152 The rules may be technical: if a domain name server does not have a domain name
in its look-up table, it must refer the domain-name-resolution request to another server,
defined for a higher level domain. Rules may directly regulate behavior and define the
consequences of disobeying a rule: one who uses the trademark of another, creating the
likelihood of consumer confusion, must pay damages to the owner of the trademark. Inter-
stellar Starship Services v EPIX, Inc, 125 F Supp 2d 1269, 1272 (D Or 2001) (stating the
general rule that once trademark infringement is shown, plaintiff has only a minimal
burden to recover damages). Rules may define governmental power: America Online may
deny access to any subscriber who violates its "rules of the road." See, for example, AOL
Anywhere Terms and Conditions of Use, available online at <http://www.aol.coml
copyright.html> (visited June 20, 2001) [on file with U Chi Legal F].
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tion may be highly formal, as in an American jury trial, or it may
be very informal as when a graduate school dean decides whether
a faculty member has met the criteria for tenure. All adjudicators
must have mechanisms for deciding what rules to apply, for iden-
tifying the cases and persons they have power over, and for re-
solving disagreements about the facts. Adjudicators also must
know what they should do with other adjudicatory decisions-are
they bound by them or should they decide for themselves, essen-
tially ignoring the other adjudicatory decisions?
Ultimately, rules, applied through adjudicatory decisions,
must be enforced. In the public sphere, if someone thumbs his
nose at an adjudicatory decision applying a rule to him, the state
takes his property or puts him in jail. Both the taking of the
property and the incarceration are acts of enforcement. Enforcers
must know what rules and what adjudicatory decisions they are
permitted and obligated to enforce (do NATO troops enforce ar-
rest warrants from the Hague Tribunal?). And they also must
know the extent of their enforcement powers (may an American
drug enforcement agent arrest a Mexican citizen located in Mex-
ico?). All three functions must be implemented through mecha-
nisms that link private decisionmaking to public law.
It is not clear that David Post would agree with this proposi-
tion. For him, the distinction between public and private is much
clearer, and important to preserve. He purports to agree with
Lessig that fundamental values are at stake in the further con-
struction of cyberspace 53 and that the threat to be resisted by law
is the "'threat to liberty.""54 But he wants policy to be made by the
market-the private sphere-rather than in the public sphere.
For Post, the crucial salvation for MAPS and RBL is that it "is
not government-based or government-endorsed in any way."'55
But why should this matter so much? If I am mugged by a
private individual rather than by a cop, I am not indifferent to
my concussion or the loss of my wallet because the actor was pri-
vate. If my employer wants to control my lifestyle in detail, I am
no more free because I work for private enterprise rather than
the state. If I must buy my groceries at the company store, and
the company police suppress my criticism, I am not "free" because
the store and the police force are not operated by the government.
153 Post, 52 Stan L Rev at 1440 (cited in note 1).
154 Id at 1448, quoting Lessig, Code at 85 (cited in note 15).
155 Post, 52 Stan L Rev at 1450 (cited in note 1).
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Post, having agreed that a threat exists, erects a Maginot
line along the English Channel against (English) government
participation in regulation, while neglecting the possibility that
liberty will be attacked by Germany through the low countries.
MAPS is a German blitz through Belgium. The English are
unlikely to attack across the Channel. The law protected against
private abuse and exploitation even before it protected against
public-sector abuse. Wanting to keep the government in check is
no argument for abandoning a rule of law with respect to private
power.
Jody Freeman criticizes administrative law for its preoccupa-
tion with protecting the public realm against intrusions by pri-
vate actors. She proposes instead a deeper analysis of the reality
that most governance is a "set of negotiated relationships" be-
tween public and private actors.'56 She explains that the sharp
distinction between public and private realms is misleading,'57
and that administrative law is wrong to focus only on account-
ability in the public realm.'58 She offers a rich set of examples of
commingling of public and private decisionmaking, including in-
corporation of privately formulated rules into public agency rules,
deputization of private enforcers of public rules, and privatization
of public functions,'59 using healthcare6 ° and prison administra-
tion'6' as paradigms. In all the examples of mixed regulation, the
greater private role presents special problems of accountability.'62
She offers little hope, however, that traditional mechanisms
of accountability, such as judicial review of state action,'63 appli-
cation of the nondelegation doctrine,"' or extension of adminis-
trative law,165 can address the realities of modern regulation ade-
quately, given the reluctance of courts to expand these doctrines.
She holds somewhat more hope for private law such as contract,
tort and property, although she also is skeptical that courts will
156 Freeman, 75 NYU L Rev at 547-49 (cited in note 42).
157 See id at 564-66 (discussing the "illusion of a public realm").
158 See id at 546-47 (noting that viewing administrative law as a set of negotiated
relationships "invites a reconsideration of the agency of the primary unit of analysis in the
field").
159 Id at 547.
160 See Freeman, 75 NYU L Rev at 594-625 (cited in note 42) (discussing the complex
intermingling of public and private functions in the health care field).
161 Id at 625-36.
162 Id at 574 (arguing that private actors "exacerbate" the concerns that make agency
discretion problematic).
163 Id at 575-80.
164 See Freeman, 75 NYU L Rev at 580-86 (cited in note 42).
165 Id at 586-88.
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be willing to make the necessary expansions of current doc-
trine.166
She urges a "deeper analysis" of the realities of public/private
governance to seek new methods of assuring accountability, in-
cluding the need for rationality and public orientation.16 Profes-
sor Freeman suggests that a public orientation might include
values such as expertise, rationality, and disinterest, and consid-
eration of non-economic factors and the protection of diffused,
unorganized interests.'68
B. Accountability Must Encompass the Three
Major Functions of Government
Regulators-public or private-make, apply, and enforce
rules. Any complete mechanism to make private regulation of the
internet accountable must address these three major functions of
government: rulemaking, adjudication, and enforcement.
Any of these functions may be performed by regular govern-
ment institutions, or they may be performed by private actors.
Legislatures may perform the rulemaking function, but so also
may a corporate board of directors. The Circuit Court of DuPage
County, Illinois, may perform the adjudicatory function, but so
also may a private arbitrator or a WIPO dispute resolution panel
when it orders a domain name registrar to revoke a domain name
because it violates ICANN policy (a system of rules). Enforcement
may be the province of the Sheriff of Tuscaloosa County, Ala-
bama, but it also may be performed by American Express when it
cancels credit card privileges.
1. Primacy of enforcement.
Enforcement is the ultimate governmental decision. Dean
Krent refers to backing private regulatory efforts with "coercive
force."169 Klaus Grewlich observes:
Legal theory proceeds from the basic premise that ulti-
mately only sovereign entities endowed with coercive
166 Id at 588-92 (noting that the protections courts afford those affected by private
decisions remains minimal, as does the scope of judicial review).
167 Id at 674-75.
168 See Freeman, 75 NYU L Rev at 558 n 52 (cited in note 42).
169 Krent, 85 Nw U L Rev at 67 (cited in note 40) (referring to the scope of delegated
power as any which "empowers those outside Congress" to implement a legislative objec-
tive and "backs those efforts with the coercive force of the federal government").
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power can make, apply and enforce legal norms, i.e. law.
Hans Kelsen defines "law" a coercive order. It provides for
socially organized sanctions, and these can be clearly dis-
tinguished from a religious order on the one hand and a
merely moral order on the other hand. As a coercive order,
the law is that specific social technique which consists in
the attempt to bring about the desired social conduct of
men through the threat of a measure of coercion which is
to be taken in case of ... legally wrong conduct."0
Although Professor Grewlich refers to coercive power to
make, apply, and enforce, coercion actually comes into play only
in the enforcement function. The state does not really enjoy a
monopoly on rulemaking; private property owners often make
rules that condition their consent for others to be on the property.
Violation of the rules makes the violator a trespasser. The state
also does not really enjoy a monopoly on adjudication; disputes
often are submitted to private arbitration or other forms of pri-
vate dispute resolution.
Indeed, the state does not enjoy a complete monopoly over
enforcement. Creditors may use self-help repossession,171 and
property owners may expel trespassers so long as a breach of the
peace does not result.7 2 It is more correct to say that the state
has a monopoly over coercive enforcement. Sovereignty is associ-
ated with nation-states that have practical ability to assert
physical power to coerce compliance with their law within defined
borders and with respect to a defined class of persons. 73
170 Grewlich, Governance in "Cyberspace" at 323 (cited in note 142) (citations omitted).
171 See Flagg Brothers, 436 US at 165 (noting that § 7-210 of the New York Uniform
Commercial Code "permits but does not compel a private party to sell the goods of another
party... in order to satisfy a debt owed"); UCC § 9-503 (1999) (defining a secured party's
right to take possession after default).
172 See, for example, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 185 (1979) (entry by landlord
onto land to oust trespassers); id at § 187 (entry by landlord to demand rent); id at §§ 198-
99 (allowing entry onto land to reclaim goods to remove trespassing goods); id at § 201
(allowing entry onto land to abate private nuisance at reasonable time and in reasonable
manner); id at § 203 (allowing abatement of public nuisance by private person threatened
with special harm); id at § 272 (recapture of chattel); § 273 (distraint of chattels); § 260
(removal of trespassing chattels); William Blackstone, 3 Commentaries on the Laws of
England 4-6 (Clarendon 1768) (describing as permissible recaption or reprisal of chattels,
entry onto land to end trespass, abatement of nuisances, and distraint of chattels as rem-
edy for nonpayment of rent or to end trespass, and noting that the only condition attached
to these self-help remedies was that they could not result in a breach of the peace).
173 New nations, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, are defined, and old nations, such as the
Soviet Union, disappear, but the coming into being of a sovereign state is a momentous
occasion in diplomacy and international law.
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Enforcement ripens legal issues that may exist with respect
to the other two functions. Suppose you have software that per-
mits you to eavesdrop on a neighbor's cable modem communica-
tion. Various public or private institutions may make "rules" that
purport to prohibit your possession or use of the software. If, say,
the Internet Law and Policy Forum or the American Bar Associa-
tion adopts a resolution prohibiting the use of such software, you
are unlikely to pay much attention. If the Russian Duma adopts a
statute outlawing the software, you will not be moved (assuming
your conduct occurs entirely in the United States). Even if a tri-
bunal associated with one of these institutions applies the "rule"
to you after an adversarial trial, you still will not change your
conduct, unless you believe the decision will be enforced. In other
words, what matters to you is the enforcement decision, which
necessarily embodies the antecedent rule and adjudicatory deci-
sions. You don't really pay attention to the acts of governance
until you think someone is going to come and seize your software,
fine you, or put you in jail.
Most, but not all, private regulatory decisions rely on the
possibility of enforcement actions in the public courts. In any
governance system, there will be some people who break the
rules, and who will not comply voluntarily with decisions of adju-
dicatory bodies prescribing penalties or other remedial action. To
those people, there must be some means of coercive enforcement.
That may be kicking them out of, or excluding them from, the
community-for example through an action for trespass.'74 It may
be taking their property. It may be incarcerating them. In virtu-
ally every legal system, the state has a monopoly on incarceration
and legally taking property. When coercive enforcement is neces-
sary, state enforcers must be willing to enforce decisions of pri-
vate institutions.
To be sure, you may anticipate enforcement of the hypotheti-
cal rule against "sniffer" software. Most people change their con-
duct to conform to new rules adopted by legislative institutions
with undisputed authority. They do that because they anticipate
174 See, for example, America Online, Inc v IMS, 24 F Supp 2d 548, 550 (E D Va 1998)
(holding that the sending of more than sixty million unsolicited e-mails ("spam") to Amer-
ica Online subscribers was an actionable trespass to chattels under Virginia common law);
CompuServe Inc v Cyber Promotions, Inc, 962 F Supp 1015, 1022 (S D Ohio 1997) (holding
that the sending of bulk e-mails by a promoter through Compuserve equipment "dimin-
ished" the value of the equipment to Compuserve and was a trespass to chattels warrant-
ing imposition of a temporary injunction). For a general discussion, see Dan L. Burk, The
Trouble with Trespass, 4 J Small & Emerging Bus L 27, 39-43 (2000) (discussing trespass
in cyberspace).
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that adjudicatory institutions will apply the rule to their noncon-
forming conduct, and that enforcement officers such as the sheriff
will enforce the decisions of adjudicatory institutions. Most people
pay civil judgments because they anticipate that the sheriff will
enforce the judgments by seizing and selling their property. But
they comply voluntarily because they know that coercive en-
forcement is a realistic possibility.'75
Because enforcement is the function that embodies the coer-
cive power of the state, accountability most often focuses on en-
forcement. In administrative law, for example, pre-enforcement
judicial review of agency rules is limited: an adversely affected
party ordinarily must wait until the agency takes some coercive
action, usually through the courts.' When one seeks to challenge
the constitutionality of a statute, one usually must wait until the
statute is enforced.
177
Thus, when private rulemaking depends for its effect on ad-
judication and enforcement by public institutions,78 or when pri-
vate adjudication depends on enforcement by public institu-
tions, 179 the involvement of public institutions provides some lev-
175 See Tom R. Tyler, Compliance with Intellectual Property Laws: A Psychological
Perspective, 29 NYU J Intl L & Polit 219, 222-24 (1996) (arguing that the threat of en-
forcement often is ineffective because of low probability of apprehension and sanctions; in
other cases, higher probability makes coercive threat more effective; voluntary cooperation
depends as much on creating culture that promotes compliance, and that depends on
morality and legitimacy).
176 See Abbott Laboratories v Gardner, 387 US 136, 148-49 (1967):
Without undertaking to survey the intricacies of the ripeness doctrine it
is fair to say that its basic rationale is to prevent the courts, through
avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in ab-
stract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the
agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has
been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging
parties.
Id (emphasis added).
177 Until a statute is enforced, potential plaintiffs lack standing unless they can dem-
onstrate that the statute facially deters their constitutionally protected activity. Applica-
tion of Martin, 447 A2d 1290, 1296 (NJ 1982). "A litigant may not.., challenge the consti-
tutionality of a state criminal statute merely because he desires to wipe it off the books or
even because he may someday wish to act in a fashion that violates it." Kvue, Inc v Moore,
709 F2d 922, 928 (5th Cir 1983), citing Younger v Harris, 401 US 37, 42 (1971).
178 An example would be application and enforcement of private "trade practice" in
courts constituted by federal or state government.
179 An example would be judicial enforcement of an arbitration award under the New
York Convention. See United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards Art III ("New York Convention"), 1970 21 UST 2519, TIAS No
6997 (1958) ("Each contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and en-
force them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is
relied upon under the conditions laid down in the following Articles."). See also Federal
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erage to assure accountability by the private rulemakers or adju-
dicators.
But suppose the state never has occasion to assert its coer-
cive power? Suppose a private entity or system possesses the
practical power to enforce its own decisions? Seizure, expulsion or
exclusion are remedies that may not require reliance on coercive
measures as to which the state has a monopoly. This is the case
with self-help repossession of chattels, as in Flagg Brothers,8 '
with excluding new ranchers from the roundup on the cattle
range in the Wild West, and with blacklisting ISPs on RBL when
they handle UCE not conforming to MAPS rules.
To the extent that internet governance is adequately backed
up by the power of expulsion or exclusion,18' its private govern-
ance institutions do not need the enforcement assistance of the
state.182 Then, the only public mechanism for assuring account-
ability by private rulemakers, adjudicators, and enforcers is a
civil action that might produce an injunction or damages award
against the private actors. 3
2. Rules.
Anyone can make rules. The question is whether anyone else
will obey them. The English King Canute issued rules prohibiting
the surf from wetting his ankles, but the water did not obey
him.'84 Conversely, some rules are obeyed as a matter of social
convention. No legislature adopted, no court applies, and no sher-
iff enforces, the widely observed rule to go to the back of a queue.
Often, however, mere social convention is not enough and the
law must reinforce rule compliance. When that is necessary, the
efficacy of rules depends on whether they are (a) applied by adju-
dicatory institutions and (b) enforced by someone with coercive
power.
Arbitration Act, 9 USC § 3 (1994) (requiring judicial deference to pre-established arbitra-
tion arrangements).
180 See discussion of Flagg Brothers in Part I C 4.
181 ICANN and MAPS are strong examples. Denial of a domain name, or placement on
the blacklist, excludes the target from all or a significant part of the internet without
reliance on any order from a court.
182 Of course, the power of expulsion may be limited in its coercive effect because
someone may be expelled from one part of the internet only to be allowed into another.
That is why the MAPS blacklist is so powerful; it reinforces the power of expulsion by
making it potentially internet-wide.
183 Part II D 4 considers legal theories to support such civil actions.
184 See William J. Bennett, ed, The Book of Virtues: A Treasury of Great Moral Stories
(Simon & Schuster 1993).
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3. Adjudicatory decisions.
The first obligation for rule efficacy is that adjudicatory insti-
tutions apply the body of rules adopted by the rulemaker. This
obligation implicates concurrent jurisdiction in the vertical sense.
Obviously, some adjudicatory institutions might have this obliga-
tion with respect to some rules, while others do not. For example,
the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") administrative
law judges are obligated to apply FCC rules, but Department of
Transportation administrative law judges are not obligated to
apply FCC rules.'85 The rulemaker has broader scope of influence
if tribunals and other legal systems must apply its rules. Thus,
rule effectiveness depends in the first instance on whether adju-
dicatory institutions with personal jurisdiction over a rule viola-
tor recognize the rules asserted to bind the violator.
Recognition, in turn, depends on the prescriptive jurisdiction
of the rulemaker and the application of the adjudicator's choice-
of-law standard.' For example, an American court may or may
not apply rules adopted by the Russian Parliament with respect
to ownership of copyright.'87 Eventually, a body chartered by the
internet community to make rules might produce a body of rules
that courts in all countries throughout the world undertake to
apply, but no such possibility exists now.
185 See F. Kralicek v Apfel, 229 F3d 1164 (10th Cir 2000) (holding that it is impermis-
sible for an AUJ to draw a different conclusion from another agency's determination,
which was based on different rules not binding on the A.'s agency); Jenkins v Chater, 76
F3d 231, 233 (8th Cir 1996) (holding that a VA determination of eligibility for disability
benefits does not bind a social security AL. because the regulations are different). Some
agencies instruct their ALJs that they must follow agencies rules even when they conflict
with circuit law developed by a United States Court of Appeals. See NLRB v Blackstone
Co, 685 F2d 102, 106 (3d Cir 1982) (referring to NLRB's instructions to ALJs not to follow
Third Circuit law to be "completely improper and reflective of a bureaucratic arrogance
which will not be tolerated"), vacated on other grounds, 462 US 1127 (1983). It would not
be "arrogant" for an agency to order its ALJs not to follow the rules of another agency.
186 Prescriptive jurisdiction and choice of law are intertwined. Suppose a dispute that
touches states A and B is litigated in B. Suppose further that the substantive law of both
A and B is subject to interpretations that could cause either to apply to the dispute. Appli-
cation of A's choice of law rule represents a sovereign judgment by A as to whether its own
law should be interpreted to apply to the dispute, in light of the interpretation that B
would give to its own law with respect to the dispute. In that respect, the choice of law
rules of both jurisdictions are expressions of their legislative conclusions as to the extent
of their prescriptive jurisdiction.
187 See, for example, Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v Russian Kurier, Inc, 153 F3d
82, 88-89 (2d Cir 1997) (applying Russian law to a copyright infringement suit brought by
a Russian news conglomerate against a United States publisher of Russian news, but
noting that "[c]hoice of law issues in international copyright cases have been largely ig-
nored," and that some courts apply United States law "without discussing the conflicts
issue").
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The relation between adjudicatory bodies and rulemakers
also depends on a hierarchy of rules. When both a federal statute
and a state statute govern the same conduct, the Supremacy
Clause... requires that the adjudicator apply the federal rather
than the state rule, if they conflict. If both a statute and a con-
tract express rules governing the same conduct, an adjudicator
must apply the statute, if the rules conflict. If the common law of
tort and rules made by a private entity conflict, a court must ap-
ply the common law and disregard the private rules. Thus, the
Supremacy Clause and preemption are both choice of law rules.
When private rules are made within a contractual frame-
work, the status of private rules in other, public, adjudicatory
and rulemaking forums are likely to be determined by the rules
for enforcing contracts. There is a doctrine in the contract law of
most legal systems that precludes enforcement of contracts that
"violate public policy."189 There also is a doctrine that limits the
enforceability of certain unconscionable "contracts of adhesion.""9
These doctrines may be used to ensure that only those private
rules fairly arrived at between parties with reasonable equal bar-
gaining power may be given legal effect by regular legal institu-
tions.
When rules are made by a private entity exercising control
over a valuable resource, the bases for a public institution such as
a court to impose public policy requirements overriding or limit-
ing the private rules depend on the existence of a private right of
action to implicate the power of the public institution.
Horizontal concurrent jurisdiction may exist with respect to
the adjudicatory function. If a private adjudicator and a national
court decide the same case the same way, there is little likelihood
of concern. But they may decide the same case differently, and
the possibility of conflict means that the adjudicator with supe-
rior power will predominate.
Resolving conflicts among adjudicatory decisions involves
four doctrines of recognition: deferral, res judicata, collateral es-
toppel, and stare decisis. Deferral means that a state institution,
when presented with a case, will refuse to decide it until it has
been decided by another, private, institution.'91 The criteria that
justify deferral are the same ones that justify res judicata, al-
188 US Const Art VI, cl 2.
189 See, for example, 17A Am Jur 2d Contracts § 257 (1991).
190 See id.
191 See, for example, Black's Law Dictionary 432 (West 7th ed 1999).
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though the deferral doctrine is more flexible. Deferral allows the
deferring institution to revisit a matter once the deferral institu-
tion has decided it and possibly to reach a different decision.
Res judicata obligates the second institution presented with a
matter to forebear. The Latin phrase translates as "the thing de-
cided."'92 It signifies that once a thing (a controversy) is decided
by one adjudicatory institution, it is decided once and for all, and
is then beyond the power of other adjudicatory institutions to de-
cide for themselves. Collateral estoppel applies to particular fact
or law issues in a case, while res judicata applies to a decision on
the entire case.
Deferral and res judicata apply to particular disputes be-
tween particular parties. A trademark dispute decided by an ar-
bitrator would be res judicata, and the losing party could not ob-
tain a different outcome by suing in court over the same dispute.
Stare decisis is a broader doctrine. It signifies that the rule of
decision emerging from one case must be applied to other similar
cases.'93 Thus, suppose a private dispute resolution panel decides
that a domain name may not be issued when it is similar to an
established trademark. In a system in which stare decisis applies,
that decision would be applied to a subsequent trade-
mark/domain name conflict involving different parties and a dif-
ferent trademark and domain name. Stare decisis is usually
thought of as an aspect of adjudication, but it also is a source of
rulemaking. The first decision gives rise to a rule which is applied
in subsequent decisions.
One can conceive of a legal system, or parallel legal systems,
in which none of these four doctrines apply. A private internet
governance system might authorize adjudicatory decision-
making, while externally, the regular national courts would ig-
nore decisions made by the private institutions. In such a system,
the losing party in the private system always would have an in-
centive to take another bite of the apple in another forum (assum-
ing a private right of action exists) in the hope of getting a differ-
ent result. While economic considerations might mitigate the in-
cidence of relitigation (this would be an example of acquiescence),
the absence of deferral, res judicata, collateral estoppel, and stare
decisis would limit the effect of the private system.
Defining the boundary between public and private spheres is
much easier for adjudicatory private regulation than for prescrip-
192 See, for example, id at 1312.
193 See, for example, id at 1414.
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tive private regulation. The Restatement of Judgments sets forth
criteria for private adjudicatory decisions before they can be
treated like judicial judgments for recognition and enforcement
purposes.194 The New York Convention19 and the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act 96 similarly express long-accepted principles for judicial
deferral to private arbitration. Typical taxonomies of procedural
due process focus on adjudication."' The harder problem relates
to defining boundaries for prescriptive private regulation and
rulemaking.
4. Deference and immunities.
Accountability of private regulatory decisions depends on the
degree of deference that public adjudicatory and enforcement in-
stitutions give to private decisions, and the immunities enjoyed
by private decisionmakers when they are sued in the regular
courts for their private enforcement action.
Public institutions may defer to private regulatory decisions.
They may defer when either vertical or horizontal concurrent ju-
risdiction exists. Deference is most common in the arbitration
context, when one of the parties to an arbitration agreement
seeks to avoid the private adjudicatory system represented by
arbitration by filing suit in the regular courts, or by commencing
a proceeding before an administrative agency. In many such
cases, the public institution refuses to decide the case on the mer-
its, but defers to the private decisionmaker."9 ' This is an instance
of the public institution declining horizontal concurrent jurisdic-
tion. Even when the public institution does not defer altogether,
194 Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 84 (1982) (granting res judicata effect to
arbitration awards meeting certain criteria).
195 See note 179.
196 See id.
197 See Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U Pa L Rev 1267, 1279-95
(1975) (enumerating eleven elements of procedural due process applicable to adjudicative
procedures); Perritt, 15 Oh St J on Disp Resol at 675 (cited in note 80) (applying Friendly's
elements of due process to private adjudication in cyberspace).
198 See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 USC § 3 (1994):
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United
States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in
writing for such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon
being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is refer-
able to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of one
of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been
had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the appli-
cant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration.
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it may admit the private decision into evidence and give it "great
weight. "199
Deference also may occur in the vertical concurrent jurisdic-
tion context. Suppose an internet service provider seeks an in-
junction or damages in the regular courts against an actor who
violates private rules adopted by the service provider and applied
through the service provider's adjudicatory mechanisms.2"' The
court may defer to the private decisions, or it may decide the pro-
priety of excluding the rule violator de novo.
Whether private regulation equipped with its own enforce-
ment measures is accountable under public law depends on the
justiciability of the private conduct. Those enforcing private rules
may be unaccountable because the private enforcers enjoy immu-
nity.20 1
Immunities for certain kinds of private regulation are well
known to American law. For example, regulation of religious con-
troversies by church institutions is immune from civil liability in
many states.2 Immunity shields a wider variety of private regu-
199 Alexander v Gardner Denver Co, 415 US 36, 59 (1974) (allowing court hearing a
statutory discrimination claim to give "great weight" to arbitration award that fully con-
sidered claim). Whether an administrative decision under the ICANN UDRP is entitled to
such weight in proceedings in the regular courts is uncertain. See ICANN UDRP (cited in
note 57). Section 4(k) of the ICANN UDRP preserves the rights of domain name dispu-
tants to take their controversies to court, but is silent on the judicial effect to be given to a
related administrative decision, presumably because this is a matter to be determined
under the rules of evidence of the particular national court. See id.
200 See Cyber Promotions, Inc v America Online, Inc, 948 F Supp 436, 437 (E D Pa
1996) (recognizing the action of trespass to chattels when defendant sent mass e-mails to
AOL's subscribers); Burk, 4 J Small & Emerging Bus L at 27 (cited in note 174) (noting
that courts have used trespass to chattels, an "obscure nineteenth century claim[,] to
exclude unsolicited bulk e-mail or 'spam' first from the computer systems of Internet sub-
scription services, and more recently from corporate computer systems"). But compare
Parisi v Netlearning, Inc, 139 F Supp 2d 745, 751-52 (E D Va 2001) (declining to treat
ICANN UDRP as arbitration for deferral purposes).
201 "Immunity" is used in a broad-and perhaps, loose-sense in this section, to en-
compass the absence of a cause of action, and the existence of a privilege, as well as im-
munity from suit, in the formal sense. See Restatement (Second) of Torts 392, Introduc-
tory Note to ch 45A (1979) (defining immunity as "avoid[ing] liability in tort under all
circumstances ... because of the status or position of the favored defendant or his rela-
tionship with others").
202 In Williams v Gleason, 26 SW3d 54 (Tex App 2000), church members filed claims
against individual church officers on defamation and prima facie tort theories, claiming
failure to follow the church's constitutional rules in a church trial, refusing copies of trial
evidence and transcripts, denying rights of cross examination, presentation of witnesses,
and recording of the trial. Id at 58. Based on ecclesiastical immunity rooted in First
Amendment doctrine, the Texas appellate court dismissed the lawsuit. Id at 59 (noting
that "the Constitution forbids the government from interfering with the right of hierarchi-
cal religious bodies to establish their own internal rules and regulations and to create
tribunals for adjudicating disputes over religious matters").
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latory activities," 3 including presentation of evidence and resolu-
tion of controversies in arbitration."4 Despite the apparent com-
plexity of the current legal framework to make regulation ac-
countable, the immunity doctrine essentially boils down to the
willingness of the sheriff to enforce rules and adjudicatory deci-
sions, shaped in turn by the possibility that the sheriff may be
personally liable for his coercive enforcement actions.2 5 At the
time of the American Revolution, the common law assured ac-
countable government mainly through application of various
privileges and immunities for governmental actors. For example,
the British soldiers involved in the Boston Massacre were tried in
common law courts and acquitted because they were found to en-
joy governmental immunity.26 A public official who seized and
sold private property or who arrested a private actor was an-
swerable for trespass or false imprisonment, unless he could es-
tablish either the privilege of authority of law2 7 or that he was
immune from suit because of his official capacity.20 8
203 See Weight-Rite Golf Corp v United States Golf Association, 766 F Supp 1104, 1112
(M D Fla 1991) (holding that a golf association officer's statement was qualifiedly privi-
leged and therefore not defamatory because it was made between two parties who both
had an interest or duty relating to its subject matter), affd, 953 F2d 651, 651 (11th Cir
1992).
204 See New England Cleaning Services, Inc v American Arbitration Association, 199
F3d 542, 545-46 (1st Cir 1999) (recognizing immunity for organizations sponsoring arbi-
tration).
205 For example, the structure of judicial review of governmental action under the
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), and under constitutional tort theories, involves the
interplay between a cause of action against a government actor and immunity for that
actor. Causes of action-and thus limitation of immunity-exist under 5 USC § 701(a)(1)
(1994) (providing judicial review except where precluded by a statute or agency discre-
tion); or under Bivens v Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
US 388, 292 (1971) ("[A]s our cases make clear, the Fourth Amendment operates as a
limitation upon the exercises of federal power regardless of whether the State in whose
jurisdiction that power is exercised would prohibit or penalize the identical act if engaged
in by a private citizen."); or under 42 USC § 1983 (1994) (providing a civil action for "the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws")
with the availability of sovereign immunity under 5 USC § 702 (1994) (allowing for a
waiver of sovereign immunity in a case that does not involve money damages).
206 Hiller B. Zobel, The Boston Massacre 132-44 (1970) (reviewing the relationship
between British soldiers in Boston and the law); id at 241-94 (describing the trial of the
soldiers).
207 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 121 (1979) (giving privileges incident to arrest by
peace officer "acting within the limits of his appointment"); Blackstone, 3 Commentaries at
127-28 (cited in note 172) (acting outside authority gives rise to liability for false impris-
onment, including executing warrant at the wrong time).
208 See Blackstone, Commentaries (cited in note 172); Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 895D comment g (1999) (when officer exceeds official authority he had no more immu-
nity than private citizen. "It is as if a police officer of one state makes an arrest in another
state where he has no authority.").
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Private regulators of the internet exercising coercive en-
forcement power similarly are answerable in the regular courts,
unless the law grants them an immunity2 9 or privilege. Moderat-
ing immunity is as important in ensuring accountability of pri-
vate regulation as is finding a legal theory to support a cause of
action. Indeed, shaping immunities and privileges is the principal
way to give meaning to the elements of "public regardedness. 21
C. A Common Law Approach
The internet needs not a grand theory of accountability, but
rather a way for the common law to begin to work on the prob-
lem. Policymakers and professors are unlikely to develop a grand
theory of accountability for private regulation of the internet
within the foreseeable future. Even development of ground rules
for regulation of the internet by traditional legal institutions is
daunting. Goldsmith, Johnson, Post, Stein (Rutgers), Netanel,
Dinwoodie, and others disagree on whether the basic approach to
internet jurisdiction should be traditional or should embrace new
ideas of a special role for cyberspace.
But the absence of a grand theory does not mean that there
is no work to be done. Public institutions are grappling with
internet regulatory issues every day, even as private regulatory
institutions are springing up, making rules, and enforcing them.
Courts and legislatures will be presented with controversies like
voteauction.com and MAPS. What should they do about them?
They need some rough, practical benchmarks to decide where
private regulation should stop and public regulation begin. They
need to be able to define the boundaries, at least rough bounda-
ries, between the public and private spheres.
Part II D explores various legal theories for controlling pri-
vate regulation. It does not matter if one cannot formulate a per-
fect cause of action under these theories. The mere possibility of
liability under one or more of the legal theories can be enough to
alter the conduct of private regulators. Fearing liability at some
substantial level of probability, they will take precautions, justi-
fying the rationality of their decisions, opening up their delibera-
tions to public scrutiny and participation, avoiding the risks of
overreaching. Private regulators will make themselves more ac-
209 Unlikely, unless they exercise formal power delegated by a state institution.
210 The elements of "public regardedness" are considered in Part II F.
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countable in the shadow of the law without waiting for the cer-
tainty of clear legal mandates.211
MAPS illustrates both the need for common law scrutiny of
private regulation and the incremental nature of developing ac-
countability when nondelegation doctrine, contract enforcement,
and statutory remedies are unavailing. Major questions exist as
to whether any of the legal theories explored in Part II D 4 would
result in liability for MAPS. Antitrust is problematic because of
the difficulty in finding either monopoly or agreements to re-
strain competition. Prima facie tort is problematic because of the
reluctance of state courts to accept the theory. Intentional inter-
ference with contractual relations is problematic because of the
uncertainty of the "impropriety" element and the difficulty of
identifying specific contractual relations interfered with. Public
nuisance is problematic because of its historical association with
the use and enjoyment of land. Nevertheless, the possibility of
liability under one or more of these theories and the proliferation
of lawsuits over MAPS blacklists should exert some chilling effect
on the willingness of MAPS itself and of imitators to engage in
arbitrary private regulation.
What remains is to identify some common law causes of ac-
tion that may bring private regulators to the bar of justice. It is
not necessary to say what standards should be imposed on them
when they get to court.212 Common law causes of action such as
211 Any experienced employment lawyer is familiar with the phenomenon. Even
though the employment at will rule continues to govern most private sector employment,
employers-especially large employers with sophisticated human relations departments-
unilaterally adopt procedures to ensure objective rationality and due process in adverse
employment decisions. See generally Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Employee Dismissal Law and
Practice 371-414, 379 (Wiley 4th ed 1997) ("Some form of self-imposed substantive fair-
ness criterion is common. Substantive fairness means that action is taken against employ-
ees only for certain reasons that bear a legitimate relationship to the employer's business
requirements. Procedural fairness means that the employer follows procedures that de-
velop the facts respecting any adverse action reliably.").
212 As a student of administrative law, the author is tempted to offer administrative
law doctrines for general application across all four categories of private regulation. Ad-
ministrative law, after all, focuses on making regulators accountable, and even though its
roots are in justifying a regulatory role for new institutions that derive power from tradi-
tional, politically accountable, branches of government, the rules of accountability may
work for regulators who arise without any grant of power from the government.
Several considerations counsel caution in such an approach, however. First, the
idea that private entities should be treated by the law as administrative agencies is star-
tling, and potentially distracting. See Demasse v ITT Corp, 984 P2d 1138, 1149, 1158 (Ariz
1999) (discussing in majority and dissenting opinions this author's "administrative-law"
model for modifications in employee handbooks). Second, the benchmarks worked out in
administrative law may not be the right ones. It is premature to write a statute, or, to
write a restatement for case law that has not been created yet. What is needed is a
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those reviewed in the following Part II D 4, with their general
standards of "impropriety," "lack of justification," "balance of the
interests," and the prospect that something may not look so good
to a jury applying such a standard is exactly the kind of environ-
ment in which some new ideas can emerge.
The regular courts did a good job of working out touchstones
for internet jurisdiction. 213 They can do the same with respect to
touchstones for accountable private regulation of the internet.214
D. Mechanisms and Theories
Dean Abramson identifies the extensive mechanisms of ac-
countability for delegated private regulation, including the non-
delegation doctrine, and clear judicial review. He identifies in
summary fashion some of the mechanisms reviewed in this Arti-
cle for imposing accountability on purely private regulators. He
discusses market forces and the possibility of direct government
intervention.21 Professor Froomkin urges more rigorous applica-
mechanism for traditional legal institutions to begin to work out tools of accountability for
private regulation of the internet.
213 David R. Johnson strongly disagrees with this observation. He argues that the
Zippo case only works domestically because the United States has a Supremacy Clause
and a dormant Commerce Clause. While the textual observation may be too positive, it is
undeniable that the Zippo continuum, elaborated by the targeting concept from Millen-
nium Enterprises, certainly avoids the horror scenarios that some feared in the mid 1990s,
in which any web site would be subject to jurisdiction wherever it was visible. See Ben-
susan Restaurant Corp v King, 126 F3d 25 (2d Cir 1997) (rejecting possibility).
214 Assigning the task of strengthening accountability to the "regular courts" assumes
that accountability comes through national (largely, American) court actions. That is not
entirely true. For one thing, persons aggrieved by private regulatory decisions can sue in
the courts of other countries, and that surely creates the potential for transnational con-
flict that hybrid regulation was seeking to avoid in the first place, as discussed in Part I A.
Eventually, new kinds of international institutions may acquire sufficient legitimacy to
take on the task of making other private institutions accountable. See generally Laurence
R. Helfer and Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Designing Non-National Systems: The Case of the
Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 43 Wm & Mary L Rev 141 (2001) (dis-
cussing "a national" lawmaking institution). See also Julian G. Ku, The Delegation of
Federal Power to International Organizations: New Problems with Old Solutions, 85 Minn
L Rev 71 (2000) (proposing a framework for analyzing U.S. constitutional issues raised by
relationships between United States and international organizations, and concluding that
delegations to international bodies are problematic because they 9train ideals of political
accountability, and international organizations lack independent sources of political le-
gitimacy); Perritt, International Administrative Law, 51 Admin L Rev at 896-900 (cited in
note 40) (explaining how constitutional nondelegation doctrine requirements can be satis-
fied by certain international regulatory structures). In addition, as Dean Krent and Pro-
fessor Freeman observe, accountability depends not only on "hard" mechanisms of judicial
review, but also on a variety of "softer" forces, including professional norms internalized
by decisionmakers and acquiescence. See Helfer and Dinwoodie's "internal checking func-
tions" (cited in note 214).
215 See Abramson, 16 Hastings Const L Q at 186 (cited in note 1):
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tion of the nondelegation doctrine, or direct application of admin-
istrative law norms.216 These suggestions work for the first situa-
tion in which private regulation occurs-that in which public in-
stitutions delegate power to or defer to decisions of private enti-
ties. They do not work conceptually in the other three situations,
in which private regulation originates not in delegation of origi-
nally governmental power, but in private consent, or in de facto
control over private resources. (As Part I C 3 explained, acquies-
cence carries its own assurance of accountability.)
1. Delegation.
When public institutions delegate governmental power to
make or apply rules, accountability of private decisionmakers is
ensured in several ways. The public institution may revoke the
delegation. Constitutional restrictions on delegation of legislative
or adjudicatory power require channeling of the delegated power
and judicial review of private decisions in the regular courts. 17
Delegation in the internet context often takes the form of safe
harbors, as explained in Part I C 1. There, the criteria for safe
harbor treatment provide for accountability.
2. Contract enforcement-bylaws.
Private rulemaking in the second situation, involving con-
tractual relations between a regulator and a regulated party, can
be policed through actions for breach of contract. Contract law
imposes limitations on the conduct of the contracting parties.
They are subject to a covenant of good faith and fair dealing.218
If a private regulator performs poorly, for example if the Better Business
Bureau does not enforce its code of ethics, a more effective competitor
might emerge. Ultimately, the new competitor could put the BBB out of
business. Moreover, if an ineffective private regulator comes to the atten-
tion of public officials, they might impose specific accountability obliga-
tions on the private regulator or assume the responsibilities of the pri-
vate regulator.
216 See Froomkin, 50 Duke L J at 184 (cited in note 27) ("So long as ICANN is making
policy decisions, however, DoC's arrangement with ICANN either violates the APA, for
ICANN is making rules without APA rulemaking, or it violates the nondelegation to pri-
vate parties doctrine set out in Carter Coal.").
217 See generally id at 141-53 (discussing relevant constitutional issues and noting
that "the private nondelegation doctrine focuses on the dangers of arbitrariness, lack of
due process, and self-dealing when private parties are given the use of public power with-
out being subjected to the shackles of proper administrative procedure").
218 See UCC § 2-609 n 6 (1998) (explaining that "good faith is a part of the obligation of
the contract and not subject to modification by agreement and includes, in the case of a
215] 269
270 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2001:
They may be subject to legally implied due process require-
ments.219 Contract-based self-help remedies also may be limited
by statutory law.22°
3. Making self enforcement accountable through statute.
The self enforcement category of private regulation could be
made accountable either through enactment of a new statutory
framework or change in common law. Enacting a statute would
be the easiest way to provide a public law framework to assure
accountability of private regulation in the self-enforcement cate-
gory, but the issues are not mature enough yet to enable political
action. Moreover near-term adoption of national statutes would
exacerbate the transnational jurisdiction problem. It would be
better to work on some rules of thumb under common law theo-
ries, dealing with the transnational problems as they arise,22' un-
merchant, the reasonable observance of commercial standards of fair dealing in the
trade").
219 See Cotran v Rollins Hudig Hall International, Inc, 69 Cal Rptr 2d 900, 910 (1998)
(finding that, in the context of implied employment contracts, "good cause" requires "fair
and honest reasons, regulated by good faith on the part of the employer, that are not triv-
ial, arbitrary or capricious ... or pretextual"). In Thompson v Associated Potato Growers,
Inc, 610 NW2d 53 (ND 2000), the North Dakota Supreme Court followed Cotran, holding
that the factfinder in a case alleging violation of a written contract for employment for a
fixed term should decide whether the employer determined just cause for termination
under an objective good faith standard. See id at 59.
220 For example, the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act ("UCITA"), 7(11)
Uniform Laws Annotated ("ULA") 6 (Supp 2001), allows a licensor to prevent continued
exercise of contractual and information rights without judicial process, but only if that can
be done without breach of the peace, without foreseeable risk of personal injury or signifi-
cant physical damage to information or property other than the licensed information, and
in conformity to specific procedures. See id at § 815, 7(11) ULA 178-79 (Supp 2001). The
UCITA provides specific procedures: a separate agreement permitting electronic self-help.
See id at § 816(c), 7(11) ULA 180 (Supp 2001). If such an agreement exists, the licensor
may exercise self-help only after giving:
notice in a record to the person designated by the licensee stating:
(1) that the licensor intends to resort to electronic self-help as a remedy on
or after 15 days following receipt by the licensee of the notice;
(2) the nature of the claimed breach that entitles the licensor to resort to
self-help; and
(3) the name, title, and address, including direct telephone number, facsim-
ile number, or e-mail address to which the licensee may communicate
concerning the claimed breach.
Id at § 816(d), 7(11) ULA 180 (Supp 2001).
221 See, for example, LICRA et UEJF v Yahoo! Inc and Yahoo France, Sup Ct Paris
(2000), available online at <http://www.gyoza.com/lapres/html/yahen.html> (visited Feb 2,
2001) [on file with U Chi Legal F] (ordering Yahoo.com and fr.yahoo.com "to take any and
all measures of such kind as to dissuade and make impossible any consultations by surfers
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til possibilities for harmonization and the benefits and costs of
different approaches have crystallized to enable more complete
assessment of appropriate legislative or treaty-based action.
Some existing statutes, however, suggest possibilities for as-
suring accountability of some kinds of private regulation. The
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA")222 makes it a crime and
a tort to access a computer used in interstate commerce without
authorization and to alter, damage, or destroy information or to
prevent authorized use of any information or computer services
causing more than minimum economic injury.223 Thus, a private
regulator who implements rules or decisions by implanting code
in computing or networking facilities belonging to another would
violate the CFAA unless the owner of the facilities authorizes the
implantation.
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act makes it a crime
and a statutory tort to intercept electronic communications, to
disclose intercepted communication, or to use intercepted com-
munications.224 It also makes it a crime and a tort to engage in
unauthorized access to stored electronic communications or to
prevent access to an electronic communication while it is being
stored in a public electronic communications facility.225 A final
provision prohibits the use of pen register and trap and trace de-
vices... except for operational management of communications
systems or under court order.227 It is possible to argue that pri-
vate enforcement techniques relying on the interception and
blockage of IP packets violate these statutory provisions, depend-
calling from France to its sites and services in dispute the title and/or contents of which
infringe upon the internal public order of France, especially the site selling Nazi objects").
222 18 USC § 1030 (1994).
223 18 USC § 1030 (a)(5)-(6).
224 See 18 USC § 2510 (1994) (defining, inter alia, "wire communication," "oral
communication," and "intercept"); id at § 2511 (deeming interception, use, and disclosure
of such communications unlawful).
225 Id at §§ 2701-10.
226 A pen register is a device for recording telephone numbers dialed by the telephone
to which it is connected. A trap and trace device determines the telephones numbers of
incoming calls to the line to which it is connected. The analog to these methods of elec-
tronic surveillance involve intercepting addressing and routing information in the inter-
net, but not the content of associated messages. See generally Stephen P. Smith, et al,
Independent Review of the Carnivore System, Final Report (Dec 8, 2000), available online
at <http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/publications/carniv final.pdf> (visited June 20, 2001) [on file
with U Chi Legal F]. The author was one of the investigators of the Carnivore electronic
eavesdropping system.
227 See 18 USC § 3121 (1994) (prohibiting the installation of pen registers and trap and
trace devices in the absence of a court order, but providing an exception for their use by an
electronic or wire communication service provider).
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ing on interpretation of the statutory definitions of electronic
communication, trap and trace device, and stored communication.
The strongest arguments would be that any code that blocks traf-
fic from particular IP addresses either represents the interception
of an electronic communication, or that it employs trap and trace
functionality, depending on whether the IP address of the sender
is construed to represent content or to be analogous to a calling
telephone number. The strongest defense would be that any
blockage occurs with the consent of the facility where the block-
ing occurs and is done for network management purposes, and
therefore falls within the privileges granted network service pro-
viders under the statute.
The Communications Act of 1934 contains a provision, dis-
cussed in Part II D 4 b in conjunction with preemption of public
nuisance actions, that prohibits malicious interference with radio
communications.228 The language of the statute is limited explic-
itly to radio communications licensed or approved by the FCC.229
It cannot be stretched to include wire based IP traffic. There are,
however, a number of state statutes that prohibit interfering with
communication services that might provide a basis for litigating
the permissibility of specific self enforcing private regulation.3 °
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act authorizes
the Federal Trade Commission to investigate trade practices that
harm the public interest. While this authority often is associated
with conduct that violates the Sherman Act, the FTC need not
establish a Sherman Act violation in order to have authority to
oppose conduct under Section 5.231
228 47 USC § 333 (1994).
229 See id ("No person shall willfully or maliciously interfere with or cause interference
to any radio communications of any station licensed or authorized by or under this chapter
or operated by the United States Government.").
230 See, for example, Wash Rev Code § 9A.48.070(1)(b) (2000) (making criminal the act
of maliciously causing interruption or impairment of service rendered by mode of public
communication); Alaska Stat § 42.20.030 (Lexis 2000) (imposing civil liability on one who
intentionally interferes with transmission of service over a utility line); Cal Penal Code
§ 591 (West 1999) (making a crime the act of obstructing "any line of telegraph, telephone,
or cable television, or any other line used to conduct electricity or appurtenances or appa-
ratus connected therewith"); Neb Rev Stat § 86-304 (1994) (criminalizing interrupting or
interfering with the transmission of telecommunications messages); SD Cod Laws § 49-32-
2 (Michie 1993) (criminalizing maliciously interfering in any manner with telecommunica-
tions facilities).
231 FTC v Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 US 447, 460-61 (1986) (finding that "the
purpose of the inquiries into market definition and market power is to determine whether
an arrangement has the potential for genuine adverse effects on competition," and there-
fore proving such effects, like an output reduction, was sufficient to "obviate the need for
an inquiry into market power").
272 [2001:
HYBRID REGULATION OF THE INTERNET
4. Common-law causes of action.
Accountability of private regulation requires institutional
oversight. As the preceding sections explain, mechanisms for in-
stitutional enforcement accountability exist in the delegation and
contract categories of private regulation. But statutory and con-
stitutional bases for enforcing accountability are thin with re-
spect to the self-enforcement category. That leaves the common
law.
232
The problematic case arises when private entities exercise
rulemaking and enforcement power because they control a valu-
able resource. In this situation, another institution does not nec-
essarily exist with legal power to insist on mechanisms of ac-
countability. Accountability can be assured only if those subject
to the private rules have enforceable legal rights against the rule
maker. The rule maker must have legally enforceable duties to
honor the mechanisms.
A number of plausible legal theories exist representing po-
tential sources of these rights and duties. Yet none of them is cer-
tain to be available in all relevant situations of private rulemak-
ing unless common law courts are willing to expand the bounda-
ries of traditional theories. The nub of the problem is in
determining whether the interests involved in using the internet
are legally protected, 233 and thus whether private regulatory acts
interfering with those interests are actionable.
a) Relaxation of state action requirement. Professor Les-
sig observes that new institutions in cyberspace perform func-
tions historically performed by governmental institutions, yet lie
232 Professor Freeman holds somewhat more hope for private law such as contract,
tort, and property as mechanisms of accountability than for judicial review of state action,
application of the nondelegation doctrine, or extension of administrative law, although she
also is skeptical that courts will be willing to make the necessary expansions of current
doctrine. See Freeman, 75 NYU L Rev at 588-92 (cited in note 42) (noting that "the com-
mon law offers ample precedent for imposing procedural requirements on private parties
under certain circumstances, but warning that "relying solely on private law to cabin
private discretion seems overly optimistic," as "[tihe protection courts afford those affected
by private decisions, and the scope ofjudicial review they provide, remain minimal").
233 The Restatement distinguishes between "harm" and "injury." See Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 870 comment e (1979). Harm is a "loss or detriment in fact of any
kind," while injury is "the invasion of any legally protected interests of another." Id. Cer-
tain types of harm are recognized as constituting injury when they fall within the scope of
existing torts, such as battery or false imprisonment; otherwise, demarcating harm from
injury is ambiguous enough to necessitate the use of a balancing test. See id. "Recovery is
thus limited to those cases in which the plaintiff's harm is of such a nature and serious-
ness that legal redress is appropriate." Id.
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"wholly outside the democratic process."2 4 The value choices af-
fecting important rights recognized in the United States Consti-
tution still are made by someone, but, given the requirement for
state action before constitutional rights can be enforced, officials
accountable to the public-such as legislators and judges-do not
make them.235 The formalism that puts private governance struc-
tures beyond judicial review is a "pathology" that "inhibits choice"
and is "deadly for action. '236 Professor Lessig does not explain ex-
actly how the formalism of the state action requirement might be
relaxed; figuring out how is the central challenge addressed by
this Article.
The formalism that Professor Lessig complains of derives
from the "state action requirement."237 The state action require-
ment embodies the distinction between the public and private
spheres, considered in Part I. State action can be found not only
when the state or other governmental entity is the nominal actor,
but also when an apparently private entity performs public func-
tions or has a symbiotic relationship with the state and is the
employer. The symbiotic relationship test is closely associated
with a nexus test. Under the public function test, the act of a pri-
vate entity constitutes state action when the entity performs a
function traditionally associated with the sovereign. This test
originated in the case of Marsh v Alabama23 but has been cir-
cumscribed in recent cases.23 9
The symbiotic relationship and nexus approaches to finding
state action in the activities of an otherwise private entity focus
234 Lessig, Code at 217 (cited in note 15) (noting that ICANN does what the govern-
ment is supposed to do, but that it operates outside of any democratic confines).
235 See id at 217-18 (noting that "it will take a revolution in American constitutional
law for the Court, self-consciously at least, to move beyond the limits of state action," and
that therefore "the scope of their constitutional review has been narrowed ... to exclude
the most important aspect of cyberspace's law-code").
236 Id at 221.
237 See generally Paul Schiff Berman, Cyberspace and the State Action Debate: The
Cultural Value of Applying Constitutional Norms to 'Private' Regulation, 71 U Colo L Rev
1263, 1269 (2000) (arguing that constitutional adjudication regarding traditionally private
activities can "foster constructive societal debate about social and political issues" arising
from new challenges to political values).
238 326 US 501 (1946) (noting that prosecution for distribution of handbills on sidewalk in
company town was state action).
239 Id at 509. See Flagg Brothers, 436 US at 164 (holding that self-help disposal of
goods under the UCC is not a public function, as "even if [the court] were inclined to ex-
tend the sovereign-function doctrine outside of its present carefully confined bounds, the
field of private commercial transactions would be a particularly inappropriate area into
which to expand it"); Hudgens v NLRB, 424 US 507, 520 (1976) (holding that the opera-
tion of shopping centers and malls is not a public function).
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on the degree of involvement by the state in the activities of the
defendant entity. Thus, in Burton v Wilmington Parking Author-
ity,24° the Court found so much state entanglement in the opera-
tions of the defendant as to amount to "that degree of state par-
ticipation and involvement ... which it was the design of the
Fourteenth Amendment to condemn."241 Emphasizing that the
state regulatory body overseeing the utility had not ordered the
challenged practice, in Jackson v Metropolitan Edison Co242 the
Court held that termination of service by a public utility was not
state action. 243 The Court offered what has come to be called the
nexus test: "the inquiry must be whether there is a sufficiently
close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the
regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly
treated as that of the State itself."244
Efforts to characterize actions of entities that control access
to important cyberspace resources as "state action" have not
faired well. In Cyber Promotions, Inc v America Online, Inc,245 the
district court rejected First Amendment claims against an e-mail
service provider by a UCE service.2 4 Rejecting the public function
argument, the court held that:
AOL exercises absolutely no powers which are in any way
the prerogative, let alone the exclusive prerogative of the
state.... By providing its members with access to the
Internet through its e-mail system so that its members
can exchange information with those members of the pub-
lic who are also connected to the Internet, AOL is not ex-
ercising any of the municipal powers or public services
traditionally exercised by the state as did the private com-
pany in Marsh. Although AOL has technically opened its
e-mail system to the public by connecting with the Inter-
240 365 US 715 (1961).
241 Id at 724.
242 419 US 345 (1974).
243 Id at 358-59 (concluding that Pennsylvania was "not sufficiently connected" to the
termination so as to make the terminator's "conduct in so doing attributable to the State
for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment").
244 Id at 351. See Pinhas v Summit Health, Ltd, 894 F2d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir 1989)
(holding that state-required peer review activity does not meet the symbiotic relationship
test, referring to Jackson for the rule that "[sitate regulation of a private entity.., is not
enough to support a finding of state action"), affd, 500 US 322 (1991) (finding federal anti-
trust jurisdiction on the basis of a sufficient connection between the alleged anticompeti-
tive actions and interstate commerce).
245 948 F Supp 436 (E D Pa 1996).
246 See id at 445.
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net, AOL has not opened its property to the public by per-
forming any municipal power or essential public service
and, therefore, does not stand in the shoes of the state.
Marsh is simply inapposite to the facts of case sub ju-
dice 247
In part, this decision turned on the availability of alternative
avenues for sending the band communications, both through the
internet and otherwise.248 Finding that the other two tests over-
lap each other,249 the court held that because there had been no
government involvement in AOL's business decisions to block the
plaintiff's e-mail traffic, the first prong of the joint participation
test could not be satisfied.25 ° The court also rejected the argument
that institution of civil litigation against the plaintiff constituted
state action.25' Other courts have rejected arguments that inter-
net service providers are state actors.252
Professor Berman observes that academic opinion since at
least 1927 has criticized the state action requirement as repre-
senting an artificial distinction between public and private ac-
tion.25 He suggests, embracing arguments put forth by Professors
Radin and Wagner,254 that the distinction between bottom-up and
top-down ordering is incoherent because private ordering in cy-
247 Id at 441-42.
248 See Cyber Promotions, 948 F Supp at 443-44.
249 See id at 444.
250 See id.
251 Id at 444-45.
252 See Howard v America Online, Inc, 208 F3d 741, 754 (9th Cir 2000) (holding that
there was no basis for finding America Online to be a state actor in conjunction with a
billing dispute); Island Online, Inc v Network Solutions, Inc, 119 F Supp 2d 289, 306 (E D
NY 2000) (holding that a coordinator of domain name registrations is not a state actor
because registration of domain names had never been an exclusively public function).
253 See Berman, 71 U Colo L Rev at 1278 (cited in note 237) ("Academic opinion over-
whelmingly has rejected the idea that legal doctrine should rest on a distinction between
public and private action."). See also id at 1268, citing Morris R. Cohen, Property and
Sovereignty, 13 Cornell L Q 8, 11 (1927) (characterizing problems in the private industrial
economy as "abuses which the Supreme Court does not allow the state to remove directly"
because W[tihere can be no doubt that our property laws do confer sovereign power on our
captains of industry and even more so on our captains of finance"). Professor Berman lists
a host of scholars who have grappled with the state action doctrine, among them Erwin
Chemerinsky in Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw U L Rev 503, 504-05 (1985). See Berman,
71 U Colo L Rev at 1310 n 16. Professor Chemerinsky argues that the discussion of the
doctrine had quieted by the mid-1980s because "earlier commentators were so successful
in demonstrating [its] incoherence," and calls for the academy "to begin rethinking state
action." Chemerinsky, 80 Nw U L Rev at 504-05 (cited in note 253).
254 Berman, 71 U Colo L Rev at 1282 (cited in note 237), citing Margaret Jane Radin
and R. Polk Wagner, The Myth of Private Ordering: Rediscovering Legal Realism in Cyber-
space, 73 Chi Kent L Rev 1295 (1998).
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berspace depends on rules of property and contract and thus re-
lies upon norms created and enforced by the state.255 Berman ar-
gues that the symbolic value of constitutional litigation suggests
that extending constitutional values to cyberspace can help ar-
ticulate and shape societal discourse on divisive issues.256 He
urges relaxation of the state action requirement to permit consti-
tutional litigation over the extension of constitutional norms of
fair process and judicial review to private action such as that en-
gaged in by ICANN.25 '
Professor Froomkin argues that American Manufacturers
Mutual Insurance Co v Sullivan258 provides some hope for declar-
ing private regulators such as ICANN to be state actors, subject
to due process obligations.259 Sullivan involved a challenge to a
Pennsylvania statute that allowed workers' compensation insur-
ers to deny health care payments until a private "utilization re-
view organization" determined the payments were for medically
necessary treatment.260 The Supreme Court framed the question
as "whether a private insurer's decision to withhold payment for
disputed medical treatment may be fairly attributable to the
State ... ."261 The Supreme Court concluded that the state had
not mandated or encouraged the withholding of benefits. 262 The
court reaffirmed Flagg Brothers, noting that merely authorizing
the insurers to use the dispute resolution services of utilization
review organizations ("UROs") did not constitute state action.63
The Court also, without much analysis, declined to find "joint
255 Berman, 71 U Colo L Rev at 1282-83 (cited in note 237).
256 See id at 1292-93 ("[Liaw has enormous potential as a creative and transformative
discourse in our society.").
257 Id at 1307-08 ("[A] broader view of the Constitution's scope would reach the private
standard-setting bodies-which now function so powerfully (yet so invisibly) to establish
the code that regulates cyberspace-and subject them to constitutional norms of fair proc-
ess and judicial review.").
255 526 US 40 (1999).
259 Given that DoC called for an ICANN to exist, clothed it with authority, persuaded
other government contractors to enter into agreements with it (including the one with NSI
that provides the bulk of ICANN's revenue), and has close and continuing contacts with
ICANN, a strong, but not unassailable, case can be made that ICANN is a state actor.
Froomkin, 50 Duke L J at 113-14 (cited in note 27).
260 Sullivan, 526 US at 46-48 (describing the challenged system).
261 Id at 51.
262 See id at 52-54 (analyzing the facts under the standard delineated in Jackson, 419
US at 350 (holding that "[tlhe mere fact that a business is subject to state regulation does
not by itself convert its action into that of the State for purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment").
263 See id at 57 ("That Pennsylvania first recognized an insurer's traditionally private
prerogative to withhold payment, then restricted it, and now (in one limited respect) has
restored it, cannot constitute the delegation of a traditionally exclusive public function.").
2151 277
278 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2001:
participation" by the state.24 The Court did, however, say that
the decision of the URO, "like that of any judicial official, may
properly be considered state action,"265 even though UROs are
"private organizations. "266 Thus, as Justice Stevens noted in dis-
sent, 267 the Court picked the wrong actor-the moving party in-
surer-rather than the adjudicator, the URO, which allegedly
failed to provide the plaintiff with due process.
According to Professor Froomkin, ICANN leaves domain
name registrars no choice, unlike the Pennsylvania state legisla-
ture, which allowed insurers to decide whether to suspend pay-
ments pending URO review.268 Of course that assumes that the
registrars are the relevant actors and not the complaining trade-
mark holders, which may be a reasonable assumption since it is
the registrars who ultimately enforce decisions-by revoking do-
main names. In Sullivan the insurers were in that position, by
denying immediate payment of benefits.
Froomkin draws from Edmonson v Leesville Concrete Co269
three factors to be weighed in determining whether state action
exists: 27° (1) the extent to which the actor relies on governmental
assistance and benefits; 71 (2) whether the actor is performing a
264 Sullivan, 526 US at 57-58. The Court distinguished Burton, 365 US 715, stating
that while Burton announced a notably vague "joint participation" test, later courts have
refined it to mean that extensively regulated private services that a state would not neces-
sarily provide itself fall outside the reach of that test. Sullivan, 526 US at 57-58. Simi-
larly, the Court distinguished Lugar v Edmonson Oil Co, 457 US 922, 942 (1982), on the
grounds that the "joint participation" in Lugar that constituted state action involved seiz-
ing private property through an ex parte application to the state, an element not present
in Sullivan.
265 Id at 54 ("While the decision of a URO, like that of any judicial official, may prop-
erly be considered state action, a private party's mere use of the State's dispute resolution
machinery, without the 'overt, significant assistance of state officials,' cannot."), citing
Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc v Pope, 485 US 478, 486 (1988).
266 Sullivan, 526 US at 46 ("UROs are private organizations consisting of health care
providers who are 'licensed in the same profession and hav[e] the same or similar spe-
cialty as that of the provider of the treatment under review.'") (citation omitted).
267 See id at 63, 65 (Stevens concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The relevant
state actors, rather than the particular parties to the payment disputes, are the state-
appointed decisionmakers who implement the exclusive procedure that the State has
created to protect respondents' rights.").
268 Froomkin, 50 Duke L J at 116-17 (cited in note 27). The State had amended the
statute, 77 Pa Stat Ann §§ 531(1)(i), (5) (1998), to mitigate the due process challenge to the
UROs.
269 500 US 614, 628 (1991) (finding race-based peremptory challenge to juror in civil
case to be state action).
270 Froomkin, 50 Duke L J at 117 (cited in note 27).
271 The Court held that the actor did make such a reliance: "a private party could not
exercise its peremptory challenges absent the overt, significant assistance of the court."
Edmonson, 500 US at 624.
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traditional governmental function;272 and (3) whether the injury
caused is aggravated in a unique way by the incidents of govern-
mental authority.27 The case also requires application of a prior
factor, "whether the claimed constitutional deprivation resulted
from the exercise of a right or privilege having its source in state
authority."274
Absent the elements of overt state sponsorship of ICANN
that Froomkin identifies, however, the first element of Edmonson
may provide no force for a finding of state action. Whether the
function performed is traditionally governmental depends sub-
stantially on whether this factor is applied to the underlying op-
erational activity (for example, providing fire protection services
or running a domain name system) or applied to rulemaking, ad-
judication and enforcement with respect to those benefiting from
the activity.2 75 What the third factor means is not altogether clear
in the internet regulatory context.276 Edmonson is of limited help
at best in moving the state action boundary to include private
regulation of the internet. First, one must find deprivation of a
benefit originating with the government, apparently requiring a
conclusion that use of the internet is a government-conferred
benefit. Second, one must find that the government was inter-
twined in the decisionmaking, and one must find some sort of
symbolic exacerbation tantamount to the courthouse locus for the
decision in Edmonson. These requirements have no force at all in
the context of a private regulator in the fourth situation, unless
use of the internet is a benefit that originates with the govern-
ment.
272 The Court held that the actor was performing such a function because it was exer-
cising "the power to choose government's employees or officials." Id at 625, 628 (distin-
guishing this power from the government's power from decisions whether to sue at all,
decisions regarding selection of counsel and from decisions regarding choices in discovery).
273 Id at 622.
274 Id at 620. The three factors cited by Froomkin are part of the question "whether a
private litigant in all fairness must be deemed a government actor." Id at 621.
275 Froomkin argues that the focus should be on the regulating conduct rather than on
the underlying activity. 50 Duke L J at 120-22 (cited in note 27) (applying this to his
analysis of ICANN, Froomkin argues that "[tihe case for ICANN being a state actor turns
on the degree of instruction, and perhaps even continuing coordination, from DoC," and
"not only is there substantial evidence that ICANN is making policy and regulating, there
is also substantial evidence that ICANN is doing so at the behest, tacit or overt, of the
Department of Commerce," such that "[wihat matters most is the high degree of control
and direction exercised over ICANN by DoC").
276 Apparently the Court meant that "the injury caused by the discrimination is made
more severe because the government permits it to occur within the courthouse itself. Few
places are a more real expression of the constitutional authority of the government than a
courtroom." Edmonson, 500 US at 628.
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Ultimately, Froomkin's argument for accountability of
ICANN boils down to this:
If DoC does no review, the case for calling ICANN a state
actor is strong, since the body uses its control over a fed-
eral resource to affect the legal rights of citizens. On the
other hand, if DoC does conduct a meaningful review, then
its decisions to adopt or to allow ICANN's decisions and
pronouncements to take legal effect are decisions subject
to the APA.277
Overt relaxation of the state action requirement is all the
more difficult because of the tendency of recent Supreme Court
jurisprudence to counterpose First Amendment associational
rights against state regulation of arguably private conduct.278
Lessig did not call only for relaxation of the state action re-
quirement in direct constitutional litigation, as other commenta-
tors have done; he called for relaxation of formalism, for applica-
tion of constitutional values in regulation of the internet. Adapta-
tion of traditional legal categories to encompass new threats to
fundamental interests is the genius of the common law. The
common law can translate important values and principles,
whether founded on the Constitution or otherwise, into rules de-
fining legally enforceable rights and duties. A number of tradi-
tional causes of action represent potential starting points for this
common law development: antitrust, intentional interference
with contractual relations, public nuisance, and various theories
from the realm of water rights.
b) Nuisance and disturbance. The concept of nuisance
permits someone whose enjoyment of resources is injured by an-
other's actions to recover damages or obtain an injunction. Pri-
vate nuisance is not particularly useful in the internet context. It
vindicates only interference with the enjoyment of land.27 Public
nuisance, on the other hand, is not limited to protecting enjoy-
ment of land.28° The problem with public nuisance is that private
277 Froomkin, 50 Duke L J at 125 (cited in note 27).
278 See California Democratic Party v Jones, 530 US 567, 586 (2000) (holding that a
state's requirement for blanket primary violated a political party's First Amendment right
of association).
279 See Restatemerit (Second) of Torts § 821D (1979) (defining "private nuisance" as "a
nontrespassory invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land").
280 See id at § 821B(1) (defining public nuisance as "an unreasonable interference with
a right common to the general public").
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persons may not recover for injuries resulting from public nui-
sance of the same quality as that suffered by the public at
large.28' But when a private person suffers injury different in kind
from that suffered by the general public, a private right of action
under this legal theory is available.282
An eighteenth-century cause of action known as "distur-
bance" fits the circumstances of self-enforcing private regulation
of the internet even better than nuisance. Disturbance involved
hindering enjoyment of an incorporeal hereditament.283 One who
fenced or enclosed a commons, or who blocked a way, was liable
for disturbance.284 This definition fits the facts of MAPS closely:
MAPS is fencing a commons-the internet-and blocking ways
into parts of it.
In Planned Parenthood League v Bell,285 the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court allowed a public nuisance action by an
abortion clinic on behalf of its patients obstructed and harassed
by an abortion protester.286 The court found that the patients of
the clinic had been caused special injury by the conduct, which
interfered with the exercise of their right to obtain an abortion. '87
Several illustrations from the Restatement (Second) of Torts
are helpful in the cyberspace context. If someone blocks a public
road and also blocks a private driveway connecting to the public
road, the person whose access to the public road depends on the
driveway may recover."' Or, if someone blocks a public road that
is the only means of access for a person, that person also may re-
cover for public nuisance.289
281 See id at § 821C (specifying who can recover for public nuisance).
282 Id at § 821C(1) (specifying that to recover for a public nuisance, "one must have
suffered harm of a kind different from that suffered by other members of the public exer-
cising the right common to the general public that was the subject of interference").
283 See Blackstone, 3 Commentaries on the Laws of England 236-40 (cited in note 172)
(defining "disturbance" as "usually a wrong done to some incorporeal hereditament, by
hindering or disquieting the owners in their regular and lawful enjoyment of it," and not-
ing that the injury protects against disturbances of franchise, common, ways, tenure, and
patronage).
284 Blackstone, 3 Commentaries at 240 (cited in note 172).
285 677 NE2d 204 (Mass 1997).
286 Id at 208-09.
287 See id at 208 (reasoning that because "a private plaintiff may maintain a public
nuisance action if the public nuisance has caused the plaintiff some special injury of a
direct and substantial character other than that borne by the general public," the claim is
permissible because it alleges "conduct constitut[ing] a public nuisance which has caused
its patients special injury by interfering with the exercise of their right to obtain an abor-
tion").
288 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821C illus 4-6 (1979).
289 Id at § 821C illus 7.
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By analogy to these illustrations, the internet-or at least
certain routes through it-is equivalent to a public highway. If
someone, like IAPS, blocks access to the internet by targeting
specific individuals or entities, those individuals or entities
should be able to show the qualitatively different harm necessary
to recover for public nuisance. Those targeted suffer an injury
different in kind from ordinary users of the internet. But courts
must be willing to draw this analogy before the public nuisance
cause of action can be a basis for assuring accountability by pri-
vate rulemakers.
Persons claiming radio interference regularly sue under pub-
lic nuisance theories, but uniformly are rebuffed based on federal
preemption by the Federal Communications Act.29° There would.
be no federal preemption of a public nuisance claim based on
blocking access to the internet under present law, because 47
USC § 333 is limited to radio interference.291 Nevertheless, the
radio interference cases are not terribly helpful because the find-
ing of federal preemption prevents any significant judicial analy-
sis of public nuisance elements in the radio interference con-
text.292 Planned Parenthood, the abortion protester case, however,
is helpful because it reinforces the Restatement's view that a pri-
vate plaintiff may sue on a public nuisance theory for special
harm, intentionally caused, and illustrates the kind of interfer-
290 See Broyde v Gotham Tower, Inc, 13 F3d 994, 997-98 (6th Cir 1994) (affirming
dismissal of nuisance claim against radio transmitter alleging interference with plaintiffs
electronic equipment as preempted by the FCA, noting the district court's finding that all
other courts that have considered the question of its preemption have come to the same
conclusion). See also Monfort v Larson, 693 NYS2d 286, 288 (App Div 1999) (affirming the
dismissal on preemption grounds of a suit brought by a radio station alleging frequency
interference by another, noting that "[t]he radio signal interference at issue sub judice
falls within the FCC's technical domain"); Fetterman v Green, 689 A2d 289, 294 (Pa Super
1997) (grounding its dismissal of a private nuisance claim brought by a radio frequency
licensee against another licenses sharing the same frequency on the preemptive force of
the Federal Communications Act (FCA), 47 USC § 333 (1994), which states that "no per-
son shall willfully or maliciously interfere with or cause interference to any radio commu-
nications of any station licensed or authorized by or under this chapter or adopted by the
United States Government," finding that "through the FCA's enactment, Congress has
impliedly preempted state law in the area of interference with radio signal transmis-
sions").
291 See note 290 (quoting the language of 47 USC § 333).
292 See, for example, Broyde, 13 F3d at 997 (stepping over the factual issues relating to
public nuisance to underscore the fact that "[r]esolution of this matter.., turns on a sin-
gle issue: the existence of an irreconcilable conflict between the FCC's exercise of exclusive
jurisdiction over the regulation of radio frequency interference and the imposition of com-
mon law standards in a damages action"); Fetterman, 689 A2d at 292 ("Although couched
in a myriad of colorful fashions, the gravamen of appellant's complaint is that appellee
improperly interfered with appellant's use of their shared frequency. Therefore, we must
begin our analysis with a careful reading and interpretation of 47 USC § 333.").
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ence with the exercise of lawful rights that can support recovery
on that theory.293 Thus, someone excluded from important inter-
net resources by private regulatory action would claim that its
conduct was not illegal, just as seeking an abortion is not illegal,
and that interfering with access constitutes a public nuisance for
which private recovery is available.
c) Prima facie tort. Prima facie tort allows one to recover
damages or obtain an injunction against an actor who intention-
ally harms legally recognized interests without justification.294
Section 870 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 295 recognizes
prima facie tort. Section 870 permits imposition of liability for
any unjustified intentional infliction of injury.29 This underlying
theory of intentional tort liability is labeled the prima facie tort in
New York and a few other jurisdictions.297 Prima facie tort origi-
nally referred to the broad concept embodied in § 870, but the
"prima facie" label has come to be associated with the require-
ments that the actor be motivated by specific intent to cause
harm (malice) and that the plaintiff prove special damages.298
293 See Planned Parenthood, 677 NE2d at 206, 208-09 (holding that, because the abil-
ity to end a pregnancy through a legal abortion is a substantive right, actions of an abor-
tion protestor that included harassing patients trying to enter the clinic by blocking their
path arose to the level of public nuisance).
294 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 870 comment a (1979) (recognizing the concept and
noting that it is also referred to as "an innominate form of the action of trespass on the
case").
295 See id at § 870.
296 Id ("One who intentionally causes injury to another is subject to liability to the
other for that injury, if his conduct is generally culpable and not justifiable under the
circumstances.").
297 Id at § 870 comment a (characterizing New York prima facie tort requirements as
more rigid than § 870). South Carolina apparently recognizes a variant of this tort that its
courts call "economic duress." See Troutman v Facetglas, Inc, 316 SE2d 424, 426-27 (SC
App 1984) (stating that "[tihe duress doctrine is intended to prevent a stronger party from
presenting an unreasonable choice of alternatives to a weaker party in a bargain situa-
tion" and noting that "[tihe duty (in an analysis as a tort) which arises, therefore, is an
obligation not to exercise superior bargaining power unreasonably," then affirming non-
suit because employee failed to show that the breach of contract suit would provide him
with an inadequate remedy).
298 See Morris D. Forkosch, An Analysis of the "Prima Facie Tort" Cause of Action, 42
Cornell L Q 465, 475 (1957) (comparing the general doctrine with the more restrictive
New York version). "Special damages," as distinguished from "general damages," are ac-
tual damages that must be pleaded and proved by the plaintiff. General damages can be
presumed to result from the tort complained of. See Douglas Laycock, Modern American
Remedies 60-61 (Little, Brown 2d ed 1996) (noting the indeterminacy surrounding the
terms "general" and "specific" damages and reluctantly concluding that "'general damages'
should refer to the value of what plaintiff lost from the initial impact of defendant's
wrongdoing," while special, or consequential, damages "should refer to everything that
happens to plaintiff as a consequence of this initial loss").
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These restrictions have been criticized by commentators and by
some courts.299
Prima facie tort provides a perfect legal framework to enlist
the authority of courts to ensure accountability of private rule-
making. Application of a private rule represents the intentional
injury of those accused of violating the rule. All that remains is
the determination that the interests affected by application of the
private rule are legally recognized, and that the content of the
private rule or its application is not legally justified. When the
effect of the private rule is to prevent use of the internet, it
should not be difficult to reach the conclusion that use of the
internet is a legally protected interest, perhaps by reference to
the concept of public nuisance. The internet is meant to be a pub-
lic resource-a kind of commons. Use of it confers important eco-
nomic and political benefits, including freedom of expression and
freedom of association. Whether rule content and application are
legally justified implicates the suggested mechanisms of account-
ability.
The problem with the prima facie tort theory is that it is not
widely recognized by state courts, New York representing a nota-
ble exception."'0 Moreover, prima facie tort is subject to a number
of stringent restrictions, such as a requirement that prima facie
tort is actionable only when the challenged conduct gives rise to
no other tort.30 ' Nevertheless, a New Mexico property owner re-
covered on a prima facie tort theory against a bank that com-
menced foreclosure proceedings against his property in Schmitz v
Smentowski. °2 The court accepted the prima facie tort theory,0 3
299 See Nees v Hocks, 536 P2d 512, 514, 516 (Or 1975) (criticizing New York's concep-
tualization of a "prima facie tort" that "transformed a broad basis for liability into a spe-
cific tort" and permitting tort recovery for an employee's dismissal in retaliation for jury
service); Jack E. Brown, The Rise and Threatened Demise of the Prima Facie Tort Princi-
ple, 54 Nw U L Rev 563, 574 (1960) (noting that "[o]nly recently, when the principle [of
prima facie tort] seemed destined to win even wider favor and to flower as a comprehen-
sive theory of liability, it was cut down to the size of merely another cause of action for
purely malicious conduct and subjected to choking regulatory rules").
300 As the analysis in this subsection indicates, it is not clear that the prima facie tort
is recognized outside of New York, Missouri, and New Mexico.
301 See Thomas v Special Olympics Missouri, Inc, 31 SW3d 442, 450 (Mo App 2000)
(affirming summary judgment for Special Olympics organization sued by excluded com-
petitor; prima facie tort not available because facts supported allegation of intentional
infliction of emotional distress, even though that tort could not be established either).
302 785 P2d 726, 739 (NM 1990).
303 See id at 734 (holding that the theory "accords with our recent tort jurisprudence,
and, if properly used, provides a remedy for plaintiffs who have been harmed by a defen-
dant's intentional and malicious acts that fall outside of the rigid traditional intentional
tort categories").
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theretofore recognized only in New York and Missouri." 4 It re-
jected the special requirements under New York and Missouri
law, and adopted the balancing approach sanctioned by the Re-
statement. 5 Because the bank had no legitimate interest in the
note supporting the mortgage foreclosure, and accepted it merely
to mislead bank examiners, and because it knew its foreclosure
action was thus legally questionable and likely to harm the plain-
tiffs, it was liable for prima facie tort. 6 Subsequently, in Beavers
v Johnson Controls World Services, Inc,"7 the New Mexico Court
of Appeals allowed prima facie tort recovery against an employer,
based on deliberate harassment of the plaintiff.0
d) Antitrust. Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act,
"lelvery contract, combination ... or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce ... is declared to be illegal."0 9 Section 2 pro-
vides, "[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to mo-
nopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or per-
sons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the
several states, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a
felony... ."31
A variety of judicially developed limitations have prevented
the explicit statutory language from being a greater disruption to
commerce than the practices the statute seeks to control. The
problem with literal application of the language is that every con-
tract restrains trade to some extent because it obligates the par-
ties to do business with each other rather than constantly consid-
ering the possibility of doing business with somebody else. Thus
every contract has some market foreclosure effect-it forecloses
market opportunities for those not parties to the contract who are
otherwise in a position to trade with one of the contracting par-
304 Id at 733-34.
305 See id at 735 ("The factors we consider are: (1) the nature and seriousness of the
harm to the injured party; (2) the interests promoted by the actor's conduct; (3) the char-
acter of the means employed by the actor, and (4) the actor's motives."), citing both the
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 870 comments f, g, h & i (1977), and Lundberg v Pruden-
tial Insurance Co of America, 661 SW2d 667, 671 (Mo App 1983) ("The judicial responsibil-
ity of a 'balancing of interests' advocated in the official comment to § 870, Restatement
(Second) of Torts ... must be undertaken to determine whether defendant's conduct was
tortuous.").
306 Id at 739.
307 901 P2d 761 (NM App 1995).
308 Id at 766-67 (applying the balancing test outlined in Schmitz, and noting that such
an approach "is necessary because not every intentionally caused harm gives rise to an
actionable tort").
309 Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 USC § 1 (1994).
310 15 USC § 2 (1994).
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ties. So the antitrust laws have been interpreted to limit literal
application of the statutory language to protect certain kinds of
contracts, which can promote competition, from others whose
anticompetitive affect outweighs any procompetitive affect. 11
Three basic limitations have arisen that are important in
considering the antitrust laws as a source of accountability for
private regulators in the internet context. First, horizontal
agreements (agreements among competitors) are scrutinized
much more closely under Section 1 than are vertical agreements
(agreements between makers of complementary goods or ser-
vices). This is so because vertical agreements often have procom-
petitive as well as anticompetitive effects. They often enhance
inter-brand competition, such as when Coca-Cola enters into a
vertical agreement that assures Coca-Cola a prominent place on
the shelves of a retailer. Vertical agreements enhance interbrand
competition even while limiting intrabrand competition. Second,
only those directly injured by anticompetitive contracts may re-
cover civilly. Third, only certain injuries are cognizable by the
antitrust laws.The antitrust decisions involving private standard setting
organizations do not give clear guidance as to what qualifies as
permissible rulemaking by such organizations, but they have
suggested the kinds of activities that may result in antitrust li-
ability. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp v Indian Head, Inc312 rejected
the argument that a private standard's exclusion of a certain
kind of pipe from the market should be immunized from antitrust
scrutiny by the "Noerr Pennington doctrine" as aimed at influenc-
ing legislative action.313
Rather, the validity of efforts to influence the private code
"must, despite their political impact, be evaluated under the
standards of conduct set forth by the antitrust laws that govern
the private standard-setting process."314 Mere compliance with
rules of a private organization cannot immunize private lobby-
ing.315 The court noted:
311 The most obvious example of such a limitation is the "rule of reason" test, but oth-
ers operate as well, such as requirements for antitrust injury, more favorable treatment
for vertical agreements than horizontal ones, and strict application of the elements of the
essential facilities doctrine.
312 486 US 492 (1988).
313 See id at 509-10. This doctrine holds that concerted attempts to influence the legis-
lative process do not violate antitrust laws. See id.
314 See id at 509.
315 See id:
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Although we do not here set forth the rules of antitrust li-
ability governing the private standard-setting process, we
hold that at least where, as here, an economically inter-
ested party exercises decision-making authority in formu-
lating a product standard for a private association that
comprises market participants, that party enjoys no Noerr
immunity for any antitrust liability flowing from the effect
the standard has of its own force in the marketplace."
The Court did note, however, that giving a competitor a veto over
changes in the private code would militate toward antitrust li-
ability. 17 It suggested that standard setting associations compris-
ing members with expertise but no economic interest in suppress-
ing competition would fare better,31 and that an entity with an
economic interest can avoid antitrust liability by "presenting and
vigorously arguing accurate scientific evidence before a partisan
private standard setting body." '319
Justice White's dissent expressed concerns that the Court's
decision would have the effect of excluding robust participation in
private standard setting by those who know the most about the
standards-participants in the market to which the standards
would apply.2 This would be so, argued the dissenters, because
virtually any meaningful standard tends to have an adverse ef-
fect on some competitors in the marketplace.
The antitrust validity of these efforts is not established, without more, by
petitioner's literal compliance with the rules of the Association, for the
hope of procompetitive benefits depends upon the existence of safeguards
sufficient to prevent the standard-setting process from being biased by
members with economic interests in restraining competition.
316 Allied Tube, 486 US at 509-10.
317 See id at 509 n 12 ("Even petitioner's counsel concedes, for example, that Noerr
would not apply if the Association had a rule giving the steel conduit manufacturers a veto
over changes in the Code.").
318 See id at 510-11 (suggesting that "[t]o the extent state and local governments are
more difficult to persuade through these other avenues, that no doubt reflects their pref-
erence for and confidence in the nonpartisan consensus process that petitioner has un-
dermined," and thus "[w]hat petitioner may not do (without exposing itself to possible
antitrust liability for direct injuries) is bias the process by, as in this case, stacking the
private standard-setting body with decisionmakers sharing their economic interest in
restraining competition").
319 Id at 510.
320 Allied Tube, 486 US at 511, 514-15 (White dissenting) (arguing that "[t]here is no
doubt that the work of these private organizations contributes enormously to the public
interest and that participation in their work by those who have the technical competence
and experience to do so should not be discouraged," which the majority opinion would do).
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In Radiant Burners, Inc v Peoples Light Gas & Coke Co,32 the
Supreme Court reviewed a claim by manufacturers who alleged
that they were excluded from a private association's seal of ap-
proval by tests not based on objective standards, but made arbi-
trarily and capriciously by the manufacturer's competitors.2 2 The
Court held that the manufacturer had stated a cognizable anti-
trust claim.323
Some commentators have suggested that the antitrust case
law involving private standard setting organizations will make it
difficult for any internet self-regulatory mechanism to function
free of antitrust liability.3 24 But these contributions to the litera-
ture do not explore the suggestion in Allied Tube and Radiant
Burner that appropriate procedures and objective justification for
private standards may protect such mechanisms from antitrust
liability.325
In Consolidated Medical Products, Inc v American Petroleum
Institute,26 the Fifth Circuit rejected an antitrust claim based on
exclusion of a product by the standards adopted by a standard-
setting organization. 7 The center of gravity of its decision was a
conclusion that the voluntary standards involved in the case had
no more than a persuasive effect in the marketplace, and thus did
not directly exclude the plaintiff's product.328 But the court also
reviewed features of the product standard setting process that
militated against an inference of an anticompetitive purpose.329
Among other things, the user committee which rejected the plain-
321 364 US 656 (1961).
322 See id at 658 (characterizing allegations and complaint).
323 See id.
324 See David A. Gottardo, Commercialism and the Downfall of Internet Self Govern-
ance: An Application of Antitrust Law, 16 John Marshall J Computer & Info L 125, 129
(1997) (emphasizing anticompetitive effect of internet self governance involving competi-
tors of the injured party).
325 See Allied Tube, 486 US at 501 (noting that when "private associations promulgate
safety standards based on the merits of objective expert judgments and through proce-
dures that prevent the standard-setting process from being biased by members with eco-
nomic interests in stifling product competition, those private standards can have signifi-
cant procompetitive advantages"); Radiant Burner, 364 US at 658 (holding that petitioner
had submitted a claim for which relief could be granted and citing petitioner's allegations
that respondents' "seal of approval" tests "are not based on 'objective standards,' but are
influenced by respondents, some of whom are in competition with petitioner, and thus its
determinations can be made 'arbitrarily and capriciously").
326 846 F2d 284 (5th Cir 1988).
327 See id at 297.
328 See id at 296-97 (noting that if market found the standards not to be helpful it
would cease to rely on them).
329 See id at 294-95 (reviewing those features and finding "no indications that ap-
proval was delayed in bad faith").
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tiff's rod design was composed not of the plaintiff's competitors
but of buyers of rods, who could have no motive for driving the
plaintiff from the market.3" Further, in processing the plaintiff's
application for certification, the trade association followed its
normal procedure for analysis of a new product.331 In addition, the
standards for product approval "reflected a sensible concern for
users of the equipment," supported by diagrams and engineering
specifications that were not vague, judgmental, or imprecise.332
The Court distinguished American Society of Mechanical Engi-
neers,333 where the private codes had a more powerful influence
because of their incorporation into state law.334 So the Consoli-
dated Medical Products decision suggests that neutrality of the
decisionmaker, compliance with reasonable procedures, and ob-
jective rationality, are important touchstones of private rulemak-
ing if it is to escape antitrust liability.
Clamp-All Corp v Cast Iron Soil Pipe Institute335 involved a
private trade association's promulgation of a standard for cast
iron soil pipes that adversely affected the plaintiff's sales.36 The
First Circuit found that the challenged standard was procompeti-
tive because it reduced information costs for consumers. 37 But,
the court said that defense would apply only to "legitimate stan-
dard setting activity."33' A legitimate standard setting activity
would not exist if a plaintiff could show that the standard served
no legitimate purpose or was unnecessarily harmful. 39 The Court
noted the absence of evidence as in Indian Head that the defen-
dant "packed" the meeting in which the standard was approved.34 °
Clamp-All reinforces the need for objective rationality and neu-
tral decisionmaking.
330 See Consolidated Medical Products, 846 F2d at 295.
331 See id at 294.
332 See id.
333 456 US 556, 559 (1982).
334 Consolidated Medical Products, 846 F2d at 296 n 43 (distinguishing American
Society of Mechanical Engineers on the grounds that "ASME involved both regulations
that have the force of law and a direct conspiracy between the ASME staff and the plain-
tiff's competitors," factors absent in the case at hand).
335 851 F2d 478 (1st Cir 1988) (Breyer).
336 See id at 481.
337 See id at 487 ("The standard, in specifying what counts as a CISPI coupling, pro-
vides a relatively cheap and effective way for a manufacturer or a buyer to determine
whether a particular coupling is, in fact, (generically considered) a CISPI coupling.").
338 Id.
339 Clamp-All Corp, 851 F2d at 487.
340 Id at 489.
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But another First Circuit case raises doubt about whether
procedural irregularities and arbitrary decisionmaking can pro-
duce antitrust liability without an additional showing of anti-
competitive purpose. 4' M & H Tire Co v Hoosier Racing Tire
Corp342 involved a suit by a tire manufacturer that was disadvan-
taged by a tire racing association's selection of another supplier
as the sole supplier for auto racing at four tracks in the North-
east. 43 The district court found antitrust liability,344 but the court
of appeals reversed.345
In particular, the court of appeals rejected the district court's
conclusion that sports regulations must be promulgated by inde-
pendent organizations interested in the sport as a whole, 46 and
also rejected the lower court's conclusion that procedural unfair-
ness in adopting the challenged standard foreclosed rule of reason
analysis.347 The court of appeals argued that the test procedures
themselves were "hit or miss, failed to account for relevant vari-
ables, and were not adequately recorded." '48 The court of appeals
recognized "that one of the evils of group boycott activity is that a
private group may arrogate to itself quasi-judicial powers-a
normally public function"-and "[iun those situations where pri-
vate groups are permitted to exercise such public powers, they
may be required to afford fair and appropriate procedures." 49 But
in the absence of any indication of bad faith or anticompetitive
purpose, especially when the decision is one of business judgment
341 To succeed under the "essential facilities doctrine" one must show "(1) control of the
essential facility by a monopolist; (2) the competitor's inability practically or reasonably to
duplicate the essential facility; (3) denial of the use of the facility to a competitor; and (4)
the feasibility of providing the facility." Cyber Promotions, Inc v America Online, Inc 948 F
Supp 436, 461-63 (E D Pa 1996), citing Ideal Dairy Farms, Inc v John Labatt, Ltd, 90 F3d
737, 748 (3d Cir 1996)) (rejecting antitrust claims, including those made under the essen-
tial facilities doctrine, and noting that "[elven if Cyber could prove AOL is a monopolist in
the relevant market, there is little likelihood that Cyber could prove that AOL monopo-
lizes an 'essential facility,'" as alternative channels were available).
342 733 F2d 973 (1st Cir 1984).
343 See id at 976.
344 See id (summarizing the district court's opinion).
345 See id at 789.
346 See M & H Tire Co, 733 F2d at 982-83 (noting that such an assumption "seems
extreme").
347 See id at 983.
348 Id.
349 Id at 983-84. In reaching its decision, the court in M & H Tire Co examined Silver v
New York Stock Exchange. 373 US 341, 363 (1963) (requiring basic procedural safeguards
for discipline and expulsion of exchange members, a requirement that "not only will sub-
stantively encourage the lessening of anticompetitive behavior outlawed by the Sherman
Act but will allow the antitrust court to perform its function effectively") (internal cita-
tions omitted).
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involving user preference rather than penalties, discipline, or
suspension, the only necessary procedures are those that will
help assure that a decision is made "non collusively and with
equal consideration" among contending products or standards. 5 °
Thus the court concluded:
We discern no duty to provide an absolutely objective or
scientific basis for decision. In the present case, the evi-
dence is clear that defendants solicited and received tires
from all interested companies for testing, and that, in good
faith they conducted a form of testing. As a result, they se-
lected a tire which in good faith they felt was best for their
particular purposes. 51
It takes considerable synthesis to infer procedural or sub-
stantive requirements for private rules from these cases. It is
reasonable to conclude that the following factors are important:
1. The greater the degree of competitor influence and de-
cision making, the more vulnerable the rule; and
2. The less notice to persons adversely affected by the
rule, the greater the vulnerability; and
3. The less objective factual support for the rule, the more
vulnerable the rule; and
4. The less opportunity for persons adversely affected by
the rule to participate in decisionmaking or in offering
arguments and evidence to influence decision makers,
the more vulnerable the rule.
The Sherman Act and section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act were intended to protect market competition. But
their language, read literally, would authorize judicial and ad-
ministrative interference with a variety of legitimate business
practices. From the earliest days of the rule of reason in Sherman
Act case law, the courts, commentators, and the FTC have recog-
nized that business, to be successful, must engage in various
kinds of self-interested behavior that limits opportunities for
competing firms. Thus, most exclusive contracts with suppliers or
customers are permissible even though they restrain trade in
some sense. Vertical agreements are viewed more sympatheti-
350 M & H Tire Co, 733 F2d at 984.
351 Id.
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cally under section 1 than horizontal agreements because they
often have pro-competitive as well as anti-competitive effects.
Firms with substantial market share ordinarily are entitled to
make their own economic decisions as to with whom they will
deal, even though that deprives others of opportunities for their
business. Past cases involve this kind of balancing of legitimate
business decisionmaking against anticompetitive effect.
No case like the MAPS case had arisen before because the
technology did not exist to permit an individual to interfere with
dealing between strangers. Now the technology does permit such
interference, and, as deployed by MAPS, it results in firms being
deprived of access to more than 40 percent of the market; not be-
cause their competitors are pursing their own economic interests,
but because someone outside the market has appointed himself
the arbiter of fair business practices.
There is no need to balance MAPS' economic interests
against those of the blacklisted firms; MAPS is not motivated by
economic interests. It is acting as a private government by exer-
cising technologically enabled market power. As long as the lit-
eral requirements of the Sherman Act can be satisfied, MAPS
should be vulnerable to antitrust scrutiny as inimical to the pol-
icy interests motivating enactment of both statutes.
e) Intentional interference with contractual relations. The
tort of intentional interference with contractual relations, called
by many different names, 52 protects contracting parties' interests
in economic expectations arising out of contractual relations be-
tween the parties. 53 Essentially, it protects the same interest
that contract law protects. The conduct prohibited by this tort is
conduct directed at inducing a breach of someone else's con-
tract,354 or under a variation, inducing someone not to enter into a
352 Roy v Woonsocket Institute for Savings, 525 A2d 915, 919 (RI 1987) (involving a
claim for "tortious interference with prospective contractual relations" in a case stemming
from the termination of an at-will bank executive); Ellett v Giant Food, Inc, 505 A2d 888,
894 (Md App 1986) (allowing claim for "interference with prospective advantage" by a
party arguing entitlement to unemployment compensation).
353 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 (1979):
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of
a contract . . . between another and a third person by inducing or other-
wise causing the third person not to perform the contract, is subject to li-
ability to the other for the pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the
failure of the third person to perform the contract.
354 See id (referring to the tort as "Intentional Interference with Performance of Con-
tract by Third Person").
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contract.155 "Also included is interference with a continuing busi-
ness or other customary relationship not amounting to a formal
contract."356
This tort has been recognized for more than one hundred
years35 and presently is treated in §§ 766 through 767 of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts. 5 To be liable, the defendant must
have acted with knowledge of the (potential) contract 5 9 and for
the primary purpose of interfering with it. 6°
Courts developing the common law of intentional inference
should recognize that code can be a contract. When one sends IP
packets to a host on the internet, the effect may be the same as
sending a written offer of a contract through the mail, or commu-
nicating an offer orally. Reaching out to make a contract involves
a legally protected interest under the tort of intentional interfer-
ence. It should be so treated when the acts of reaching out are
electronic, and when the relationships sought are electronic rela-
tionships.
The Restatement makes clear that the essence of this basis
for tort recovery is that the interference be "improper," a term
meant to embody the same interest-balancing process as is re-
quired under § 870.361 The Iowa Supreme Court articulated a
355 See id at § 766B (referring to the tort as "Intentional Interference with Prospective
Contractual Relation").
356 Id at § 766B comment c.
357 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 comment c (1979) (tracing the historical
development of "liability for tortuous interference with advantageous economic relations");
Note, Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations in the Nineteenth Century: The
Transformation of Property, Contract, and Tort, 93 Harv L Rev 1510, 1510 (1980) (arguing
that "the interference tort is best understood in the context of three stages of nineteenth
century legal thought," the first stage being the period prior to 1850).
358 Section 766 deals with the general rule. Section 766A treats interference with an-
other's performance of his own contract. Section 766B treats interference with prospective
contractual relations. Section 767 addresses the factors to be considered in determining
whether the interference was "improper."
359 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 comment i (1979) ("To be subject to liabil-
ity ... the actor must have knowledge of the contract with which he is interfering and of
the fact that he is interfering with the performance of the contract.").
360 Id at § 766 comment j (noting that the rule also applies "to an interference that is
incidental to the actor's independent purpose and desire but known to him to be a neces-
sary consequence of his action"). See also Lewis v Oregon Beauty Supply Co, 733 P2d 430,
436 (Or 1987) (holding there could be no recovery on an intentional interference theory
where there was insufficient proof of the defendant's knowledge of verbal intimidation by
another employee such that a jury could find intent).
361 Restatement (Second) of Torts, Introductory Note to ch 37 at 7 (1979) (noting that
"the determination of whether an interference is improper depends upon a comparative
appraisal" of a number of factors). See Hanrahan v Nashua Corp, 752 SW2d 878, 882 (Mo
App 1988) (affirming dismissal of intentional interference claim because no pleaded facts
showed that the employer's conduct was unjustified); Gordon v Lancaster Osteopathic
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sound and useful framework in approving jury instructions that
interference is improper if (1) the defendant does not act to pro-
tect the defendant's own financial interest or (2) if the defendant
uses improper means.362 Under this formulation, whether the
means are improper depends on the interests with which the de-
fendants interfered, the social interests in protecting the freedom
of action of the defendant,363 and the contractual interests of the
plaintiff.364 Generally, maintaining an effective business opera-
tion is a legitimate objective. 65
The Restatement identifies a number of factors a court may
consider in determining impropriety:
1. The nature of the actor's conduct; and
2. The actor's motive; and
3. The interests of the other with which the actor's con-
duct interferes; and
4. Social and contractual interests; and
5. The interests sought to be advanced by the actor; and
6. The relations between the parties. 66
The intentional interference tort is used often in boycott
cases. Odom v Fairbanks Memorial Hospital36 involved an anes-
Hospital Association, 489 A2d 1364, 1370 (Pa Super 1985) (holding that the allegation of
lack of justification was enough for a trial on an intentional interference claim when
plaintiff pathologist presented letters from medical staff asking board to terminate his
privileges); Harman v LaCrosse Tribune, 344 NW2d 536, 541 (Wis App 1984) (holding that
a newspaper's inducement of a law firm representing it to dismiss a lawyer who attacked
the paper in a press release was not wrongful, as the lawyer-plaintiff violated his duty of
loyalty to his client). The party alleging intentional interference is required to prove im-
propriety as an element of the cause of action. See Sharon Steel Corp v V.J.R. Co, 604 F
Supp 420, 421 (W D Pa 1985) (dismissing a counterclaim for intentional interference filed
by a dismissed employee for failure to plead "absence of privilege").
362 See Wolfe v Graether, 389 NW2d 643, 658-59 (Iowa 1986) (affirming refusal of
directed verdict against physician who induced medical practice to terminate business
manager).
363 For a case in which these interests were unusually low, see Wagenseller v Scotts-
dale Memorial Hospital, 710 P2d 1025, 1044 (Ariz 1985) (proof that supervisor caused
plaintiff's termination for refusing to engage in indecent behavior on an off-duty rafting
trip entitled plaintiff to go to jury).
364 See Wolfe, 389 NW2d at 659 (finding that the failure to consider these factors led to
improper jury instructions that had a material affect on the privilege claim).
365 See Bump v Stewart, Wimer & Bump PC, 336 NW2d 731, 737 (Iowa 1983) (holding
that individual members of a law firm would have been justified in terminating lawyer's
employment contract on evidence that the lawyer's relationship with other lawyers was
detrimental to the practice).
366 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 767 (1979).
367 999 P2d 123 (Alaska 2000).
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thesiologist excluded from practice privileges at the dominant
hospital in his practice area. 68 He sued among other things for
intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. A
prospective business relationship existed between him and the
new surgical center he proposed to open, the defendant knew of
that relationship, and the plaintiff was not able to open the new
center because he was "financially devastated when his staff
privileges [with the defendant] were terminated."3 9 The court did
not engage in analysis of the privilege or justification element of
the tort, simply holding that the defendant's conduct "was not
privileged or justified."7 °
The intentional interference tort often lies when antitrust
claims fail. That occurred in In Re Baseball Bat Antitrust Litiga-
tion,371 where the plaintiff claimed that the defendants wrongfully
excluded his wooden baseball bats from significant parts of the
market. 72 The court found that the plaintiff had failed to allege
"antitrust injury," dooming his antitrust claim. 73 The court al-
lowed him, however, leave to amend his intentional interference
claim to allege more particularly expectations of business rela-
tionships with which the defendants' conduct interfered. 4 Among
other things, the intentional interference complaint alleged ir-
regularities in the defendants' internal procedures.7
Bruce Church, Inc v United Farm Workers of America376 in-
volved an intentional interference claim against a union for orga-
nizing a lettuce boycott.377 While the appellate court remanded for
a new trial, it accepted the proposition that the evidence of a sec-
ondary boycott supported a claim for intentional interference. 8 It
did not engage in any extensive analysis of the impropriety of the
boycott under the tort theory.
368 See id at 127.
369 Id.
370 Id.
371 75 F Supp 2d 1189 (D Kan 1999).
372 See id at 1192.
373 Id at 1195-96.
374 Id at 1203-04.
375 In re Baseball Bat, 75 F Supp at 1204-05 (noting that the procedural irregularities
were alleged to have resulted in the dissemination of false information interfering with
potential sales of plaintiff's wooden bats).
376 816 P2d 919 (Ariz App 1991).
377 See id at 921.
378 Id at 930-31 ("We specifically find that the record contains sufficient evidence to
justify an instruction on this tort claim, when all of the multistate conduct of the union is
considered.").
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In the internet context, an intentional interference plaintiff
would establish with requisite concreteness the existence of exist-
ing or prospective economic relationships with which the private
regulatory entity interfered. The plaintiff would further argue
that, because the rule or adjudicatory decision complained of was
not arrived at under accountable procedures and/or was not justi-
fied by a sufficiently close linkage with legitimate interests of the
regulating entity, the interference was improper.
The intentional interference tort has a requirement that is
useful in constraining judicial review. The tort exists only with
respect to third party interference with contractual relations, not
to one's interference with her own contract. Thus in the first pri-
vate regulatory situation described in Part I C, in which the regu-
lator and the complaining party have a contractual relationship,
complaints against regulator decisionmaking may be cognizable
in a breach of contract action but not in an intentional-
interference action. Control over one's own resources thus would
be outside the scope of intentional interference liability. Inten-
tional interference claims would permit judicial review only of
efforts to control access to someone else's resources, as in the case
of MAPS.
E. International Considerations
Part of the problem that hybrid regulation seeks to solve is
constructing public law institutions that function internationally.
Absent an international public law framework, persons dissatis-
fied with the results of private rulemaking, adjudication and en-
forcement will seek relief in national courts, vitiating the trans-
national benefit of private regulation. National court litigation
over hybrid regulation raises the same issues of prescriptive and
adjudicative jurisdiction that justified interest in private regula-
tion in the first place.
One possibility is to harmonize transnational jurisdiction
through a treaty, but Hague Conference discussions over a new
treaty addressing matters related to jurisdiction are not promis-
ing.379 The Conference is considering a comprehensive treaty for
379 The Hague Conference on Private International Law has one hundred years of
experience in facilitating multilateral agreement among states on public law frameworks
for private law. See Future Convention on International Jurisdiction and Foreign Judg-
ments in Civil and Commercial Matters ("International Jurisdiction Convention")
(adopted by the Special Commission Oct 30, 1999), available online at <http://www.hcch.
net/e/workprog/jdgm.html> (visited Feb 2, 2001). See also Convention on the Taking of
Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters (concluded Mar 18, 1970), available
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judicial jurisdiction and enforcement of foreign civil judgments."'
The Conference has an opportunity to work out basic ground
rules for localizing conduct in internet markets. 8' It also has an
opportunity to define the relationship between private regulation
and public enforcement. 2
Modeled closely on the European Brussels and Lugano Con-
ventions, the Hague draft convention383 applies to civil and com-
mercial matters, excluding revenue, customs, or administrative
matters. 4 It also excludes arbitration and revised related pro-
ceedings,8 5 admiralty and maritime,386 and insolvency, composi-
online at <http:/www.hcch.net/e/conventions/text20e.html> (visited Feb 2, 2001); Conven-
tion on the Choice of Court (concluded Nov 25, 1965), available online at <http:ll
www.hcch.netle/conventions/textl5e.html> (visited Feb 2, 2001); Convention on the Ser-
vice Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters (con-
cluded Nov 15, 1965), available online at <http://www.hcch.net/e/conventions/textl4e.
html> (visited Feb 2, 2001); Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Recognition
of Decrees Relating to Adoptions (concluded Nov 15, 1965), available online at <http:/!
www.hcch.net/e/conventions/textl3e.html> (visited Feb 2, 2001); Convention on Recogni-
tion of the Legal Personality of Foreign Companies, Associations and Foundations (con-
cluded June 1, 1956), available online at <http://www.hcch.net/f/conventions/text07f.
html> (visited Feb 2, 2001); Convention on Conflicts between the Law of Nationality and
the Law of Domicile (concluded June 15, 1955), available online at <http://www.hcch.net/fl
conventions/text06f.html> (visited Feb 2, 2001); Convention on Civil Procedure (concluded
Mar 1, 1954), available online at <http:/www.hcch.net/f/conventions/text02f.html> (visited
Feb 2, 2001); [all internet materials cited in this note on file with U Chi Legal F].
380 See International Jurisdiction Convention (cited in note 379) (containing draft
convention and association analyses).
381 See International Jurisdiction and Judgments Project, available online at <http://
www.ali.org/ali/Intl_Juris-Proj.htm> (visited Feb 2, 2001) [on file with U Chi Legal F]
(containing analyses of Hague Conference efforts of the ALI).
382 In an experts' conference convened by the Hague Conference in Ottawa in 2000, the
author suggested that the draft convention exception for choice of forum clauses enforce-
ability for consumer contracts could be conditioned on the consumers not having available
to them an acceptable private dispute resolution alternative.
383 The discussion in this section refers to the Preliminary Draft Convention on Juris-
diction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters adopted by the Special
Commission on October 30, 1999. See Hague Conference on Private International Law,
Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Com-
mercial Matters ("Preliminary Draft Jurisdiction Convention"), available online at
<http://www.hcch.net/e/conventions/draft36e.html> (visited Feb 2, 2001) [on file with U
Chi Legal F].
384 Id at Art 1(1) ("The Convention applies to civil and commercial matters. It shall not
extend in particular to revenue, customs or administrative matters.").
385 See id at ch I Art 1(2)(g) ("The Convention does not apply to arbitration and pro-
ceedings related thereto.") The exclusion of arbitration is problematic, because it makes
the drafters reluctant to solve disagreements over certain jurisdiction rules-particularly
the rule allowing consumers to sue in the courts of their own jurisdiction-by precondi-
tioning the exercise of such jurisdiction on exhaustion of certain privately provided reme-
dies.
386 See id at ch I Art 1(2)(h) ("The Convention does not'apply to admiralty or maritime
matters.").
298 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2001:
tion or analogous proceedings. 87 The convention limits jurisdic-
tion 8 as well as mandating enforcement of foreign judgments. 9
Accordingly, only those judgments supported by jurisdiction un-
der the convention are entitled to enforcement.
Forum selection clauses are effective with only procedural
preconditions.39 General jurisdiction exists in places designated
by the parties in a forum selection clause,39' and also when a de-
fendant waives jurisdictional protests by "proceeding on the mer-
its without contesting jurisdiction."392 Forum selection clauses
may point either to the courts of contracting states or to the
courts of non-contracting states. 93 Objections to jurisdiction are
waivable 94
Special rules apply to consumer contracts. 98 Consumers may
bring suit in their home states when sellers from other states
target their home states,396 and may be sued only in their home
387 See Preliminary Draft Jurisdiction Convention at ch I Art 1(2)(e) (cited in note 383)
("The Convention does not apply to insolvency, composition or analogous proceedings.").
388 See id at ch II (containing provisions related to jurisdiction, beginning with the
general statement that "a defendant may be sued in the courts of the State where that
defendant is habitually resident").
389 See id at ch III (containing provisions discussing the recognition enforcement of
judgments, including the general rule that "[a] judgment based on a ground of jurisdiction
provided for in [Chapter II], or which is consistent with any such ground, shall be recog-
nised or enforced under this Chapter").
390 See id at ch II Art 4(2) (requiring, for example, that the agreement be in writing
and "in accordance with a usage which is regularly observed by the parties").
391 See Preliminary Draft Jurisdiction Convention at ch II Art 4(1) (cited in note 383):
If the parties have agreed that a court or courts of a Contracting State
shall have jurisdiction to settle any dispute which has arisen or may arise
in connection with a particular legal relationship, that court or those
courts shall have jurisdiction, and that jurisdiction shall be exclusive
unless the parties have agreed otherwise.
392 See id at ch II Art 5(1).
393 See id at ch II Art 4(1) (allowing forum selection clauses to point to the Contracting
state or, "[wlhere an agreement having exclusive effect designates a court or courts of a
non-Contracting State, courts in Contracting States shall decline jurisdiction or suspend
proceedings unless the court or courts chosen have themselves declined jurisdiction").
394 See id at Art 5.
395 See Preliminary Draft Jurisdiction Convention at ch II Art 5(1) (cited in note 383)
("A] court has jurisdiction if the defendant proceeds on the merits without contesting
jurisdiction.").
396 Id at ch II Arts 7(1)(a)-(b) (allowing jurisdiction over contractual disputes where
the claim "is related to trade or professional activities that the defendant has engaged in
or directed to that State, in particular in soliciting business through means of publicity,
and the consumer has taken the steps necessary for the conclusion of the contract in that
State").
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courts.397 Specific jurisdiction against defendants with branches,
agencies, or other establishments may be brought wherever the
branch, agency, or other establishment is located, or where the
defendant has carried on regular commercial activity by other
means.
398
Intellectual property that must be registered or deposited can
be litigated only in the place of deposit or registration. 99 This
source of jurisdiction does not apply to copyright even though reg-
istration or deposit is involved.4"0 Exclusive jurisdiction over reg-
isterable intellectual property, except for copyrights, is vested in
the courts of the place of registration.4 °0 The draft convention
prohibits certain grounds of jurisdiction, including in rem juris-
diction, except for claims specifically related to (i) the seized prop-
erty;40 2 (ii) nationality of the plaintiff or defendant;403 (iii) "the
domicile, habitual, or temporary residence or presence of the
plaintiff;"4 4 (iv) general doing business jurisdiction;4 5 (v) tax ju-
397 See id at ch II Art 7(2) ("A claim against the consumer may only be brought by a
person who entered into the contract in the course of its trade or profession before the
courts of the State of the habitual residence of the consumer.").
398 See id at ch II Art 9:
A plaintiff may bring an action in the courts of a State in which a branch,
agency, or any other establishment of the defendant is situated, [or where
the defendant has carried on regular commercial activity by other
means,] provided that the dispute relates directly to the activity of that
branch, agency or establishment [or to that regular commercial activity].
(brackets in original).
399 See Preliminary Draft Jurisdiction Convention at ch II Art 12(4) (cited in note
383):
In proceedings which have as their object the registration, validity, [or]
nullity[, or revocation or infringement,] of patents, trade marks, designs
or other similar rights required to be deposited or registered, the courts
of the Contracting State in which the deposit or registration has been ap-
plied for, has taken place or, under the terms of an international conven-
tion, is deemed to have taken place, have exclusive jurisdiction.
400 See id at ch II Art 12(4) ("This shall not apply to copyright or any neighbouring
rights, even though registration or deposit of such rights is possible.").
401 See id.
402 Preliminary Draft Jurisdiction Convention at ch II Art 18(2)(a) (cited in note 383)
(disallowing jurisdiction of a Contracting State on the sole basis of "the presence or the
seizure in that State of property belonging to the defendant, except where the dispute is
directly related to that property").
403 See id at Art 18(2)(b) & (c).
404 See id at Art 18(2)(d).
405 See id at Art 18(2)(e).
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risdiction,4 6 and (vi) signing a contract related to the dispute in a
state.4"7 Signatories may provide for other grounds of jurisdiction
under national law,40 8 but those grounds do not support recogni-
tion and enforcement under the treaty.4 9
The main controversies preventing agreement on the draft
convention currently involve U.S. objections to limitations on
general doing business jurisdiction, U.S. objections to extension of
tort jurisdiction to the place of injury without regard to the pur-
posefulness test of World-Wide Volkswagen,41 ° and the exclusion
of consumer and employment contracts from choice of forum
clauses. Additionally, intellectual property interests are having
difficulty understanding why intellectual property disputes ever
should be litigated anywhere other than in forums of the place
where the intellectual property arises.411
Even if the Hague Conference efforts were entirely success-
ful, they would not come close to resolving the difficulties in de-
signing an accountability system for private regulation of the in-
herently international internet. It is, for example, entirely possi-
ble under the Hague Convention as drafted for courts in multiple
states to have jurisdiction over the same conduct. This possibility
raises the specter of multiple, conflicting judicial decisions result-
ing from the application of the causes of action and standards of
review suggested in this Article.
All of those judgments would be entitled to transnational en-
forcement against the assets of defendants, wherever found. In
this sense, the Hague Judgments Convention would worsen the
problem of transnational conflict. Currently, an internet defen-
dant without assets in the forum state can more or less safely
ignore litigation there, but if the Hague Convention were
406 See Preliminary Draft Jurisdiction Convention at ch II Art 18(2)(f) (cited in note
383) (disallowing jurisdiction of a Contracting State on the sole basis of "the service of a
writ upon the defendant in that State").
407 Id at Art 18 (2)(j).
408 See id at ch 11 Art 7.
409 Id at Art 17 (authorizing non-prohibited assertion of rules of jurisdiction under
national law). See also id at ch II Art 24 (excluding Article 17 judgments from mandatory
recognition and enforcement).
410 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp v Woodson, 444 US 286, 295 (1980) (finding "a total
absence of those affiliating circumstances that are a necessary predicate to any exercise of
state-court jurisdiction," as the foreseeability of contacts with the forum state, which must
be purposeful, were insufficient to support personal jurisdiction).
411 The author participated in a special conference convened by the World Intellectual
Property Organization in January 2001, at which these concerns were manifest.
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adopted, the defendant's assets would be put at risk even though
the assets are not located in the forum state.
But some conflicting judgments may not be all bad at this
stage of development of hybrid regulatory mechanisms. The
French Yahoo! case helps Yahoo! and other internet service pro-
viders realize that they are unlikely to avoid the application of
regular, geographically-based law, and therefore they should par-
ticipate more actively in developing overarching mechanisms to
make first-level decision makers accountable-regardless of
whether those decision makers are private or state-based.
F. Criteria and Rules of Thumb: What Should
"Publicly Regarding" Mean?
Assuming a legal theory can be found to support judicial re-
view of private rulemaking, considered in Part II D, one must
then identify the standards to be applied by a court or by a jury.
The challenge is to probe the meaning of "public interest" as the
term is used by Professor Freeman,413 of "public regardedness," as
the term is used by Dean Krent,414 and of "legitimacy" as the term
is used by Professor Dinwoodie.415
In his comments on an earlier draft of this article, David R.
Johnson expressed discomfort with presenting accountability in
terms of vertical relationships between private decisionmakers
and traditional governments. He suggested an alternative under-
standing based on congruence. The congruence idea is developed
more fully in Part II F 6.
Consistent with the suggestion in Part II C that the common
law should be allowed time to develop some ideas in the context
of concrete disputes, one can envision a legal environment in
412 Professor Dinwoodie suggests, however, that adoption and implementation of the
Hague Judgments Convention could lead to convergence of national laws, at least with
respect to intellectual property, which would reduce the strains on private bodies address-
ing the same questions across national boundaries. Helfer and Dinwoodie, 43 Wm & Mary
L Rev at 271-73 (cited in note 214).
413 See Freeman, 75 NYU L Rev at 558 (cited in note 42) (noting that "Iiln a public
interest model, the agency is obligated to exercise its discretion in implementing statutes
with a view to the national interest or general welfare, rather than yielding to factional
pressure at the behest of one or another powerful interest group").
414 See Krent, 85 Nw U L Rev at 105 (cited in note 40) (explaining that "[b]ecause only
Congress (subject to Presidential veto and congressional override) has determined that the
delegation is consistent with its responsibility to protect the public, the ultimate content
and public regardedness of the delegated authority are open to doubt").
415 See Helfer and Dinwoodie, 43 Wm & Mary L Rev at 244-45 (cited in note 214)
(explaining how lack of legitimacy will undermine effectiveness of private regulatory insti-
tutions).
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which persons sufficiently aggrieved by private regulatory action
to commit the resources to litigate would eventually reach a jury.
A jury then would be charged with deciding whether the actions
of the private regulator were "justified," or "proper," or reflected
the right balance of interests. Or, a jury might be charged to con-
sider whether the private regulator's decisions sufficiently re-
spected the "public interest."
What might counsel in their closing arguments invite the
jury to consider in applying the general standard of propriety or
public interest? This Article now discusses characteristics of ac-
countability that might be taken into account by judges as they
develop the common law.
Grewlich suggests the following elements for hybrid regula-
tion:416
1. existence of representative entities
2. principles, codes of conduct or guidelines allowing for
rule-based behavior (respecting fundamental rights and
the principle of proportionality)
3. independent self-regulatory bodies, including represen-
tatives from industry and users to administer the codes
or guidelines
4. assurance that hybrid regulation not lead to anticom-
petitive behavior or restrictive business practices and
will not affect the freedom to provide new services
5. availability of downstream self regulation in the form of
appropriate technical solutions to supplement self regu-
lation.417
More generally, he suggests that hybrid regulatory regimes
respect principles of subsidiarity415 and proportionality. 41
416 Professor Grewlich calls it "a co-operative system of self regulation." Grewlich,
Governance in Cyberspace at 294-95 (cited in note 142).
417 Id.
418 Subsidiarity assigns policymaking and implementation to the lowest practicable
level of authority-to actors as close as possible to where action occurs, thus constituting a
"bottom-up" approach to organization. Subsidiarity and competition are the pillars of
"ordoliberalism." Id at 331, citing David J. Gerber, Constitutionalizing the Economy: Ger-
man Neo-liberalism, Competition Law and the "New" Europe, 42 Am J Comp L 25, 25
(1994) (discussing the ordo-liberal, or Freiburg School, whose thinkers believed that the
"competitive economic system .. necessary for a prosperous, free and equitable society"
could only come about "where the market was imbedded in a 'constitutional' framework").
419 Proportionality embodies the same idea as "narrowly tailored": neither over- nor
underinclusive. See Grewlich, Governance in Cyberspace at 329-33 (cited in note 142)
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Professor Freeman suggests that accountability mechanisms
must protect both "rationality" and "public orientation."42 ° Public
orientation might include values such as expertise, rationality,
and disinterest, and consideration of non-economic factors and
the protection of diffuse, unorganized interests.421 She urges a
"deeper analysis" of the realities of public/private governance to
seek new methods of assuring accountability.422
Professor Dinwoodie offers three types of "checking func-
tions." '423 Creational checking functions circumscribe private deci-
sionmaking in advance, when the documents authorizing private
decisionmaking are drafted. External checking functions involve
review of first-instance decisions by appellate bodies, judicial or
otherwise. Internal checking functions flow from self-restraint
and the culture of decisionmakers. Dinwoodie does not draw a
strong distinction between rationality and fair procedure, but
these two elements are implicit in much of his discussion of the
three types of checking function.
A synthesis of commentator suggestions includes two basic
elements of accountability: rationality and fair process. One obvi-
ous possibility for mandating these two elements is to impose the
basic requirements of administrative agency rulemaking under
the Administrative Procedure Act.424 Thus, a private rulemaker
would be required to publish proposed rules, receive comments on
the proposed rules from any interested party, and then offer a
rationale for the final rules in light of the scope of rulemaking
power asserted, the need for the rules, and the comments re-
ceived. Borrowing rulemaking standards from administrative law
has a number of advantages. The requirements are flexible, both
procedurally and substantively. They allow the rulemaking deci-
("The consistent application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality might
have the virtue of limiting a tendency to add rules to areas currently not subject to regula-
tion.").
420 Freeman, 75 NYU L Rev at 548-49 (cited in note 42) (proposing that "both critical
legal studies and public choice theory are correct: There is no purely private realm and no
purely public one," and proposing that "[i]n light of public/private interdependence ... we
think in terms of 'aggregate' accountability: a mix of formal and informal mechanisms,
emanating not just from government supervision, but from independent third parties and
regulated entities themselves").
421 Id at 558 n 52.
422 See id at 674 ("The inquiry into public/private interdependence undertaken here-
the description of different governance arrangements, the analysis of their strengths and
weaknesses, and the identification of mechanisms for rendering them accountable-is an
effort to rethink governance by engaging in a form of microinstitutional analysis.").
423 Helfer and Dinwoodie, 43 Wm & Mary L Rev at 199-213 (cited in note 214).
424 5 USC § 553 (1994).
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sion maker to take the initiative and offer its own rationale,
without being bound by a formal adjudicatory record. They allow
the private decisionmaker to change the rules simply by giving
new notice, receiving new comments, and offering a new ration-
ale.42
5
But there also are disadvantages. Private rulemaking lacks
the statutory framework that governs agency rulemaking; it is
not clear how a private rule would be determined to be ultra
vires, because there is no statutory grant of authority in the pri-
vate rulemaking context. Moreover, even though the APA rule-
making procedures were originally conceived to be informal and
flexible,42 s more than fifty years of judicial interpretation has im-
posed a number of obligations on agencies that they find cumber-
some.
427
A second possibility is to apply the requirements imposed on
private standard-setting organizations: objective rationality and
a neutral decision maker. There also are hints in some of the
cases that some sort of process permitting participation by inter-
ested parties is necessary.42s This approach is not materially dif-
ferent in basic concept from the APA approach, but its require-
ments are -more basic and therefore may allow greater flexibility
for differing circumstances confronting private rule makers. The
relatively few cases interpreting these requirements, compared to
the large number of cases interpreting APA requirements, may
be an advantage in this regard. On the other hand, the require-
ment for a neutral decisionmaker makes sense when the harm at
issue involves decisions made by competitors that exclude the
interested party from the market. This requirement is logically
less appropriate if the cause of action warranting judicial review
425 See Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Assn of the United States, Inc v State Farm Mu-
tual Automobile Ins Co, 463 US 29, 57 (1983) (holding that an agency must provide "rea-
soned analysis" for changing rules).
426 See generally American Hospital Association v Bowen, 834 F2d 1037, 1045 (DC Cir
1987) (holding that Congress enacted the exceptions to § 533 of the APA "as an attempt to
preserve agency flexibility in dealing with limited situations where substantive rights are
not at stake").
427 See generally Hecklen v Chaney, 470 US 821, 831 (1985) (conceding that when
considering a decision of an agency under the APA, "recognition of the existence of discre-
tion is attributable in no small part to the general unsuitability for judicial review of
agency decisions to refuse enforcement").
428 Compare M & H Tire Co, 733 F2d at 983 (1st Cir 1984) (rejecting district court's
conclusion of procedural unfairness because of inadequacy of notice given to tire manufac-
turers of certain tests conducted before the standard was adopted), with Clamp-All Corp,
851 F2d at 489 (1st Cir 1988) (absence of evidence that defendant "packed" meeting in
which standard was approved indicates legitimacy of proceedings).
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does not require that the challenger be a competitor of the deci-
sionmaker.
A third possibility is to follow the case law applied to private
associations, precluding expulsion of members without due proc-
ess.4 29 Yet another possibility is to allow private rule makers to
avoid review of the substantive justification for a rule if they use
certain processes affording participation opportunities to affected
parties-either directly or through representatives. This is the
basic approach used for ICANN and also is embedded in the idea
for negotiated rulemaking in the administrative procedure con-
text. Negotiated rulemaking is not a completely appropriate
model, however, because negotiated rulemaking is only used to
develop a proposed rule which then is subject to the regular APA
rulemaking requirements, anA subject to judicial review on sub-
stance as well as procedure. But, as Part II C explained, the chal-
lenge is not to develop a grand theory, but only to develop some
rough benchmarks for reviewing courts to use. At this point, it
probably is enough to suggest that a challenged rule be reviewed
under each of the suggested alternatives, with the proponent of
the rule allowed to demonstrate how it passes muster under at
least one of the approaches.
The following benchmarks represent an effort to adapt the
requirements for rulemaking in the APA and other models.
1. October recommendations.
On October 8, 1997, a number of internet stakeholders met in
Washington to define the boundary between internet self-
governance and the governments of sovereign countries. This au-
thor convened the meeting in response to declarations by the
United States and European governments that called for private
sector leadership and self regulation of the internet. Participants
recognized that no system of self-governance can exist independ-
ently of national systems of law and that the degree of connection
between private regulatory bodies and traditional legal institu-
tions varies by issue. In any system of self regulation, it is neces-
sary to ask what can be done to heighten confidence that a par-
429 See Austin v American Association of Neurological Surgeons, 47 F Supp 2d 941, 942
(N D I1 1999) (holding that private associations must afford due process and follow by-
laws); Normali v Cleveland Association of Life Underwriters, 315 NE2d 482, 484-85 (Ohio
App 1974) ("a member of a private association may not be expelled without due process.
This right is derived not from the constitution but rather from a theory of natural justice;"
due process includes absence of bad faith, compliance with constitution and bylaws of
association and natural justice).
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ticular issue will be handled in a way that will be fair, legitimate,
and efficient.
Self-regulatory systems meeting certain criteria can inspire
that confidence. The participants in the October 8 meeting
reached agreement in principle on five such criteria, set forth
fully elsewhere.430 The criteria included transparency;43 ' due proc-
ess;432 accountability;433 openness;434 and protection of public pol-
icy.435 Not every participant on October 8 agreed with every word
of the principles and the explanatory notes, but the published
statement fairly reflected the judgment of the group taken as a
whole.436
These criteria were intended for use by the designers of self-
regulatory systems, by government policymakers, and by judges
who must determine the degree of deference to accord the deci-
sions of private self-regulatory bodies for the internet. When a
self-regulatory system meets all the criteria, its private decisions
made consistent with its constitutional documents are entitled to
judicial deference and to some insulation from antitrust and tort
law.
430 Perritt, 12 Berkeley Tech L J at 479-82 (cited in note 1) (setting forth in full in
appendix the Criteria for Autonomy guidelines agreed to in the meeting of October 8,
1997).
431 Rules and agreements should be disseminated and published widely on the inter-
net, in an understandable and complete form. The process for amending and setting rules
should be fully disclosed. Rules should be able to be created and changed only after an
adequate notice period. Initiation and results of adjudications should be fully disclosed,
including the factual and legal basis for the decision. Enforcement procedures and deci-
sions should be fully disclosed. Who is making decisions and how they were selected
should be publicly disclosed. See id at 479-80.
432 Decisions on rules 'and adjudication should be preceded by notice. Adjudicatory
decisions should be preceded by some form of hearing appropriate to the factual issues and
to the magnitude of the interest at stake. Decisions should be expressed in writing, includ-
ing electronic formats. Review of private decisions should be available, but should be con-
fined to whether due process occurred; not to the correctness of the decision on the merits,
although merits-based review was contemplated by the public policy criterion. See id at
480.
433 The accountability criterion relied to a considerable extent on market forces, and
incentives for internet participants to cooperate with each other, as occurs with the basic
standards and protocols. The accountability criterion also contemplated, however, gov-
ernmental control over certain locally-associated activities, and constitution of nonprofit
corporate entities to provide a mechanism for representative accountability. See id at 480-
81.
434 Private governance mechanisms should be open to participation at several levels.
Any intergovernmental agreement should be open to any nation state. Policy oversight
entities should not exclude particular groups or views. Registrars should enjoy freedom of
entry. Consumers should have choice, including portability and variety.
435 Acceptable criteria must exist to avoid contract overreaching and for intellectual
property protection and protection of the interests of third parties.
436 See Perritt, 12 Berkeley Tech L J at 481-82 (cited in note 1).
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The participants in the October 8 discussions were focused on
domain name regulation. At the time, major questions existed as
to whether domain name regulation was most appropriately un-
derstood as a governmental or a private function. Early disputes
over trademark and domain name conflicts had muddled the au-
thority over the domain name system,43 ' and three months before
the October 8 conference, the Department of Commerce had is-
sued a request for comments pertinent to privatizing the DNS.43
Significantly, this period of uncertainty included a unilateral step
by Jon Poste439 to redirect the DNS system to a purely private
"Root B."44° But the language of the October 8 statement makes it
clear that the focus was on private systems.441 Also, the language
of the October 8 statement extended beyond domain name ad-
ministration.442 Interestingly, the October 8 statement has a pro-
cedural emphasis. Rules must be created and changed only after
adequate notice- Review should be confined to whether due proc-
ess was made available, "not to the correctness of the decision on
its merits."44" Anyone meeting the stated qualifications must be
allowed to participate. Despite the procedural emphasis, substan-
tive review of private decisions should be available444 "to avoid
contract overreaching and for intellectual property protection and
protection of the interests of third parties."44
The language of the October 8 statement is constitutional in
its generality; it hardly provides a specific template for common
law doctrine, let alone a statute or regulation. Nevertheless, it
makes somewhat more concrete the idea of "accountability" or
"public relatedness." And, it comes from representatives of the
internet community rather than from purely academic students
of administrative or constitutional law.
437 See Froomkin, 50 Duke L J at 61-62 (cited in note 27) (explaining the controversy).
438 See id at 62-63 (reviewing history of governmental review).
439 The late Jon Postel, a computer scientist at USC, exercised de facto control over the
development of internet protocols and the management of internet name space. He exer-
cised personally the powers that, after his death, were exercised by ICANN. See generally
Froomkin, 50 Duke L J at 53 (cited in note 27) (explaining evolution of Jon Postel's role;
"by all accounts Jon Postel and his colleague Joyce Reynolds were not only socket czars,
but Internet names and numbers czars").
440 Id at 64-65. The "root" is the basic list of top-level domain names within the DNS.
441 See, for example, Perritt, 12 Berkeley Tech L J at 479-80 (cited in note 1) (criterion
A, stating that "any private system ... must be transparent").
442 See id ("and any other aspects of self-regulation ...
443 Id at 480 (criterion B).
444 See id (criterion B, stating that "review of self government decisions should be
available" and that exceptions to limitation on review of correctness of decision should be
reserved to cases implicating protective principles).
445 Perritt, 12 Berkeley Tech L J at 482 (cited in note 1) (criterion E).
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2. Basis in constitutional values.
Part IV D 4 a argues that constitutional values can inform
common law litigation so as to assure accountability of private
regulation. The specific criteria or touchstones for private regula-
tion, discussed throughout Part II F, can be linked to fundamen-
tal constitutional values. In understanding these constitutional
values, one must recognize that not every constitutional value
must be applied in common law litigation. A process of selective
incorporation, roughly analogous to that utilized in giving content
to the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection obligation of
states, is appropriate.
Put in the most general terms, constitutional values of proce-
dural due process and substantive due process are appropriate
starting points for private regulatory accountability. Procedural
due process requires, at a minimum, that persons affected by a
decision be given notice of a proposed decision before it is made
and also given an opportunity to be heard.44 Judge Henry J.
Friendly deconstructed procedural due process into some eleven
elements of procedure that can be imposed depending on their
utility and on the nature of the interests involved.447 Procedural
due process requirements have been codified for rulemaking 48
and adjudication449 by federal administrative agencies in the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act.45°
Substantive due process requires rational decisionmaking
and obligates decisionmakers to justify their decisions by refer-
446 Procedural due process requirements for legislative decisionmaking are considera-
bly different from procedural due process requirements for adjudicative decisionmaking.
"The due process clause sets a significantly lower bar for legislative functions." New York
State Terry Foods, Inc v Northeast Terry Compact Commission, 198 F3d 1, 13 (1st Cir
1999) (rejecting challenge to decision to set minimum milk prices, and finding no violation
of due process because decisionmaker board provided for industry representation); Na-
tional Small Shipment Traffic Conference, Inc v Interstate Commerce Commission, 725
F2d 1442, 1447-48 (DC Cir 1984) (notice and comment procedures rather than adversarial
hearing well suited for legislative-type decisionmaking; context was administrative law
rather than constitutional due process).
447 See Perritt, 15 Ohio St J on Disp Resol at 677-78 (cited in note 80) (noting that
Friendly's "list of procedural elements represents a kind of menu," and that "[als one
moves down the list, more formality and more fairness are present, albeit at increased
cost").
448 5 USC § 553 (2000) (requiring, for example, general notice of all rulemaking in the
Federal Register in the absence of actual notice to those subject to such rules, and that
"[e]ach agency shall give an interested party the right to petition for the issuance,
amendment, or repeal of a rule").
449 See id at §§ 554-59 (discussing opportunities for and requirements of agency hear-
ings).
450 See id at §§ 551-706.
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ence to objective facts and legitimate interests within their com-
petence. Substantive due process is codified for decisions by fed-
eral administrative agencies in the "arbitrary and capricious" and
"abuse of discretion" standards for judicial review of such deci-
sions.451 These standards apply both to rulemaking452 and adjudi-
catory453 decisions.
Both of these values should inform scrutiny of private regula-
tory decisions relating to the internet. Other constitutional val-
ues, such as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and
the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures are
likely to implicate sharper conflicts between competing interests
of the actor and the aggrieved party. Therefore, they should be
used more sparingly.454
3. Subject matter competence.
Few rulemaking institutions have unlimited subject matter
competence. Congress must act within powers conferred by the
United State Constitution. State legislatures must act within the
limits of state constitutions and so as not to conflict with federal
law or impede interstate commerce. Administrative agencies
must act only with respect to subject matter defined by statute,
which must be expressed in a manner consistent with the non-
delegation doctrine. The ICANN MOU limits ICANN rulemaking
power to "technical matters" relating to administration of the
domain name system.455
Some hints of limitations on subject matter competence are
visible in intentional interference cases in which interference
451 Id at § 706(2)(A).
452 See Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Assn of the United States, Inc v State Farm Mu-
tual Automobile Ins Co, 463 US 29, 41 (1983) (holding that actions of an agency "under the
informal rulemaking procedures of § 553 ... may be set aside if found to be 'arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law'"), citing 5 USC
§ 706(2)(A).
453 See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc v Volpe, 401 US 402, 413-14 (1971),
overruled on other grounds by Califano v Sanders, 430 US 99 (1977) (holding that "in all
cases agency action must be set aside if the action was 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law' or if the action failed to meet statu-
tory, procedural, or constitutional requirements"), citing 5 USC §§ 706(2) (A), (B), (C), (D).
454 See Turner Broadcasting System, Inc v FCC, 520 US 180, 192-93, 217-18 (1997)
(reviewing the competing First Amendment expressive interests of those wanting access to
communications channels and those controlling such channels); Skinner v Railway Labor
Executives' Association, 489 US 602, 619 (1989) (discussing the competing interests of
employers and employees when employers conduct employee searches that implicate the
Fourth Amendment interests of employees).
455 See ICANN MOU at III B (cited in note 60).
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with contractual relations is found to be improper or to abuse a
conditional privilege because the motives are "extraneous" to the
matters legitimate to the relationship.45 This means that judges
applying the common law to internet-related private governance
decisions should view the decisions of an entity that has narrowly
defined regulatory competence more sympathetically than those
of an entity that can range broadly into various subject matters.
This makes sense because a decisionmaker knowing she has nar-
row boundaries for legitimate action is more likely to restrain
herself.457 Dinwoodie makes much of narrowing decisionmaking
authority as a mechanism for improving legitimacy.45
4. Rationality.
Freeman says that rules should be "rational."459 The APA re-
quires that they not be "arbitrary or capricious."46 ° Substantive
due process and equal protection require that, at a minimum,
rules have a "rational basis."461 Antitrust law requires that pri-
vate standards be justified by objective rationality.462
One can infer from these requirements a deep sense in the
legal tradition that accountability requires rationality. The prob-
lems in implementing the value of rationality include allocating
decisional responsibility between the first instance decision-
maker-a legislature, agency or private regulator-and the re-
viewer, usually a court. Further, the legal system must determine
what interests are legitimate bases for a rule, and which interests
may not be considered. It must determine how close the nexus
456 Schwanbeck v Federal-Mogul Corp, 578 NE2d 789, 803 (Mass App 1991) (stating
that improper conduct, which may include ulterior motive or wrongful means, is an ele-
ment of intentional interference with contractual relations), revd on other grounds, 592
NE2d 1289 (Mass 1992).
457 This pertains to Dinwoodie's "internal checking functions." See Helfer and Din-
woodie, 43 Wm & Mary L Rev at 210-13 (cited in note 214).
458 See id at § II (B)(1)(c) (reviewing narrowing of scope of eligible disputes during pre-
ICANN discussions); § II (B)(3)(c) (ICANN's narrowing the scope of eligible disputes).
459 Freeman, NYU L Rev at 598 (cited in note 42) (need for devices to assure rational-
ity).
460 5 USC § 706(2)(A).
461 See People of State of California v FCC, 905 F2d 1217, 1238 (9th Cir 1990)
("[A]rbitrary and capricious' review under the APA does not permit us to impute reasons
to the agency and uphold its action if it has any conceivable rational basis.").
462 See, for example, Allied Tube, 486 US at 500-01 (noting that although "private
standard-setting associations have traditionally been objects of antitrust scrutiny," if
'private associations promulgate safety standards based on the merits of objective expert
judgments and through procedures that prevent the standard-setting process from being
biased by members with economic interests in stifling product competition, those private
standards can have significant procompetitive advantages") (internal citations omitted).
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between the rule and the underlying interest must be, how free
the rulemaker is to choose among alternative approaches to pro-
tect the interest,463 and how logically and persuasively the rule-
maker must articulate the connection.
Rationality as a criterion for rulemaking works regardless of
the rulemaking situation. It can be applied to those in control of a
valuable resource, to those contractually enabled to make rules,
or to those rulemakers whose power stems from being delegated
by a public institution.
5. Scope of regulatory authority in terms of
persons and entities bound.
Legislative power, known in private international law as
"prescriptive jurisdiction," does not extend to the whole world.
Traditionally limited by geographic boundaries of a state,464 it
also can be limited to members of a "bargaining unit," in labor
law, to the members of a private association,465 or to subscribers
of an internet service provider.466 The challenge in hybrid regula-
tion is to define "citizen" of a private community in advance. Is it
anyone who crosses the "border?" What does "border" mean? Does
conduct, as in using a securities exchange or sending e-mail to
the subscribers of a particular service, work?
Determining the persons or entities bound by privately made
rules is especially problematic only in the fourth regulatory situa-
463 Herein lie the seeds of a requirement to show that a rule represents the least re-
strictive among a set of alternatives. An element of rationality is to adopt means narrowly
tailored to accomplish ends. Constitutional law scrutinizes state action that burdens fun-
damental rights or suspect classifications for overbreadth, and prefers narrowly tailored
means for pursuing legitimate state interests. The common law of intentional interference
with contractual relations scrutinizes means to make sure they are appropriately related
to legitimate interests. Common law review of private regulatory decisions should seek the
same congruence between means and legitimate ends.
464 See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, Introductory Note to Part IV, ch
1 at 237 (1987) (noting that "[tierritoriality and nationality remain the principal bases of
jurisdiction to prescribe"). See also id at §§ 402-03 (proscribing and circumscribing such
jurisdictional bases).
465 See Dallas County Medical Society v Ubinas-Brache, 2001 Tex App Lexis 818, *8-
14 (reviewing basic criteria for judicial oversight of private association decisions; linking
applicability of private rules to membership); Malia v RCA Corp, 794 F2d 909, 912-13 (3d
Cir 1986) (holding that a collective bargaining agreement does not apply to management
position outside bargaining unit).
466 See America Online, Inc v IMS, 24 F Supp 2d 548, 550 (E D Va 1998) (affirming
summary judgment for AOL against defendant who sent bulk e-mail to AOL's subscrib-
ers); Cyber Promotions, Inc v America Online, Inc, 948 F Supp 436, 437 (E D Pa 1996)
(holding that "in the absence of State action, the private online service has the right to
prevent unsolicited e-mail solicitations from reaching its subscribers over the Internet").
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tion, where the regulatory authority arises from control of a valu-
able resource. When the basis for regulatory authority arises
from delegation by public institutions, the delegation can define
the universe of persons or entities to be regulated. Indeed, such a
definition is conceptually part of the "channelizing" necessary to
satisfy the nondelegation doctrine.467 When contract is the basis,
the universe of those regulated is defined by the universe of those
party to the contract. When acquiescence is the basis, the regu-
lated universe is determined by those acquiescing.
When regulatory authority is premised instead on control of a
valuable resource, the scope of the regulated population is as
broad as the universe of those using the resource. When the re-
source is traditional private property-a particular piece of com-
puter hardware, for example-the owner may condition use on
compliance with a set of rules, and those electing to use the re-
source under those conditions have implicitly consented to be sub-
ject to the rulemaking authority of the owner.
But when the resource is common, as is the internet in the
aggregate, this property-based mechanism for defining the uni-
verse of the regulated is less satisfying. The commons belongs as
much to the user as to the regulator, and there is no obvious rea-
son why 'the user should be subject to the will of the regulator.
This is the situation with MAPS and its likely imitators.
6. Congruence.
Congruence exists when policies, and their application or en-
forcement, result from actions and decisions by a group substan-
tially the same as the group that bears the impacts-at least the
negative impacts-of those policies.46 When the regulated popu-
lation makes the rules, either directly or through fairly elected
representatives, congruence is realized. Notwithstanding
Netanel's arguments, developed in Part I B, private ordering of-
ten produces more congruence than state-based decisions. Indeed,
467 See Yakus v United States, 321 US 414, 424-25 (1944) (noting that the nondelega-
tion doctrine is satisfied "when Congress has specified the basic conditions of fact upon
whose existence or occurrence, ascertained from relevant data by a designated adminis-
trative agency, it directs that its statutory command shall be effective," and therefore "[i]t
is no objection that the determination of facts and the inferences to be drawn from them in
the light of the statutory standards and declaration of policy call for the exercise of judg-
ment, and for the formulation of subsidiary administrative policy within the prescribed
statutory framework").
468 David R. Johnson suggested congruence as an important value in his comments on
an earlier version of this article.
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that may be why the subsidiarity principle so often is honored by
allowing private groups to make decisions while traditional gov-
ernment authorities abstain.
ICANN can produce congruence, if its election and represen-
tation mechanisms can be perfected. Indeed, the desire for con-
gruence is why so much controversy exists over development of
those mechanisms. On the other hand, MAPS is not congruent
because its proprietors decide what the rules are and cut off any-
one else who will not follow their rules. Those potentially bur-
dened are completely different from the decisionmaker.
Markets do not necessarily assure congruence. Various
asymmetries may allow one side of a reciprocal relationship to
impose self-interested rules on the other side. On the other hand,
governments do not always produce congruence either. The tyr-
anny of the majority469 also exists in public institutions, and even
when institutional mechanisms exist to protect minorities, trans-
action costs may prevent them asserting their interests. Devolv-
ing regulatory power to lower, private levels may produce better
congruence. Public policy aimed at improving congruence can fo-
cus on reducing choke points rather than on enforcing account-
ability rules.
Choke points may be governmental as well as private. Ac-
cordingly, the public policy key to eliminate choke points may
focus on switching costs associated with abandoning one's sover-
eign's law in preference for another sovereign. This possibility is
enshrined in private international law as a longstanding willing-
ness to honor party choice of substantive law when it does not
conflict with important public policies.47°
7. Rulemaking process.
Procedural due process, notice-and-comment rulemaking un-
der the APA, requirements for private standard setting organiza-
tions derived from the antitrust laws, and norms for rulemaking
by private associations exhibit similarities. Persons likely to be
affected by rules are entitled to notice of the proposed rule and an
opportunity to comment on it.471 The rulemaker must take the
469 See Part I B 2; Romer v Evans, 517 US 620 (1996).
470 See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187 (1971).
471 See 5 USC § 706(2)(A) (1994). Private associations must afford their members due
process and must follow their own bylaws. Austin v American Association of Neurological
Surgeons, 47 F Supp 2d 941, 942 (N D Ill 1999) (denying summary judgment so evidence
can be presented on compliance with due process and bylaws in suit against private physi-
cians' association; applying Illinois law).
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comments into account in making a final decision to promulgate
rules, and (sometimes) must articulate the factual and legal basis
for the rule. Labor law is less demanding, although the duty of
fair representation in the bargaining context requires procedural
fairness in setting the bargaining agenda and reaching a final
negotiated compromise between employer and union positions.472
COPPA borrows APA rulemaking concepts by requiring that a
private arrangement for protecting children's privacy be pub-
lished in the Federal Register and subject to review by the FTC,
in light of comments received in response to the notice.473
What purpose do these procedural requirements serve? Can
that purpose be served by imposing procedural requirements on
private rulemaking? One purpose of the APA notice and comment
requirements is to generate a record for judicial review. Unless a
path to judicial review of the merits of a decision exists, this pur-
pose is nullified. Two other purposes exist, however: enhancing
rational decisionmaking, and testing for political consensus.
Netanel suggests that liberal democracy seeks to identify
consent and collective choice as foundations of legitimacy.474 Al-
though Netanel did not probe the relationship of procedure to this
aspect of liberal democracy, notice and comment rulemaking re-
lates to consent and to collective choice in the following ways.
First, it ascertains collective choice in a rough way. The aggre-
gate of comments on a proposed rule manifest the collective will
of those commenting. Together with the content of the proposed
rule and the silence of those not commenting, the comments com-
prise a rulemaking record that expresses the collective choice of
those affected by the rule. From a consent perspective, silence in
a face of the proposed rule indicates consent that it be promul-
gated. Commenting indicates consent that a rule, altered to ac-
commodate the comments, be promulgated.
The set of those entitled to participate in the rulemaking
process is linked conceptually to the set of those bound by the
472 White v White Rose Food, 237 F3d 174, 183 (2d Cir 2001) (explaining relaxed stan-
dards for the duty of fair representation in connection with negotiating new collective
bargaining agreements or amendments).
473 See 15 USC § 6502.
474 Netanel, 88 Cal L Rev at 407-10 (cited in note 5):
Individuals decide, or rational individuals would decide, to establish a
state to serve their private ends. The state thus arises from, and its le-
gitimacy depends upon, the express or tacit consent of individuals. The
state, in turn, may rightfully exercise its authority only in accordance
with the terms of that "social contract."
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rule. In small associations, it is common, though not legally re-
quired, for all members to participate in formulating rules
through discussions at meetings such as annual conventions.
Everyone potentially bound by the rule is entitled to participate.
In larger associations, everyone potentially bound by a rule is
entitled to vote in electing representatives, who determine rules
directly. The larger and more diffuse the population affected by
rules, the greater the difficulty in designing a participatory proc-
ess for deliberating over rules. One of the problems with ICANN
has been the difficulty in defining populations entitled to vote for
representatives on the board of directors empowered to adopt
rules. When negotiated rulemaking supplements traditional
agency rulemaking, emphasis is placed on constructing a rule
negotiation committee that includes representatives of the major
affected interests.4 5
But despite these conceptual and practical difficulties with
process requirements, notice and comment rulemaking, whether
conducted by a public or a private entity, tests for consensus.476
The consensus may be more relevant when it can be determined
for a pre-defined community, and when that community is coter-
minous with the community being regulated.
As with any consensus-based regulation, rebels, who are of-
ten also innovators, are problematic. Rebels are prepared to defy
consensus, and the law must determine whether they must con-
form. But this is no different for private than for public regula-
tion. The rulemaking "record" will not necessarily be different for
a record developed through notice and comment rulemaking con-
ducted by a public agency than it will be with a record developed
by a private entity using essentially the same process, assuming
the notice is equally effective in both cases. This is assuming that
interested parties take the possibility of a private rule as seri-
ously as they would take the possibility of a public rule.477
475 See Negotiated Rulemaking Procedure, 5 USC § 561 et seq (1994) (noting that the
purpose of the enacted procedure is to "establish a framework for the conduct of negotiated
rulemaking").
476 Accord Helfer and Dinwoodie, 43 Wm & Mary L Rev at 253-55 (cited in note 214)
(urging improved direct representation and voting structures for ICANN, even while ex-
pressing skepticism that ICANN can overcome past criticisms of inadequate representa-
tion procedures to underpin rulemaking).
477 A health care professional (Mitchell T. Bergmann) consulted by the author regard-
ing the procedures used by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals and Health
Care Organizations ("JCAHO") was puzzled why anyone would be interested in having the
standards made by a governmental agency rather than by the JCAHO, which relies on
consensus within the covered health care professions.
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Suppose the law obligates MAPS or a similar organization to
follow notice and comment rulemaking. Apart from the difficulty
of defining the universe of those entitled to notice and allowed to
submit comments, what purpose is served? Suppose the proprie-
tor of MAPS is determined to adopt a double opt-in rule for UCE.
Suppose further that those handling UCE oppose the rule. How
are their interests protected more if they are given notice of the
double opt-in rule and allowed to submit comments opposing it,
than if the proprietor of MAPS issues the final rule as soon as he
thinks of it? Shall MAPS be forbidden to adopt the rule if all the
comments oppose it? That would protect the interests of the ob-
jecting parties, but also would go beyond requirements imposed
on administrative agencies. And it would turn notice and com-
ment rulemaking into a kind of plebiscite. In the face of over-
whelming comments opposing the proposed rule, may the MAPS
proprietor nevertheless adopt a double opt-in rule if he suffi-
ciently justifies it and rebuts the arguments made by comment-
ers? Such a requirement draws rulemaking procedure closer to
the rationality requirement-not necessarily a bad result, but one
which blurs the two criteria, and diminishes the power of requir-
ing certain rulemaking procedures as opposed to requiring ra-
tionality alone.
Thomas Grey says that the purpose of procedural require-
ments is to promote good decisionmaking.475 That is a different
justification from consensus testing. Majorities, even unanimous
ones, can make irrational decisions. Objectively rational decisions
may not command a consensus. But notice and comment rule-
making may promote better, more rational decisionmaking.4"9
Even if a decision maker is not bound in any formal legal sense
by the "record" generated through the notice And comment proc-
ess, she will be embarrassed if she makes a decision obviously
inconsistent with that record unless she persuasively explains
why a deviant decision is appropriate. Often it will be easier to
conform the decision to the record than to explain why it differs.
478 Thomas C. Grey, Procedural Fairness and Substantive Rights, in J. Roland Pen-
nock and John W. Chapman, eds, Nomos XVIII: Due Process 182, 184 (1977):
The rules and principles of procedural fairness (in the narrow sense) all
are designed to promote the correct decision of disputes. All of them tend
to ensure that facts will be found more accurately or that evaluations will
be made more reasonably and impartially than would be the case if they
were not in force.
479 Id.
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Why do legislatures use notice and comment procedures,
usually giving notice of proposed legislation by introducing a bill,
and then holding hearings to receive comments on the proposal?
It is not because they are constitutionally obligated to follow
those procedures, or that they fear being forced by a court to use
them. One reason for the prevalence of such procedures is that
they allow elected officials to test the political wind. If a represen-
tative is elected on an anti-abortion platform, he may have little
idea about the views of his constituency on internet privacy. He
may stumble into a political buzz-saw unless legislative hearings
provide a way to smoke out public opinion.
But notice and comment processes in legislatures serve an-
other purpose. Sometimes, the ideas embodied in introduced bills
seem sensible, but are really stupid, when considered in the con-
text of a deeper understanding of the problem. Public notice of
proposed legislation and hearings on the proposals help to distin-
guish the wise from the foolish proposals, to enhance rational de-
cisionmaking. This is so not because any court threatened to im-
prison legislators for contempt if they do not engage in the notice
and comment process; it is so because the populace generally un-
derstands the substantive benefits of notice and comment in the
legislative process, and because notice and comment have come to
be the norm.
What's good enough for the goose (public legislature) should
be good enough for the gander (private legislature). Transparent
process is expected of elected legislatures, even though their
members could say, "We stood for election; we got elected; we owe
you no other explanation." That it is expected and honored evi-
dences the utility in promoting accountability. It is similarly
valuable whether the "legislators" are public or private.
8. Review by independent entity.
Access to the courts to prevent-or to recover damages for-
unlawful interference with legally recognized interests is funda-
mental to the rule of law.48° When the sovereign is the actor, ac-
cess to the courts takes the form of judicial review. But, as Dean
Krent has explained, judicial review is not the only mechanism to
assure accountability; other public institutions can exercise over-
480 Abdul-Akbar v McKelvie, 239 F3d 307, 326 (3d Cir 2000) ("[Tjhe court has repeat-
edly recognized the fundamental importance of the right of access to courts."). Judicial
review is a paradigm of Dinwoodie's external checking function. Helfer and Dinwoodie, 43
Wm & Mary L Rev at 201-10 (cited in note 214) (explaining external checking function).
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sight as well.48' At its most basic level, accountability exists as
long as a legislature has power to enact a statute that divests a
private regulator of authority or that limits exercise of authority.
But legislative action requires mobilization of significant political
will, and the theoretical possibility of legislative response if the
exercise of private regulatory power exceeds acceptable limits
may be a thin reed.
Far more satisfactory for those adversely affected by private
regulatory action is the possibility of a lawsuit to test compliance
with other touchstones of accountability. In the first two private
regulatory situations, judicial review of agency action482 and ac-
tions for breach of contract provide pathways to the courts. It is
in the fourth situation where access to the courts may be prob-
lematic. This is the subject of Part II D 4, analyzing possible
causes of action to obtain review of private rulemaking.
But there is a problem with review of private regulatory ac-
tion in the regular national courts: it tends to vitiate the benefits
of private regulation as a way of dealing with transnational ju-
risdictional problems.4"" It is far from clear what international
institutions might be constructed to provide independent review
of private regulatory decisions, mitigating the need for review in
national courts if there is to be any review at all.484 But when
481 See Krent, 85 Nw U L Rev at 101 (cited in note 40) (discussing not only the ways in
which the executive branch can exercise accountability, but also pointing to "possible
substitutes for the public accountability that executive branch control ensures," external
checks like "the self-interest of a different sovereign governmental entity, the self-interest
of a particular industry, judicial review, or market forces").
482 But see Froomkin, 50 Duke L J at 27 (cited in note 27) (noting that the DoC-ICANN
relationship eliminates "the prospect of any meaningful judicial review").
483 See Perritt, 88 Ky L J at 921 (cited in note 37) (discussing the problem of jurisdic-
tion as it relates to the internet, noting that the internet "encourage [s] greater reliance on
private ordering as part of the international legal system" because "people have been
thinking seriously about whether traditional jurisdictional rules are adequate for the
Internet or whether new approaches are necessary"); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Economic and
Other Barriers to Electronic Commerce, 21 U Pa J Intl Econ Law 563, 574 (2000)
("[J]urisdictional uncertainties associated with transnational commerce on the Internet
can be reduced when rules are made and enforced by private rather than public institu-
tions.").
484 The U.S./EU Safe Harbor Privacy Principles provides for transnational review of
private regulatory decisions by setting minimum standards for private rules and providing
backup enforcement in national institutions. Safe Harbor Privacy Principles, issued by the
U.S. Department of Commerce (July 21, 2000), available online at <http://www.export.gov/
safeharbor/SHPRINCIPLESFINAL.htm> (visited Feb 2, 2001) [on file with U Chi Legal
Fl.
Of course international review bodies may present their own problems of account-
ability. See Perritt, 51 Admin L Rev 871 (cited in note 40) (exploring constitutionality of
international regulatory agencies for the internet).
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such institutions exist, the need for probing review in national
courts is reduced.
9. Relationships among variables-tighter control
for broader authority.
The criteria for rulemaking accountability are not orthogo-
nal; they are interdependent. Notice and comment rulemaking
enables more robust judicial review, and reinforces the rational-
ity requirements. All the other criteria are severely weakened in
the absence of judicial review.
Professor Freeman argues that "aggregate accountability" is
what matters.4"5 Thus, a private rulemaker subject to demon-
strated contractual constraints might plausibly have more flexi-
bility with respect to rationality and procedural regularity. One
that employs disinterested expert decisionmakers with lots of
legislative "due process" might be subjected to only loose judicial
review. But a decisionmaker free of these controls might be sub-
ject to much more searching judicial review, and much more rig-
orous rationality standards, including a requirement to show that
any restriction adopted is the least restrictive among a set of al-
ternatives.
10. Avoidance of common carrier obligation: preserving
the rights of proprietorship.
Any rules of thumb for improving accountability of private
rulemaking must avoid overreaching. One of the difficulties in
developing legal theories for judicial review of private rulemaking
is that the theories intrude upon the prerogatives of the operators
of private networks. Millions of autonomous networks are con-
nected to the internet, and any legal theory that would subject all
of their acceptable use policies to judicial scrutiny would be both
undesirable and unenforceable. Merely connecting to the internet
and opening one's network to internet traffic should not make one
a common carrier. How can individual ISPs, content providers,
employers and indeed individuals organizing discussion groups or
publishing web pages avoid being treated as common carriers?
Surely not every autonomous network connected to the internet
485 Freeman, 75 NYU L Rev at 664 (cited in note 42) ("Even in the absence of tight
government control, a public/private regime characterized by multiple and overlapping
checks might produce enough aggregate accountability to assure us of its legitimacy.") She
includes internal private procedural rules, responsiveness to market pressures, and in-
formal norms of compliance.
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should be obligated to justify its terms of service and acceptable
use policies.
The nature of the internet means that any network operator
that makes rules for use of its own network facilities almost cer-
tainly will exclude some uses technically possible through the
internet. The operator may exclude some incoming mail, some
types of access by internal network users to external web pages,
and some types of discussion involving both internal and external
users. So there is a need for further rules of thumb that would
distinguish entities whose rules are subject to judicial scrutiny
from those internet participants who are not.
The first such rule of thumb distinguishes entities whose
rules are subject to judicial scrutiny from common carriers. The
scope of judicial scrutiny does not include a duty to build out net-
work facilities to accommodate all those requesting service.
Second, this Article does not suggest a duty to accept every-
one; only a duty to be rational and to use reasonable process. The
distinction between someone subject to these duties and a com-
mon carrier is analogous to the distinction between an employer
obligated to dismiss employees only for good cause as that might
be defined by law, and an employer obligated to use reasonable
procedures to resolve disputed factual issues incident to a dis-
missal from employment.486
A third rule of thumb would distinguish autonomous net-
works from entities exercising rulemaking power with broader
scope. For example, one possibility is to subject to judicial review
only rules that affect more than one autonomous network. This
would exempt employers and individual retail ISPs. This rule of
thumb would distinguish between rules aimed only at those with
an affiliation with the rulemaking entity from rules aimed at
those lacking an affiliation. Thus, theories other than contract
would protect strangers, while the flexibility of contract regimes
would protect both the service provider and customers of that
service provider. In less formal language, this rule of thumb
would say, "you can make rules for your own property but if you
make rules for other peoples' property you must justify the rules
and use fair process in making them."
486 Cotran v Rollins Hudig Hall International, Inc, 69 Cal Rptr 2d 900, 910 (1998)
(holding that an employer must conduct an adequate investigation in determining
whether good cause for employment termination exists).
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A fourth distinction, analogous to the public-use inquiry in
First Amendment law,487 would distinguish entities that make
rules only for the use of private spaces by a defined class of per-
sons engaged in regular activities there from spaces that have
been opened up to the public. Even as to spaces that have been
opened up to a public, the sponsor should be able to impose rea-
sonable restrictions as to subject matter, civility, and charges for
access. The justification, impropriety, and rule of reason inquiries
in prima facie tort, intentional interference, and antitrust law488
provide ample analytical frameworks for assessing these possi-
bilities.
The rule of thumb immunizing autonomous network Accept-
able Use Policies would not exempt backbone providers. But
emerging controversies over peering arrangements by large back-
bone providers may well result in some measure of regulatory or
judicial oversight anyway, and the benchmarks for rulemaking
suggested in this Article are completely compatible with the pos-
sibility of such oversight.
CONCLUSION
Even as the benefits of private regulation of the internet
have been recognized more broadly, concerns have increased that
purely private regulation may undermine democratic values and
the rule of law. The best way to achieve the benefits of private
regulation while also assuring public accountability traditionally
associated with regulation by traditional governmental entities is
to develop hybrid systems of regulation in which public law pro-
vides broad frameworks within which private regulation can
work out the details. The most ambitious hybrid regulatory
framework is ICANN, which has come under increasing criticism
for insufficient accountability.
But a greater threat exists. Private regulation can occur
through the development of blacklists or filters embodied in com-
puter code that enforces privately developed rules by blocking
significant parts of the internet. There, traditional legal regimes
to police delegated governmental power or to assure against
abuse of contractual relationships does not exist. The law must
evolve traditional tort theories of intentional interference with
contractual relations and public nuisance and relax some of the
487 Cornelius v NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc, 473 US 788, 801
(1985).
488 See Part II D 4.
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limitations imposed on antitrust liability to assure that these pri-
vate rule makers are accountable to basic principles of democracy
and rule of law. Despite the criticism of ICANN, at least ICANN
attempts to provide a mechanism for representation of affected
interests in making and revising its rules. Early deployment of
private filters and blacklists involve no such attempt.
No one knows enough yet to write a good statute to assure
accountability across such a broad spectrum of private regulatory
action. Until everyone gains more experience, the common law
can crystallize the issues and the alternatives. It should provide a
more sympathetic safe harbor for private regulatory regimes that
include assurances of rationality and fair process and scrutinize
more closely those that lack such assurances.
